

**Global Bourdieu and Nigeria –
Studying African Perspectives on (In)Security**

by

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Abstract

African states are increasingly emerging as key actors for both the good and the bad in global politics, as local success stories and severe socio-political problems intersect with what some call the New Scramble for Africa. Questions and developments related to African security and insecurity are thus fundamentally relevant for both African societies and the geopolitical and geoeconomic imagination and praxis. Yet sound engagements with genuine *African perspectives on (in)security* are scarce, and it remains unclear how African states shape their security policies to deal with their very own security challenges for two reasons: First, conventional distinctions of what is internal/external, domestic/foreign, secure/insecure or political/sociological are outdated, since they are traversed by multiple, complex and interrelated socio-political practices and relations in today's social world. Second, neither can the conventional Western/Northern-centric social sciences make sense of the African condition and context, nor can the helpful-in-this-regard African Studies and African International Relations literatures escape their own pre-established essentialisms, pessimistic stereotypes, and mono-causal explanations. Motivated by this conundrum, this thesis argues for the *development of new analytical devices to study how African states' security policies are shaped in less essentialist and more context-sensitive ways*. To do so, it argues for understanding the practice turn in the social sciences and for *appropriating Pierre Bourdieu's reflexive, practice-theoretical, and field-analytical sociology by an in-depth sociospatial reading of his work*. This helps us interpret and employ his key concepts as truly global, interrelated, and practical *thinking tools* to approach empirical realities in African social formations, against the backdrop of an often superficial and misrepresenting Bourdieusian International Studies literature. Using complex and fragile *Nigeria as a decidedly empirical, exploratory case study*, this thesis makes the case for and traces how the tools of field and habitus intersect, carves out its key object of analysis and tool of a *Field of Nigerian Security Policy* (FNSP), and thinks the tools of habitus and capital primarily as an outcome of the empirical analysis. It asks the research question of *how Nigeria shapes its security policy towards the contemporary security challenge – or space of (in)security – of Boko Haram*, drawing upon almost four months of self-reflexive and ethnographic fieldwork. The empirical analysis maps the agents of a FNSP by a sociological discourse analysis of manifold textual sources and investigates the more informal insights of agents' habitus and capital(s) by conducting interviews with leading Nigerian experts and practitioners. It reveals how a FNSP is constituted and shaped by diverse agents, relations of (informal) cooperation, competition, domination, and transversality, a dual habitus of problems/scarcities and aspirations/necessities, and multiple (including negative) kinds of capital – and how agents' classificatory practices produce Nigeria's security policy towards Boko Haram eventually. Exploring African perspectives on (in)security with a globalised Bourdieu, this thesis thus develops the envisioned analytical device to study African social formations, which others can follow. It, thereby, advances the field of African International Relations in theoretical terms and offers deep insights into the Nigerian political space in practical terms.

For My Mum. In Endless Love.

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List of Abbreviations

ACF	Arewa Consultative Forum
ALS	Al-Shabaab, Somalia
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BEF	Borno Elders Forum
BIS	Bourdieuian International Studies
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
ch.	Chapter
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration
DHQ	Defence Headquarters
DSS/SSS	Department of State Services/State Security Service
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
en.	Endnote
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abuja
FG	Federal Government of Nigeria
fn.	Footnote
FNSP	Field of Nigerian Security Policy
HOR	House of Representatives
ICC	Intelligence Community Committee
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IPS	International Political Sociology
IPT	International Practice Theory
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
JIB	Joint Intelligence Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOI	Ministry of Information
NA	Nigerian Army
NACTEST	National Counter-Terrorism Strategy
NASS	National Assembly
NDC	National Defence College
NDCL	National Defence Council
NDP	National Defence Policy
NDR	Niger Delta Region

NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NILS	National Institute for Legislative Studies
NINSED	Nigerian Network on Security and Democratic Governance
NIPSS	National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies
NISS	National Institute for Security Studies
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council
NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NSS	National Security Strategy
ONSA	Office of the National Security Advisor
p.	Page
PCDSCN	Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North-East
PFPCVE	Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
SIRA	Society for International Relations Awareness
TM	The military (Armed Forces of Nigeria, AFN)

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1. Introduction

1.1 (African) International Relations, Nigeria, and How to Study African Security Policy

African¹ states are increasingly emerging as key actors for both the good and the bad in global politics, as local success stories and severe socio-political problems intersect with what some call the 'New Scramble for Africa' (Carmody 2011; Melber/Southhall 2009).² In so doing, they receive greater attention from academia, policy circles, and the media (Brown 2012; Abegunrin 2013; Brown/Harman 2013b). Scholars investigate postcolonial African states' trajectories and what 'African Agency' is (Brown/Harman 2013a). They explore differentiations in the global political economy, climate change, South-South alliances, regional powers, non-state actors, transnational forms of authority and rule, migration flows, democratisation processes, and the relationship between identity and culture (Hönke 2013; Cheru/Cornelissen/Shaw 2012; Nolte 2010). Once again, Africa is becoming – and this is not without problematic repercussions for research ethics – a (re)source to tap into for empirical research.

Yet how to soundly study the ways in which African states' *security policies* are shaped remains unclear in the current global juncture: First, considering how today's multiplicity of social and political practices and relations modifies and transcends what has conventionally been understood as spaces of the internal and external, domestic and foreign, secure and insecure – leading to a complex and ever-shifting intermingling of *objective* social forces and contextual registers with *subjective* dispositions and imaginations of agents. Second, considering how the constructed, negotiated, and contested nature of Africa's political spaces conflict with both conventional Western/Northern-centric social sciences and – to a lesser degree – alternative representations of *African Studies* and *African International Relations*, since these fields of inquiry remain trapped in their *pre-established, de-historicised, and de-contextualised modes of reasoning* (see Sections 1.2 and 1.3). In the last analysis, they often tend to hinder our understanding through the misleading power of their very own and prevalent essentialisms and '*theoreticist readings*' (Wacquant 2014b: 128; emphasis in original; see Section 1.5 and Chapters 2-4).

¹ Following established conventions in the academic field of *African Politics*, I use the term *Africa* as a descriptor for the region of *sub-Saharan Africa* (Dunn/Englebert 2013: 14; for a continental view, see, Young 2012: 4).

² See, Kopinski et al. 2011; Taylor 2009; Taylor 2008; Alden 2007; Alden et al. 2008; Tjønneland 2014; The Economist 2000; The Economist 2013; Addo 2015; Kingsley 2015.

This thesis, therefore, argues for the development of *new analytical devices to study how African states' security policies are shaped in less essentialist and more context-sensitive ways*. Drawing upon the *practice turn* in the social sciences and International Political Sociology (IPS) (e.g., Knorr Cetina et al. 2001; Adler/Pouliot 2011a), this thesis argues that such analytical devices can be developed by appropriating the metatheoretical and methodological insights of Pierre Bourdieu's reflexive, practice-theoretical, and field-analytical sociology.³ By carving out and rendering useful an analytical device called *Field of Nigerian Security Policy* (FNSP) (see Section 1.5 and Chapters 2-4), I address this thesis' research question: *How does Nigeria shape its security policy towards the contemporary security challenge – or space of (in)security – of Boko Haram?* The focus is on *how*-questions for two, interrelated methodological reasons: First, as Chapter 4 shows, getting access to relevant security policy agents in Nigeria is highly restricted and trying to lay open their causal reasoning about security policy thus unviable.⁴ Second, asking *how*-questions is a fitting tactic to recognize the 'genetic' and 'reflexive' epistemological and ontological premises of Bourdieu's sociological project in the first place (Bourdieu 1988: 541; Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992b: 69; Bourdieu 2000: 31; Ashley 1987: 409). Although this thesis relies heavily on Bourdieu's sociology and its recent appropriation in International Studies, it is *not* (!) an attempt to develop a generalizable *Bourdieuian* security policy theory. The latter would thwart the very idea and foundation of his work and of this thesis.

In contrast, this thesis engages in-depth and critically with his work: It explores how by reading Bourdieu's sociology *sociospatially*, and by making the case for and tracing how his key concepts of *field* and *habitus* intersect, we can understand and use them as interrelated, *global thinking tools* to practically approach empirical realities in African social formations. This thesis uses West Africa's complex and fragile regional power Nigeria⁵ as an exploratory –

³ For Bourdieu's own work, see, for example, Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1990a; Bourdieu 1990b; Bourdieu 1991; Bourdieu 1996b; Bourdieu 1996c; Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu 2000; Bourdieu 2014; Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992a. His sociology is critically assessed in book-length by, among others, Calhoun et al. 1993; Danaher et al. 2002; Brown/Szeman 2000; Shusterman 1999; Swartz 2013b; Swartz 1997; Swartz/Zolberg 2005; Grennfell 2008; Susen/Turner 2011; Gorski 2013a; Hilgers/Mangez 2015a; Reed-Danahey 2005.

⁴ Similarly, I do not study this security challenge itself in-depth, since I can neither appropriately access it as an *outsider* (see Chapter 4), nor do I see the necessity as Nigerian and international experts did and do so extensively (see Section 1.3 and Chapters 5 and 6).

⁵ See, for example, Adebajo/Mustapha 2008; Adebaniwi/Obadare 2013a; Adebaniwi/Obadare 2011a; Adebaniwi/Obadare 2009a; Adejumbi 2011a; Adejumbi 2010a; Agbaje et al. 2007; Aghedo/Osumah 2010; Amuwo 2010; Eke/Tonwe 2013; Hill 2012; Kingsley 2014; Nanven Garba 1995; Olarinmoye 2008; Uduma 2013; Yagboyaju 2011; Hutchison/Johnson 2012; Falola/Heaton 2008.

that is, highly inductive and empirical – case study, since the country is not only a 'daunting singularity', but also 'a [great] template for examining [...] the African postcolonial state' with its different modalities and difficulties (Adebanwi/Obadare 2013b: 4, 5; Adebanwi/Obadare 2011b: 1; Adebanwi/Obadare 2010: 387; Alumona et al. 2019b: 2). To study this African postcolonial state's 'social universe', we need a 'different reading' (Bourdieu 1985: 724; Bigo/Madsen 2011: 219). A reading that allows us, as Adebanwi and Obadare have it, to explore 'how the past, present and future of Nigeria mix and mesh in the (re)production of a *particular instance* of postcolonial mess', that is, a mess consisting of diverse 'historical and dialectical dimensions' (Adebanwi/Obadare 2011b: 5, 21; my emphasis). Having established the general purpose of this thesis, the next four sections situate my key arguments by demonstrating why we need new analytical devices to study how African states' security policies are shaped, why and how I focus on Nigeria and Boko Haram, and why Bourdieu helps us with all of that.

1.2 From African IR to Nigeria and Nigerian Studies

The premises introduced thus far are based on the wider claim that Western/Northern-centric interpretations of International Relations (IR) fail to capture the complexities of the African context. This claim is derived from an academic field Tieku and others have called 'African' International Relations (African IR) (Tieku 2014). Conceiving of such a field and its key contributions,⁶ it tries to cope with the various bridges, detours, and blind alleys among the discipline of IR and African (Area) Studies. Using the term *African* IR poses an important question: To what extent is it possible to speak about and make use of a common denominator such as *African(ness)*? Does not speaking about African IR and African agency inevitably lead to the risk of essentialising social conditions and political life in Africa and to trivialise *difference*? On the one hand, this risk should always be considered. On the other hand, Brown argues that the 'shared history' of African states in the international realm allows for the use of such a denominator (Brown 2012: 1891; Brown/Harman 2013a). Bayart also sees a 'relative commonality of historical destiny' in Africa which 'allows us to *construct a*

⁶ See, for example, Abrahamsen 2017; Taylor 2010; Taylor 2004; Taylor/Williams 2004; Lemke 2011; Lemke 2003; Clapham 2005; Clapham 1996; Brown 2012; Brown 2006; Brown/Harman 2013a; Brown/Harman 2013b; Jones 2005; Cheru et al. 2012; Dunn/Shaw 2001; Engel/Olson 2005; Engel/Nugent 2009; Reno 2009a; Reno 2001; Death 2013; Mazrui 1977; Khadiagala/Lyons 2001; Smith 2009.

scientific object, to circumscribe a political area in a [non-positivist] comparative perspective' (Bayart 2009: 34; my emphasis and addition). In a similar fashion, I draw upon Bourdieu and attempt the 'construction of a scientific object' concerning Nigeria's security policy (Bourdieu 1992: 235).

This Africa-specific body of literature is part of wider discussions about the location and source of knowledge production in International Studies, and whether and to what extent theoretical frameworks produced in the West/North can be transferred onto social contexts beyond their original habitat. The question becomes: '[H]ow well does IR "travel" around the globe? (Death 2013: 763; Karp 1997). Even though there is a growing awareness in the literature how vital it is to broaden and/or shift the basis of knowledge production,⁷ scepticism is appropriate: Perspectives, voices, and practices from the Global South are still too often not heard, mapped, and valued. While African IR and Africanist scholars seem less absolute in their critique of a more diverse IR today, many still claim that Western/Northern discourses and 'academic theorizing' on African politics remain pessimistic and pathological (e.g., the 'name-calling' of African states), and that liberal-individualist understandings of political life and Eurocentric conceptions of statehood, authority, and sovereignty do not – or only insufficiently – represent the African context (Adebanwi/Obadare 2009b: 10; Brown/Harmann 2013b: 76, 71ff.; Adejumo 2011b: 7; Aiyede 2013: 118). To some extent, Africa would be enduringly misrepresented as a place of failure, disorder, and economic irrelevance and, hence, marginalised in thinking about global politics. Compared to the assumed ideal world of the West/North and its idea of widely sovereign and coherent states, Africa would 'always be [seen as] a problematic other' (Brown/Harman 2013b: 69).

This critical stance towards IR's (in)ability to understand and represent the African context is based on several empirical observations and theoretical premises: The role the state plays in the social fabric of African societies and the varying forms of state society relations are commonly used as the primary differentiation. Scholars call for ways to 'contextualise and unpack the nature of the state' in Africa by exploring how it operates, how it is constituted by competing and/or collaborating social groups, and how their practices shape the different ways of governing (Söderbaum/Taylor 2007: 5; Söderbaum/Taylor 2009; Brown 2012; Dunn

⁷ See, for example, Tickner 2003; Bhambra 2014; Bilgin 2008; Comaroff/Comaroff 2012; Blaney/Inayatullah 2004; Blaney/Tickner 2012; Alden et al. 2010; Connell 2007a; Connell 2007b; Connell 2006; Acharya 2014; Acharya/Buzan 2019; Acharya/Buzan 2010; Kayaoglu 2010; Peters/Wemheuer-Vogelaar 2016.

2009a; Dunn 2001). While Jackson analysed some time ago how the 'quasi states' of the Third World lack *positive sovereignty* and *empirical statehood* (i.e., an internal monopoly of violence and capability to defend themselves) (Jackson 1990; Jackson/Rosberg 1982), Clapham and others further develop these arguments and conceive of the volatile and relational nature of statehoods in Africa in terms of *degrees* and as empirical phenomena describing *continua* (Clapham 1998; Clapham 1996; Ayoob 1995; Lemke 2003; Dokken 2008; Bates 2008; Herbst 2000; Boone 2003).⁸ In addition, IR misses that regional and transnational social relations are mainly the product of political elites' rationales on regime security, of the role played by *micro-regionalisms* (e.g., informal networks of actors and their cross-border economic and security practices), and of regionalised violent conflicts weaving together unstable alliances of political elites in (neighbouring) weak states, rebel groups, local populations, refugees, and private military companies. Regions in Africa have different degrees of *region-ness* and should be considered as fluid social spaces constantly being (re)build by local to global actors' practices engaging in processes of regionalisation on different geographical scales.⁹ Considering these complex social environments, scholars see 'transboundary formations' at work *transnationalising* the state in Africa and leading to the permanent creation, transformation, and destruction of forms of territorial order and socio-political authority (Callaghy et al. 2001; Engel/Olsen 2012). Contrasting IR's ideal-typically relatively resourceful Westphalian state, the regularly fragile socio-economic conditions and limited resources of postcolonial African states necessitate the navigation by, and strengthen the role of, political elites and charismatic presidents (Khadiagala/Lyons 2001). For example, Bayart focuses on different domestic actors' strategies of accumulation and survival, and Reno on political elites' strategies to privatise, criminalise, and weaken the state via networks with (external) warlords and companies to defeat internal rivals and perpetuate systems of economic exploitation (Bayart 2009; Reno 2009a; Reno 2009b; Reno 2001; Reno 1999; Bayart et al. 1999; Mbembe 2001; Böge et al. 2009). The next section explores the specificities of the case of Nigeria in more detail.

⁸ For discussions ranging from so-called weak to collapsed states in Africa and the Global South, see, for example, Bethke/Bueger 2014; Call 2011; Call 2008; Di John 2010; Lambach 2008; Sørensen 2007; Zartman 1995.

⁹ See, for example, Bøås/Hentz 2003; Grant/Söderbaum 2003; Shaw/Söderbaum 2003; Söderbaum/Taylor 2007; Söderbaum/Taylor 2009; Francis 2006; Dokken 2008; Salehyan 2007; Buzan/Wæver 2003.

1.3 From Nigeria and Nigerian Studies to Boko Haram

Turning to *Nigerian politics*, those studying the country initially highlight how British colonial 'divide-and-rule tactics' were driven by erratic and antagonising politics which shaped the very birth and idea of Nigeria as a territorial state in conflict with its own history – political tactics that created an 'artificial state', a 'lopsided federal system', or a 'consolidated (Dis)Order', inconsistent with various Nigerian characteristics ranging from individuals' identities and socio-political stances to 'traditional forms of government and governance' (Mustapha 2008b: 42; Olusola Olaniyan 2009: 134; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 3, 1; 4, 11; Amuwo 2011: 46, 49; Onuoha/Varin 2020: 225; Akinola et al. 2019: V; Campbell 2011). Consequently, Nigeria's 'conglomerate multiethnic and multireligious society' both intersects with, and produces a state with, a 'fractured nationhood' (Joseph 2013: 267; Mustapha 2008b: 41).

The *Nigerian state* of today is often experienced, among other things, as an 'alien institution', 'a predator, a pirate, or even a vampire', and is described as 'a permanent state of emergencies' driven by 'systematic decay and dysfunctionality', a 'rentier state' reproducing 'colonial power relations', and a 'frustrating paradox' (Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 131; Kabir Isa 2009: 244; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 13; Ismail 2009: 31; Onuoha 2009: 248; Okonta 2008: 133; Nwoke 2011: 54f.; Jackson 2007: 587; Ebohon/Ifeadi 2012: 9f., 17; Egbo et al. 2012: 598, 614; Alli 2013: 117, 142; Ellis 2012: 138; Onah 2014: 73f.). Where some conceive of 'death' as a prevalent feature of the Nigerian state and its 'visual geography', others conceive of an environment of wide-spread socio-economic deprivation and social unrest in which the state governs through 'repression, authoritarianism, arbitrary policymaking, and extractive rule' (Adebani/Obadare 2009b: 9, 5; Onuoha 2009: 248; Okonta 2008: 117; Owen 2013: 148; Adejumbi 2011b: 12; Adejumbi 2010b: 11; Agbaje 2010: 65; Sogunro 2014). Politics becomes a 'do or die' affair (Alumona et al. 2019b: 4; Nwoke 2011: 55) and Adejumbi holds: 'Blackmail, intimidation, violence, arson, and political assassination are all tactics of political competition in a Hobbesian political struggle' (Adejumbi 2011b: 14; similar are Mamza 2018: 433; Adebani/Obadare 2010: 392; Seiyefa 2017: 103).

Conceived to be 'deeply divided [into factions] along, ethnic, regional, religious, and ideological lines' (Gambari 2008: 60; Osaghae 2002: 219f.; Yaqub 2015, interview), famous writer Chinua Achebe makes *Nigeria's elites* responsible for the country's *troubles* since they have repeatedly failed to organise it properly (Achebe 1983: 22, 30; Osaghae 2011: 29;

Adebanwi/Obadare 2010: 394). Competing and collaborating with one another at the same time, these elites are infamous for their 'anti-people politics' against the poor Nigerian *masses*), their 'tunnel vision', and their (non)strategic political praxis shaped by 'incoherence', inconsistency, and a lack of 'responsibility' (Amuwo 2011: 47, 57; Adebanwi/Obadare 2011b: 16; Agbaje et al. 2007: 79; Adebanwi/Obadare 2009b: 10; Osaghae 2011: 37; Aiyede 2013: 116, 112; Folarin 2009: 63; Nwoke 2011: 55; Adejumobi 2010b: 4ff.; Saro-Wiwa 2012: 120; Joda 2015: 219; Obiozor 2015: 244, 249; Agbaje 2010: 62; Ebohon/Ifeadi 2012: 9; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 30f.; Onuoha 2019: 566; Afoaku 2017: 22; Seiyefa 2017: 103, 107; El-Bushra et al. 2014: 12). Some of the results are that elections turn into so-called 'selections' through illegitimate and violent practices, that political coalitions are instable, and that positions of powers and their transfer are disorganised and highly conflictive (Kew 2011: 121; Osaghae 2011: 37). While Nigerian elites use tactics such as the creation, engagement, and manipulation of social conflicts, social infrastructures and 'cultural symbols', these tactics are embedded in the wider 'identity politics' of Nigeria's 'imagined communities' (e.g., ethnic groups) and their exclusionary logics (Aiyede 2013: 112; Osaghae 2011: 36; Adogame 2011: 101; Adejumobi 2011b: 13; Adebajo 2008a: 5). These logics might even create an 'ethnic security dilemma', if ethnicity develops into the key instrument of struggles in political life (Kew 2011: 123; Olainmoye 2009: 141).¹⁰ Nigeria's economic and political elites rely on, employ, and exploit the various *resources* the state offers to an extent that the country's postcolonial history can be understood in terms of a 'reconfiguration and contestation over revenue allocation' which, in turn, led to a 'vicious struggle to dominate the [federal] state' and its ways to distribute these revenues (highly unequally) across regional states and local minorities (Osaghae 2011: 37; Watts 2007: 642; Obi 2011: 73; Onuoha 2009: 255; Okonta 2008: 129). Building and imagining a Nigerian nation becomes fundamentally undermined if elites can (re)produce their socio-political power through 'oil patron-client networks', through their grip on oil revenues, and through what Watts calls the 'logic of rent seeking, petro-corruption, ethnic spoils politics, and state multiplication' (Osaghae 2011: 37; Watts 2004: 74; Amuwo 2011: 54; Okonta 2008: 117; Aiyede 2013: 112, 116; Obi 2011: 73). This grip is secured

¹⁰ Commonly understood by scholars as a social construct, ethnicity can become a socio-political *problem*, if it is politicised, manipulated, and exploited by actors such as political elites for reasons of political manoeuvre and in situations of conflicts – in particular, if institutional branches of the state are dominated by specific ethnic groups to the deprivation of other groups (Amuwo 2011: 94; Abegunrin 2013: 92, 103).

by what Bayart refers to as the endless 'reciprocal assimilation [and recycling] of elites' in Nigeria, that is, the self-reproduction of those elites who dominate the state apparatus (Bayart 2009: 150ff.; Osaghae 2011: 32; Owen 2013: 161).

These constellations and processes relate closely to the more general notions of *neopatrimonialism* and *prebendalism*: The notion of neopatrimonialism refers to profoundly rooted, informal, and 'locally embedded patron-client networks', which are based upon shared personal commitments (Hoffmann/Nolte 2013: 43, 25). Whether called 'oga' in Nigerian parlance, 'big men', or patrons, these agents are centrally placed in the networks and draw upon formal political structures and state resources for their own benefits, and for those of their clients, by providing 'patronage downward in the network[s] in exchange for loyalty upward' (Elden 2014: 419; Osaghae 2011: 37; Hoffmann/Nolte 2013: 25; Kew 2011: 126; Pratten 2013: 253). Although these networks constitute the possibility for, and are driven by, the intermingling of public and private spheres of influence, individuals embroiled in them are informed by private norms, rules, identities (e.g., ethnic groups), and personalised forms of authority, which clash with mainstream IR's conception of the state as an impartial, public, and bureaucratic-rationalist agent of Weberian provenance (Utas 2012; Engel/Erdmann 2006; Johnston et al. 2009; Meagher 2005; Chabal 2005; Bierschenk/de Sardan 2014). These networks also facilitate the exchange between political elites and agents who are less directly entangled with the state, for example, by organising the support of everyday, young Nigerians based on a degree of 'consent' about who should govern despite all personal hardships (e.g., the oil-money infused extension of the state's governing practices throughout the country to pacify contestation and to win elections) (Hoffmann/Nolte 2013: 25, 42f., 46). By bringing together competitors for political power in rather similar 'moral universes', neopatrimonialism merges 'governance with personal loyalty' and qualities and, hence, privatises political power – a privatisation that disperses into all walks of social and political life in Nigeria (Hoffmann/Nolte 2013: 46; Owen 2013: 150; Osaghae 2011: 32; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 16). Directly derived from the Nigerian case by Richard Joseph in 1987, the related notion of prebendalism focuses on the processes and 'shared expectations about the appropriation of state offices' by agents, that is, how agents *own* these offices in the first place (Joseph 2013: 264, 274). Regardless of military or democratic rule in the Nigerian postcolony, some argue that prebendalism is the *modus operandi* and goal of Nigerian politics: Politics under conditions of patron-client networks would always be nothing

other than the conflictive, volatile, and enduring fight to secure positions *in* the state for resources *of* the state as a 'path to personal wealth' (Adebanwi/Obadare 2013b: 6, 13, 16; Joseph 2013: 265, 268; Denzer/Guyer 2013: 53; Pratten 2013: 244). Operating on the level of individuals, the logic of prebendalism is concerned with whether agents are *part of*, or have guaranteed personal *access to* (i.e., "someone who is there"), the state, since only then can one make claims to 'entitlement', to more 'agency', and to more 'social mobility' (Owen 2013: 148, 151, 168, 169).¹¹ Pratten notes that insecurity both produces prebendalism and is produced by it, for example, through 'epistemological insecurity' (e.g., fear of false 'information' in an environment shaped by 'everyday deception') and 'political insecurity' (e.g., risk of unaccountable practices and 'uncertain loyalties of patrons') (Pratten 2013: 244, 247, 251, 254; on daily deception, see also Østbø Haugen 2018: 1296).

Into play comes what under colonialism was to some extent an anti-colonial, 'patriotic' tactic, and what many see as the 'Nigerian factor' in postcolonial times, that is, the practice of *corruption* (Kew 2011: 122; Ismail 2009: 30). Corruption would be a 'systemic', '*taken for granted*' (!), and insecurity-enhancing constituent of Nigeria's social universe with forms such as 'giving/taking bribes, side payments, fraud, capital flight, looting, settlement, over-invoicing', or even roadblocks erected by 'Pay-As-You-Go Police' and other institutions of state collecting a sort of 'tax' (Osaghae 2011: 40; Okoosi-Simbine 2011: 160, 164, 159; Aiyede 2013: 117; Pratten 2013: 247; my emphasis; Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 132; Pérouse de Montclos 2014d: 405; Waro 2020: 30; Afoaku 2017: 23). Politics becomes 'monetized' and elites become 'moneybags' and 'godfathers' employing a 'culture of settlement' in political organisations and elections, that is, these elites use different goods to pay off individuals and groups who, then, cannot any longer call upon constitutional, democratic rights or tackle impunity (Adejumobi 2011b: 13; Osaghae 2011: 40; Okoosi-Simbine 2011: 160; Ismail 2009: 30; Adetula 2008b: xxxviii). While excluding oneself from these practices can be (seen as) a '*political choice*', there are various other practices possible and effective since 'social capital' and other 'connections' such as ethnicity and religion are often more relevant (Owen 2013: 150, 160; Osaghae 2011: 33; emphasis in original; for the salient role of religion in Nigeria, see, for example, Ayantayo 2009; Nweke 2018; Alao 2013).

¹¹ On this, Aghedo and Osumah refer to Okecha saying that agents who gain access are often told by their close, social network: 'This is your chance to become rich; make the best of God-given opportunity...grab anything that comes your way' (Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 132).

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For these issues, and for questions of violence more broadly, the role of *oil* and the Niger Delta Region (NDR) can hardly be overstated since the 1960s and, especially, after the nationalisation, 'indigenisation', and centralisation of Nigeria's oil revenues starting in 1969 (Obi 2011: 69, 73). At least 90 percent of Nigeria's overall revenues are produced in the NDR's four oil refineries, yet Nigeria still imports refined oil as these refineries need modernisation (Nodland 2010: 194; Suberu 2011: 89; Adebajo 2008a: 2; Mikell 2008: 289; ICG 2012: 6; Obi 2011: 65). 'Nature and nationalism' fused, so Watts, but the technological and financial imbalances towards foreign oil companies remained, since having ownership of and access to oil does not actually refine Nigeria's everyday 'daily need' and 'determining feature' (Watts 2004: 72, 52; Denzer/Guyer 2013: 55; Gandy 2006: 382; Watts 2007: 643; Obi 2011: 69, 72). Rather than being simply a *resource* that *curses* Nigeria, as some argue (Okonta 2008: 133; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 17), it seems more appropriate to suggest that it is less oil as such that is problematic but the state's configuration resulting in 'the instrumentalisation of oil by hegemonic domestic and transnational social forces' (Obi 2011: 77, 67; Watts 2004: 55, 53; Watts 2007: 648). The development of this configuration and oil are clearly interrelated. What stands out is the 'enclave character' of oil (i.e., the material and social infrastructures assembling it), the ways political struggles shape 'oil into forms of affluence and power', and how oil and violence intersect in Nigeria and, especially, the NDR (Watts 2004: 53, 62; Mitchell 2013: 1, 2). To explore these processes, Watts conceives of what he calls an 'oil complex' that shapes and is the vehicle for Nigeria's 'petro-capitalism' (Watts 2004: 54). Other authors state the existence of similar formations such as an 'authoritarian power structure', a 'military-business complex', or a 'topography of networks of power, accumulation and profit' (Okonta 2008: 117; Amuwo 2011: 56; Onuoha 2009: 255).¹² Watts' account is most convincing by claiming that the oil complex does not only consist of 'a volatile mix of forces', but also of 'a unity of firm, state, and community that is territorially constituted through oil concessions' (Watts 2007: 643; Watts 2004: 54). That is, the oil complex consists of the federal state's general domination of resource exploitation, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) providing concessions to transnational oil companies, a security arrangement of public and private security agents protecting the oil complex, and the so-called 'derivation

¹² While Nigeria's self-image of and role as an (external) anti-colonial force in Africa is pointed out by several scholars (e.g., Gambari 2008: 64; Uhomoibhi 2008: 226; Abegunrin 2013: 26), Okonta offers a critique of the country's present (internal) 'colonial power relations' (2008: 117).

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principle' by which the state's oil revenues are shared across regional states and local communities (Watts 2004: 60, 61). Since the derivation principle does often only exist on paper as vast sums of 'unearned income' vanish mostly at the federal level, the oil complex becomes highly securitised by a 'panoply of paramilitary, mercenary, security and other militarized agents' ranging from the Nigerian state's security forces to private security companies (Watts 2004: 54, 61, 60; Watts 2007: 642, 643; Onuoha 2009: 247; Obi 2011: 74; Watts 2015: 14). In short, various groups struggle over what is called the 'national cake' of Nigeria, but the highlighted processes and mechanisms enable Nigerian elites to 'eat' the cake and – less so – to share it (Adebanwi/Obadare 2013b: 12; Denzer/Guyer 2013: 54; Nodland 2010: 204; Bayart 2009: lxxxiv).

Summing up the last two sections, alternative interpretations by scholars of African IR and Nigerian Studies provide us with a necessary corrective to address IR's shortage of conceptual guides to travel to non-Western/Northern places and to understand these highly multifaceted places' rapidly changing socio-political constellations. They do not only help us to embrace and engage with questions of difference and context,¹³ but they also contribute to our understanding of 'aspects of the totality of the contemporary African formation' and how we might conceive of Nigeria's postcolonial political space with its constitutive social relations, topographies, and logics (Adebanwi/Obadare 2011b: 9; Osaghae 2011: 37). What we can see is, for example, that Alexander Wendt's often applied conceptualisation of the state as a person has its limits in Africa (Brown 2012; Williams 2013). Tieku even suggests that IR's 'individualist worldviews' contrast African 'consensual' and 'collectivist cultures [which] prioritize the social over the personal and group preferences over individual interests and goals' (Tieku 2014: 11, 16). But, even if scholars try to understand how 'Africa works' in reality (Chabal/Daloz 1999), I argue that they remain likely to propose a priori, essentialist assumptions – of which many lead to universalising claims eventually. Several of the contributions operate with pre-established and partially 'Afro-pessimist' claims that risk to (re)produce an essentialist academic discourse by overstating the *problematic* 'Africanness' of African politics and by underplaying its socio-historical constitution (Kaarsholm 2009: 19, 21; Adebanwi/Obadare 2011b: 9). As Brown and Harman note, the danger is here to 'reinforce

¹³ On the importance of context, place, and space in socio-political analysis, see, for example, Massey 2005; Grossberg 2013; Grossberg 2006; Falletti/Lynch 2009; Thrift 2006b; Auyero 2006; Gregory 1994. For a critical view on contextual political analysis, see, Lawson 2008.

the notion of Africa as an 'other', an exceptional region that sits outside the bounds of established scholarship, while at the same time essentializing both African and European history' (Brown/Harman 2013b: 75). Africa appears to be less marginalised than it is often portrayed, some of the (infamous) media and IR representations – for example, on Nigeria's fragile social fabric – are not entirely wrong, and the adaptation of IR in African IR can be on the verge of an oversimplification if we consider approaches such as post-structuralism and International Political Sociology (IPS) as an integral part of IR (Dunn/Englebert 2013; Brown 2006). Therefore, Brown and Harman ask scholars 'to find ways to handle the tensions that arise between abstract universals and the empirical complexities of the continent's international relations', and to try to 'make the role of African political actors analytically more central' (Brown/Harman 2013b: 85, 86). Brown still calls for new concepts to 'accommodate the variety of entities to which the label [African] 'agent' can be applied, can differentiate between them, and can locate agency in relation to the social context from which it arises and which shape, enable and constrain it' (Brown 2012: 1894). For him, scholars should investigate the 'degree of influence or power such agents are able to exert, their room for manoeuvre, and the identification of those factors that constrain or enable such agency' (Brown 2012: 1893).

Responding to these calls, this thesis is located *after* (!) African IR's critiques and interventions, and my argument that different, less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical devices are needed to study how African states' security policies are shaped can be better understood now. The challenge remains, truly, how to conceive of Nigeria's social universe with its 'normalcy of complexity' (Iweriebor 2013b: 6; see also Chapters 3-7) and by going beyond *the exceptional* (Meeting 2015; Akpome 2015),¹⁴ considering the different pathological narratives introduced such as the pervasiveness of elitist and violent politics, of neopatrimonialism and prebendalism, and of oil-induced and corrupt power relations.¹⁵ I argue that Bourdieu can help us here. Prior to that, the next section adds another, important context and introduces why and how I focus on Boko Haram by conceiving of it as a *space of*

¹⁴ The reference of *Meeting 2015* refers to an informal conversation with a former key member of Nigeria's *official foreign and security policy community* and another Nigerian academic in Abuja on June 3, 2015.

¹⁵ Scholars studying Nigeria's current (in)security landscape tend to aggregate it similar to Varin who sees – not incorrectly – at work: 'terrorism, militancy, insurgency, ethno-religious conflict, corruption, poverty, banditry, farmer-herdsmen clashes, climate change, environmental degradation, food [in]security, arms trafficking, organized crime, and forced population displacements, among others' (Varin 2020: 2; similar are Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 128; Ebohon/Ifeadi 2012: 7; Alumona et al. 2019b: 2; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 36).

(in)security.

1.4 From Boko Haram as a Space of (In)Security to Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology

Surely, it would be possible to approach Nigeria's contemporary key security challenge Boko Haram in terms of public and academic discourses on state failure, violent conflicts, terrorism, organised crime, and security governance – or by relying on concepts and spatial metaphors such as 'ungoverned spaces' and territorial 'areas of limited statehood' (Dowd/Raleigh 2013; Risse 2011; Ellis 2012; for 'zones of peace' in West Africa, see Kacowicz 1998 and Thies 2010). To different degrees, they all engage with the question of how to account for the sets of differently located, motivated, and constituted actors (e.g., ethnic groups, warlords, insurgents) beyond and below the state which give rise to shifting and variegated configurations of (in)security dynamics within domestic settings and across national boundaries as defined by colonialism. With their competing claims on and practices of sovereignty, power, legitimacy, and identity, these actors contribute to and expose the often very limited physico-geographical and ideational reach of the state and its monopoly of violence, that is, its difficulty in penetrating societal realms with opposing or hybrid social logics. States in Africa often struggle to implement their policies, to uphold their territorial integrity, and to govern their territory.

Yet it is not only problematic that most of these contributions continue to (re)produce Western/Northern-centric concepts, but they also, irrespective of diverse scholarly efforts, still tend to operate within the 'territorial trap' of the social sciences whereby states contain in themselves – in 'a bounded section of space' – *their* social, political, and economic relations which they govern widely sovereignly in and through a 'totalistic territorial logic' (Agnew 1994; dell'Agnese 2013: 115; Agnew 2017: 49; Agnew 2013). These contributions are also likely to make use of rather empty spatialized vocabularies with often limited analytical value: While introducing the very possibility of a (socio-)spatial lens for African politics and Africa's international relations with ideas derived from the *spatial turn* in the cultural, human, and social sciences should be acclaimed (e.g., Engel/Nugent 2009; Engel/Olsen 2012; Söderbaum/Taylor 2009), the latter as well as the former contributions typically remain superficial since they do not develop a deeper understanding of the ways subjectivities of

actors, their practices, and social contexts hang together.¹⁶ *Spaces* are, for example, never (entirely) *ungoverned* or *statehoods limited* in specific *areas*, since there always exist alternative governing practices by, and relations among, various socio-political actors in the complex assemblages of what is called the 'State in Africa' (Bayart 2009) – even if these spatiotemporal enactments might be at times difficult to perceive and to understand for (external) researchers due to their fluidity, instability, and invisibility. As Adebani and Obadare note, 'what [...] a 'state' is or means for those who encounter it within the African postcolony cannot be taken for granted', since this requires empirical analysis and to think the (Nigerian) state 'within a specific African social formation' (Adebani/Obadare 2009b: 3, 2). A state, certainly, *exists* in some modulation given different social formations, but there is no requirement to fix its nature in advance (Adebani/Obadare 2009b: 11, 22). This holds, even more so, if we follow the verdict that what we can observe in Nigeria today are the 'destabilizations, reconstructions, and reconsiderations of the Nigerian state' (Owen 2013: 148; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 1). It is necessary to comprehend that *the state* – or the variety of statist and governmental agencies – are not fixed and static entities and that scores of what is commonly seen as established notions of statehood, security policy, and state society relations are misleading when seen in the light of the social history of the Nigerian state and cases such as Boko Haram.

Drawing upon insights from IPS, I argue that the constitutive social relations of both Nigeria's security policy realm and Boko Haram are vivid examples of those social and political 'phenomena' that currently more and more intersect and transcend conventional scientific dichotomies such as between domestic and foreign realms of politics, or between *the political* and *the sociological* (Walker 2017: 15; Basaran et al. 2017a; Walker 1993; Bigo/Walker 2007; Bigo 2008). Understood by IPS scholars as 'transversal lines' breaking with various empirical and conceptual 'boundaries' of *the international* (Basaran et al. 2017b: 1, 3; Walker 2017: 15), these phenomena call for, so Bigo, a 'conception of politics in terms of flux and field [that] allows us to bring together categories of practices that had been otherwise assigned to a

¹⁶ This problem exists arguably in Political Science and IR more generally, for a lack of trans-disciplinary engagements with insights developed in disciplines such as human geography or sociology. For related discussions and exceptions, see, Agnew 1994; Crang/Thrift 2000a; Smirl 2015; Sjöberg 2008; Griffin 2012; Elazar 1999; Dijkink/Mamadouh 2006; O'Loughlin 2000; Chaturvedi/Painter 2007. As for what state-of-the-art (socio-)spatial analysis might offer, see, for example, Merriman 2022; Arias/Warf 2009; Brenner et al. 2008; Belina/Michel 2007; Massey 2005; Döring 2010; Harvey 2006; Günzel 2009; Thrift 2006a; Shields 2006; Jones 2009; Schroer 2006; Elden 2013.

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space of inside and outside (to the detriment of analysis) and to differentiate these practices otherwise' (Bigo 2008: 16, en. 12, p. 42). What alert observers can witness today is the constant (re)production, negotiation, and contestation of politics, *the political* and political spaces in Africa (and elsewhere) through interrelated and complex social and technological 'process[es], change[s] and flows' stemming from a multitude of political actors (Basaran et al. 2017b: 2; Dikeç 2005; Featherstone/Korf 2012; Swyngedouw 2014; for Nigeria, see, Vaughan 2003; Adebani/Obadare 2011a). These actors' recurrent practices, as insights from *Political Geography* demonstrate, shape social relations within and across several spatial lexica such as territory, place, scale, and network, that is, what Brenner and others call 'sociospatial relations' (Brenner et al. 2008: 389; for a critique, see Shapiro 2008). Sociospatial relations, in turn, traverse our conventional understandings of *the local*, *the global*, and, increasingly, *the urban* – or where to locate (the reasons for) specific socio-political phenomena (Magnusson 2014; Sassen 2011). While the growing relevance of these 'other spatial modalities' has let some to argue that the notion of space might be 'the everywhere of modern thought', in current academia conceptions prevail making the case for space as being relational and a socio-historical product (Agnew 2017: 51; Crang/Thrift 2000b: 1). Writes Jones:

'In short, the spatial project for relational thinkers is to replace topography and structure-agency dichotomies with a topological theory of [territory,] space, place and politics as encountered, performed, dynamic, and fluid' (Jones 2009: 492; dell'Agnese 2013: 116).

This is not to say that all spaces are characterised by a state of permanent openness and flux or that actors can modify them at every moment. Relational conceptions of space can underestimate the 'multifarious acts of fixing space and to highlight factors that constrain, structure, and connect space' (Jones 2009: 488; Schroer 2009: 365).

I argue that the different, amorphous constellations of actors constituting the phenomenon of Boko Haram (re)produce through their daily practices sociospatial relations which, in turn, construct fluctuating and temporary social articulations of *spaces of (in)security*. Whether colonialism, the civil war over the secessionist region of Biafra (1967-1970), military coup d'états and rule, or the 'rise of armed militant groups' and forms of religious 'internal

subversion', Nigeria's political history has been profoundly shaped by 'manifest or latent *violence*' and the various contestations and threats to the state's social coherence, territorial sovereignty, 'authority', 'national security', 'security and survival', and 'economy and foreign policy' (Fawole 2008: 104, 102ff.; Watts 2007: 650; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 13; Abegunrin 2013: 99; Gandy 2005: 44; emphasis in original).¹⁷ These forms of violence, contestations, and threats led several Nigerian and international authors to question Nigeria's resilience as a territorial state and to narrate possibilities as far as its 'catastrophic collapse' (Adebani/Obadare 2013b: 12; Elden 2014: 420; see, for example, Campbell 2011; Osaghae 2011: 37). Thinking about Nigeria and scrutinising *the Nigerian state*, indeed, often comprises thinking in terms of 'radical insecurity' and '(dis)organised violence' – or even, so Adejumbi, about the 'logic of 'we' and 'them' at all levels' (Pratten 2013: 254; Adebani/Obadare 2011b: 14; Adebani/Obadare 2009b: 4; Adejumbi 2011b: 13).

Considering the forgoing, I argue that Boko Haram articulates a space of security *and* insecurity at the same time: It articulates a space *of security* to some extent, (i.e., mostly for those rather few actors who constitute Boko Haram in the first place), since it does not only obtain a sense of identity and socio-economic predictability through its practices, but shapes conditions of possibility allowing for very practical ways to 'adopt territorial and other strategies to project and manage power' in the struggle over and against what scholars see as an 'inherently problematic proposal', namely, the postcolonial, Nigerian state with its 'evil dimensions' and personalised, prebendal, and petro-capitalist modes of elitist governing in an 'oil nation' (Agnew 2017: 55; Adebani/Obadare 2009b: 24; Aiyede 2013: 112; Watts 2004: 72; Pratten 2013: 248; see Section 1.3). It articulates a space *of insecurity* to some extent (i.e., mostly for those rather many actors who must deal with the wide-ranging reverberations of Boko Haram), since its violent practices do not only threaten and harm the socio-economic predictability and identity/biopolitical integrity of affected communities, but they contest the Nigerian state in its violent-military struggle 'to keep both territory and sovereignty within its control' and in its desire to reduce 'uncertainty' in relation to its mode of governing (Elden

¹⁷ After the civil war, these were, for example, the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA); Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF); Odua People's Congress (OPC); Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS); Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas (NDCG); South-South Liberation Movement (SSLM); Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF); or the 'Sayawa of Bauchi state; Berom of Plateau state; Tiv, Jukun, and Bachama groups of Taraba state' (Fawole 2008: 105; Olusola Olaniyan 2009: 128; Watts 2007: 656; ICG 2012: 14).

2014: 419, 423; Adebani/Obadare 2013b: 18; Pérouse de Montclos 2012: 539). In so doing, Boko Haram as a space of (in)security profoundly impacts both on the composition and role of Nigeria's own security policy, and on questions of peace, security, and development in Nigeria and West Africa more broadly. Because of this significance for the Nigerian political space, it is *assumed to be* subject to extensive socio-political practices and discourses allowing for the availability of data/evidence in the empirical analysis in multiple 'forms' ranging from produced 'artefacts' (e.g., texts such as governmental publications and media outlets), via the actions of agents, to the ways language is employed in different texts and media (Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 78; Loughland et al. 2015: 24; Mutlu et al. 2015: 85; see Chapter 4).

A disclaimer: I do not deny whatsoever the significance of insecurity in Africa – that is, the social practices, relations, and structures producing actual instances of insecurity – or the necessity and legitimacy to study them. Rather, I conceive of international public and academic discourses to be overly focused on (pre-theorising) these instances, on African states' failures to address related predicaments, and on external strategies of *problem solving* (Cox 1981). What is too often missing are two things: First, an understanding, mapping, and foregrounding of African (here: Nigerian) socio-political actors' perspectives, practices, and voices *on* different forms of spaces of (in)security (here: Boko Haram). Second, a theoretically guided, process-oriented, and explicitly empirical investigation of the ways these actors do so, and how this might become (in)security knowledge in the end. As Mvomo Ela and Ukeje underscore, it remains central 'to insist on an African agency and voice in setting priorities' in such matters (Mvomo Ela/Ukeje 2013: 43). How to do all this without developing new – or deepening already existing – analytical devices driven by philosophies of science prone to essentialism(s)? The next section offers a short, introductory overview of how Bourdieu helps here.

1.5 From Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology to a Field of Nigerian Security Policy

Though some have explicitly argued against using Bourdieu's rich body of work for an engagement with the Global South based on their criticism of Western/Northern theorising (e.g., Connell 2006; Connell 2007a),¹⁸ this thesis *precisely adopts a Bourdieusian approach* (!)

¹⁸ Connell considers Bourdieu's work to be part of what she calls 'mainstream sociology' based on an overly abstract 'ethno-sociology of metropolitan society' (Connell 2007a: 226, 196).

to research Nigeria's security policy. The reason is that Bourdieu's particular *modus operandi* to study social phenomena offers, *if (!)* framed soundly and reworked in timely ways, both a promising way to think global politics and *the international* differently – for example, the necessity of understanding that Nigeria's and other African states' security policies and concerns are part of, and constitutive for, these fields – and a way to critique existing approaches in IR and African IR. Emphasising a (dialectical) sociological perspective in the form of an analysis of concrete everyday practices, it is possible to make use of Bourdieu's sociology to tackle some of the problematic assumptions and renderings of IR and African IR. The following possibilities are usually seen to be offered by his 'non-Cartesian social ontology' (Wacquant 1992b: 5; Adler-Nissen 2013b; Leander 2011; Leander 2010; Swartz 2013a):

First, it enables scholars to (re)think the relationship between social agents and their practices, how practices unfold in various spaces of engagement, and how agents can be 'individuals, social networks, social groups, and institutions, as well as formal organizations' (Swartz 2008: 49; Villumsen Berling 2013: 66, en. 23, p. 72). Second, it provides for an innovative vocabulary to grasp the relevance of social relations and how they are constitutive for questions of power (e.g., kinds of capitals as resources) and agency (e.g., agents' positions in social space vis-à-vis their subjective dispositions). Third, it problematizes the disciplines' state-of-the-art concepts and theories and how these make sense of substantive issue areas. Fourth, it lays open the constructing mechanisms of agents' visions and divisions of the social world and how they enable principles of inclusion and exclusion (e.g., how the inside/outside distinction is constructed by practices, power relations, and technologies). Fifth, it helps to re-conceptualise the state, its institutional genesis, and its symbolic powers. Sixth, it shows that the international and domestic realms have more in common than usually assumed, that is, the former is also 'a densely structured [hierarchical and historically produced] social space' (Adler-Nissen 2013b: 4). Finally, it allows us to question the fragmentation of the social sciences often produced by the fierce insistence of scholars towards a specific *methodological* camp and the proclamation of ultimate *methods* of research, that is, the denial of any forms of self-reflexivity in *doing* science.

As for this introduction, it shall suffice to point out that Bourdieu's 'structuralist constructivism' or 'constructivist structuralism' enables us to grasp the intrinsic relational character of *the social* by means of engaging with and applying his key concepts (Bourdieu 1989: 14). Drawing upon Wittgenstein, Bourdieu conceives of these concepts as 'thinking

1. INTRODUCTION

tools' helping him to pursue a 'relational mode of thinking' (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992b: 160; Bourdieu 1989: 15; Bourdieu 1992: 228; Wacquant 1992a: xi; Fogle 2011: xi; also, Jackson/Nexon 1999). Scholars can make use of one or a number of these tools (e.g., field, habitus, capital, doxa) for studying politics and for trying to overcome the still prevalent theory-practice dichotomy in the social sciences (Adler-Nissen 2013b; Bigo 2011; Leander 2011). Writes Bourdieu:

'As soon as we observe (theorein) the social world, we introduce in our perception of it a bias due to the fact, to study it, to talk about it, we must retire from it more or less completely. This *theoreticist* or intellectual bias consists in forgetting to inscribe into the theory we build of the social world the fact that it is the product of a *theoretical gaze*' (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992b: 69; my emphasis).

As Walker explains re (rationalist) IR theories, these are 'full of ontological and epistemological claims that are left abstract' (Walker 1993: 100). Again, Bourdieu:

'Essentialist thought' is at work in all social universes and most especially in fields of cultural production' such as in 'the religious' or 'scientific field', that is, in fields 'where games which have the universal at stake are played out' (Bourdieu 1996b: 298).

While we will see that some scholars conceive of Bourdieu himself to make such problematic claims, there are ways to interpret his work as *the intention* to avoid making pre-established (theoretical) claims about the empirical object of analysis for as long as possible. Inasmuch as it is tempting for scholars to embrace the latter, this has clearly its limits since a basic vocabulary – as offered by his thinking tools, for example – is necessary to be able to encounter the social world in a meaningful way.

For approaching, thinking, and working with the empirical concerns of this thesis, I presume for now the preliminary existence of a broadly interpreted, transitional and exploratory FNSP. That is, I claim – as the *smallest, pre-theorised footprint* possible, so to say – that we need to understand the ways in which African states' security policies are shaped by concrete *social practices* of relevant security policy agents in their *particular sociospatial contexts*. To some extent, this move contrasts Bigo's reading that it would be unconvincing of 'researchers [to]

declare and decide from prior ontology that a field has come into existence and [to say] where it begins, where it finishes, where the boundaries are, eradicating all the interesting questions' (Bigo 2013: 126; Bigo 2011: 240). Yet, drawing upon claims in the literature (e.g., Jackson 2008), I understand as my 'analytical tactic' the state of Nigeria and its security policy realm as fields among others in social space (Sassen 2013a; Sassen 2013b).¹⁹ These insights not only connect with the language of struggles, networks, and power relations so familiar to scholars of Nigerian politics, but explain my turn towards using a FNSP as a thinking tool in this thesis. This Introduction closes with providing an outline of this thesis' structure.

1.6 Outline of Thesis

This Chapter 1 (Introduction) introduced this thesis' general purpose and research question, focusing on why we need new analytical devices to study how African states' security policies are shaped. Chapter 2 (Literature Review) reviews and critically assesses in detail how Bourdieu's sociology is adopted by scholars in International Studies to draw lessons for my own appropriation. Chapter 3 (Theory) explores the practice turn in the social sciences and offers my very own in-depth, sociospatial reading of Bourdieu's sociology to carve out a FNSP – a global thinking tool for approaching Nigeria's security policy realm. (Readers new to Bourdieu might consider reading these last two chapters in reverse order). Chapter 4 (Methodology) establishes the ways in which I can and must construct such a FNSP in methodological terms for translating generated insights to questions of African agency and security policy. Chapter 5 (Writing (In)Security) maps the agents of a FNSP with the help of a sociological discourse analysis and asks how agents speak authoritatively on Boko Haram. Chapter 6 (Dialoguing (In)Security) studies the more informal insights of a FNSP through interviews with Nigerian experts and practitioners. Chapter 7 (Conclusion) concludes this thesis by summing up its key findings and engaging its research question, Nigerian perspectives on (in)security, a global(ised) Bourdieu, and a way forward.

¹⁹ Sassen understands *analytical tactics* as those personal spaces 'before method' that allow her to mute the 'disciplining' moments of methods, 'to position myself in whatever ways I want/need vis-à-vis the object of study', to 'destabilize stabilized meanings', and to criticise 'what our established methods and paradigms obscure' (Sassen 2013a: 79; Sassen 2013b: 111).

2. Literature Review – Bourdieu and the Study of International Relations

2.1 Introduction

In the introduction, I have argued that Bourdieu's sociology can be used to develop a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study how African states' security policies are shaped. To set the stage for my own reading and appropriation of his sociology in the following theory and methodology chapters, this literature review chapter reviews and reflects upon in detail for what purposes and how scholars have interpreted and made use of his 'metatheoretical' vocabulary in International Studies (Swartz 2013a: 19; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 26; Fogle 2011: 63; Vandenberghe 1999: 38) (Sections 2.2-2.5). The goal is both to draw lessons from these contributions and to point out problematic elements in these interpretations to build on the former and to avoid the latter in the next two chapters. This chapter concludes with summing up and evaluating these insights for developing the envisioned analytical device (Section 2.6).

2.2 Appropriation of Bourdieu's Sociology in International Relations

Bourdieu's work is influential in a variety of disciplines in the social and human sciences (Gorski 2013a; Callier et al. 2012; Deffner/Haferburg 2014; Susen/Turner 2011). Although Political Science and International Relations are relatively late adopters, there was a steep rise of scholarly interest since the year 2000.²⁰ The reason is that the appropriation of (various aspects of) his sociology is increasingly seen by scholars to be able to reveal the ways in which agency, (fields of) practice, and knowledge production hang together. Scholars interested in international relations make use of it to approach diverse social arenas such as security (Bigo 2008; Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; Huysmans 2002; Villumsen Berling 2012; Williams 2007; Leander 2005; Abrahamsen/Williams 2011; Elhardt/Senn 2014), security communities (Adler 2008; Adler 2005; Pouliot 2010; Pouliot 2008), diplomacy (Neumann 2007; Neumann 2005; Neumann 2002; Adler-Nissen 2008), foreign policy (Jackson 2008; Hopf 2010; Hopf 2002; McCourt 2011; Ekengren 2013), International Political Economy (IPE) (Leander 2002; Shapiro 2002), European integration (Kauppi 2003), and environmental politics (Epstein 2008).

²⁰ For an overview of how Bourdieu's sociology informs IR, see the contributions in Adler-Nissen 2013a.

Because these studies are relatively new to the mainstream of the discipline, most contributions are first and foremost concerned with introducing (certain parts of) Bourdieu's social theoretical framework to the respective author's own academic sub-fields and ask what his framework has to offer to advance these fields. This makes, first, a critical assessment difficult, since the literature covers a broad range of substantive issues ranging from the global field of nuclear weapon politics to the intricacies of diplomats' habitus. A second difficulty is that an explicit engagement with questions of states' security policy – not to mention the likelihood of African cases – is rare in this body of literature.

While this thesis aims at such an engagement, I contend that an exploration of what might be called the *Bourdieuian International Studies* (BIS) literature must be based primarily on the ways scholars have integrated Bourdieu's ideas and thinking tools into their research, that is, whether this is done soundly and with sufficient conceptual depth and scope. Yet the point is *not* to establish an orthodox interpretation of how to understand and use a particular tool or several tools, since there are multiple reasonable ways to draw upon – and (mis)read – Bourdieu's rich body of work (Leander 2011; Wacquant 2014b; see Chapter 3). Rather, it is about highlighting the specific modalities in which his work is interpreted and employed by each author and how this relates to the analytical concerns of this thesis. These insights help me to lay the foundations for my own appropriation of Bourdieu's sociology in the next two chapters. The criteria for selecting the classical and more recent literature under review were relevance (i.e., widely cited as key sources) for the development of BIS and texts addressing the specific issue area of this thesis such as security policy.²¹ I arrange the reviewed literature along the selection of, and emphasis on, specific thinking tools by scholars to facilitate distinctness, order, traceability, and comparability. If authors introduce several tools and it is possible to identify an emphasis on a specific tool or a combination of tools, then they are framed in the following table. To keep the table clear-cut, I ruled out more specific concepts such as *hysteresis* and *practical sense* (e.g., Pouliot 2010), *illusio* (e.g., Mérand 2010) or Bourdieu's twist to *interests* and *strategies* (e.g., Williams 2007). These concepts might be better conceived of as particular articulations of the role of habitus, or what might be called the *field/habitus-intersection* (see Section 2.6 and Chapter 3), in the first instance, and since it is possible to make arguably very convincing contributions by focusing only on (the relation

²¹ Most contributions analysed for this review can be located within the academic field of IR. Yet some were selected from fields such as Historical Sociology as they speak to concerns of this thesis.

between) field and habitus, as we will see in the work of Bigo (2008, 2002). Therefore, I distinguish between contributions focusing on the subjective 'moment' of social life using the thinking tool of *habitus* (Section 2.3), contributions focusing on the objective moment using the tool of *field* (Section 2.4), and contributions highlighting a relational and mixed use of the tools (Section 2.5) (Bourdieu 1989: 15).²² Within these categories and in *Table 1*, the authors are ordered by name.

Table 1

	<i>Use of Bourdieu's Thinking Tools in BIS</i>				
	<i>Field</i>	<i>Habitus</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Doxa</i>	<i>Reflexivity</i>
Adler 2008		x			
Adler-Nissen 2008	x	x	x		
Bigo 2002, 2008	☒	☒			
Elhardt/Senn 2014	x		x	x	
Go 2008	☒	x	x	x	
Guzzini 2000, 2005, 2013	x	☒	x	x	x
Hopf 2002, 2010		☒		x	
Jackson 2008	x	☒	x	x	
Kauppi 2003	☒	x	x		
Leander 2001, 2002, 2005	x	x			x
Mérand 2010	x	x	x		
Neumann 2002		x			
Pouliot 2010	x	☒	x	x	

²² While Swartz holds that Bourdieu's 'master concepts' consist of 'field, capital and habitus', he also adds the crucial concepts of 'symbolic power and violence, doxa, classification struggles, and reflexivity' (2013a: 20, en. 4, p. 33; Swartz 2003). Wacquant claims that the 'six conceptual pillars' of Bourdieu's sociology are field, habitus, capital, 'plus doxa, symbolic power, and reflexivity' (2014b: 125; 2004: 399).

Shapiro 2002	x				
Steinmetz 2008	x	x	x		
Villumsen Berling 2012	x		☒	☒	
Williams 2007	x	☒	x		

2.3 Taking Subjectivity Seriously – Emphasising *Habitus*

Adler (2008) draws upon Bourdieu for his conceptualisation of security communities as 'communities of practice' constituted by collectives of professionals and their practices (Adler 2008: 196). Interested in the question why security communities spread, he holds that 'practices [...], the background knowledge that constitutes them, and the environment in which they are performed actually make possible political actors' socialization and persuasion and ultimately their rational calculation' (Adler 2008: 196). Communities are believed to 'structure [agents'] consciousness and intention' and therefore to enable practices (Adler 2008: 196). As 'knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity', practices would 'structure experience', are intrinsically related to discourses, and can be evaluated and 'learned' among agents (Adler 2008: 198). The operation of background knowledge is key for Adler, since it sets the stage for how agents can behave based on their own rationality. He derives the notion from Bourdieu's disposition-oriented definition of habitus in *The Logic of Practice* (1990b: 53) and Searle's emphasis on 'background' as 'a set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states to function' (Searle 1995: 129, in: Adler 2008: 202). Background knowledge is transported by communities of practices over time, develops in an evolutionary sense (i.e., via the theory of cognitive evolution), and specific aspects of it are chosen and institutionalised. This has repercussions for the practices adopted and of which some can perpetuate themselves together with their associated background knowledge – a process driven by what Adler calls 'meaning investment' (2008: 203). Herein, meanings – which can be connected to practices or physical *things* – are furnished in a way to make them taken-for-granted and thus discursively dominant.

Adler contributes to the practice turn in IR by means of highlighting how background knowledge, agents' practices and context are interrelated. This connection is relevant for

understanding a Field of Nigerian Security Policy (FNSP). Yet it seems unclear how exactly they are interrelated because context is not further conceptualised, besides speaking about *the* environment and discourses. Without a proper understanding of context in the first place – for instance, by introducing Bourdieu's field theory or more discourse-oriented perspectives – the idea of background knowledge-informed practices of agents remains trapped in an understanding of agency driven by individualistic accounts of rationality. Moreover, his account seems to mix a variety of practice-theoretical insights with pre-established assumptions about what structures what. Even if practices function as a series of recurrent structurings that impact on agents' cognitive states, practices seem to be misinterpreted as constituting a sort of external (structural) reality for everyone. In doing so, Adler's reference to Bourdieu is minimal: Although he does briefly mention symbolic power, he stays with Antoniadis' concept of 'cognitive authority' for this matter (Antoniades 2003: 29, in: Adler 2008: 203). It also surprises that he talks about *taken-for-grantedness* without even mentioning the concept of doxa.

Guzzini (2000, 2005, 2013) applies Bourdieu's work to rethink constructivism and the concept of power. He identifies the necessity for a 'reconstruction of constructivism [...] as an explanatory meta-theory', because of conceptual vagueness and claims that insights from interpretivism and sociology help here (Guzzini 2000: 149). Interpretivism would emphasise how the actions of agents are always loaded with meaning and how scholars' interpretations of their actions are only possible based on agents' own interpretation of the social world prior to this (e.g., Schutz 1962). Combining this with sociology's ability to show 'that meaningful action [...] is a social or intersubjective phenomenon' and that the constitution of subjectivities is interrelated with 'social context', Guzzini conceptualises constructivism as 'a social construction of meaning (including knowledge), and of the construction of social reality' (2000: 149). Since the question how knowledge is constructed and what role it plays is central for him, he points out with Bourdieu that the construction of knowledge is not only related to (textual) discourse but that social practices shape this process as well. Like Adler (2008), Guzzini's approach to 'background knowledge' as a form of navigator for the 'correct behaviour' of agents is informed by Bourdieu's habitus and Searle's background (2000: 161). Guzzini sees, in fact, Bourdieusian sociology (i.e., the concepts of field, habitus, capital, and doxa) to be able to tackle the (interpretivist) dilemma that a proper analysis involves at best two meaning-producing entities, that is, agents interpreting the world and acting therein, and

scholars observing them and creating scientific stories with (possible) repercussions for these agents (e.g., Giddens 1984). Bourdieu would start his analysis with 'the relationship between structure and field', understand the former 'as the product of collective history', and relate it 'to the system of social difference or stratification', that is, 'to the generative context for the establishment of [powerful] status groups' (Guzzini 2000: 165). Guzzini himself relates stratification to the availability and usefulness of different kinds of capital in different fields and sees fields to 'give meaning to agency' because they are 'a network of positions [...] with a shared system of meaning' (2000: 166). Dispositions (i.e., habitus) would form a non-generic relationship with fields and contribute to the reproduction of fields by favouring practices that stabilise its present constellation and its differentiating characteristics in comparison to other fields. Yet he notes that the process of reproduction is far from being impenetrable, since fields and dispositions change regularly. They would change because of the evolving social space, the different ways agents draw upon their personal trajectories, and for the fact that agents are likely to come to a new field with old dispositions or are located in more than one field at the same time. Bourdieu's framework would resemble a 'field-specific' approach of socialisation focusing on social groups and how they are linked to the construction of an 'agent's identity' (Guzzini 2000: 166). For Guzzini, Bourdieu also helps to understand that producing knowledge is by definition a process driven by (political) power relations within specific politico-economic conditions and to inform the conceptualisation of power in more general terms (2005: 500).²³ He claims that the term power can either be used to combine 'the totality of analyses' among different concepts of power or to refer to only one of the concepts to be found in 'political (ontological) theory and social (explanatory) theory' (Guzzini 2013: 78).²⁴ Bourdieu's sociology would mainly speak to the latter and thus addresses questions of 'domination' and 'agency and influence', that is, analysing what and 'how resources and latent capacities' are used by various agents to become successful in the social games they are playing (Guzzini 2013: 78). Since fields are the sites where such games are played, resources (i.e., different kinds of capital) are basic elements for the constitution of fields and an agent's ability to employ capitals becomes rather synonymous with being

²³ Bourdieu explicates this point as follows: 'The theory of knowledge is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality – in particular, social reality – is a major dimension of political power' (1977: 165; Guzzini 2000: 520).

²⁴ Guzzini argues that the concept of 'authority' combines these two strands and proposes a related vocabulary of 'Government (order), autonomy (freedom), domination (rule), [and] influence (cause)' (2013: 78).

powerful. Rather than approaching power from a perspective of positivistic causation, Bourdieu would focus on the social conditions of production of capital(s), their field-specific character, and their varying competence of 'fungibility' (Guzzini 2013: 80). Based upon a sociology with a 'structuralist' tendency, Bourdieu would propose 'a context-specific and *relational analysis of power*' (Guzzini 2013: 80f.; emphasis in original). A crucial part of this analysis is the symbolic dimension of capital and violence. Each capital in the possession of an agent is (capable of) being transformed into its symbolic form whenever other agents cognitively recognise and value it as such within the confines and principles of the field. Symbolic violence occurs when agents adhere to these principles in a habitual sense (i.e., by choice, though, without being always entirely conscious about it) and in relation to their supposedly prescribed role as the dominated and as the non-challenger of the field's doxa (Guzzini 2013: 81f.).

Although I am sympathetic with Guzzini's introduction of key Bourdieusian concepts, he seems to be rather vague in his conceptualisation of structures and the question how they relate to fields. What exactly is, for example, the difference between the two? Focusing on background knowledge, socialisation, and status groups, Guzzini seems to remain attached to a form of mainstream constructivism that misses out on the full potential of Bourdieu's sociology. The reason for that might be that he, in the last analysis, conceives of it as structuralist. Yet his attempts to disclose Bourdieu's contribution to advance the analysis of power is useful for understanding agents' practices in a FNSP.

Hopf (2002, 2010) draws upon Bourdieu to analyse the link between identity and foreign policy and to develop what he calls the *logic of habits* in international relations. In his book, he wants to 'develop a [constructivist] theory of social identity and foreign policy choice' and claims that '[e]ach society is bounded by a social cognitive structure within which some discursive formations dominate and compete' (Hopf 2002: 1). Individuals, he argues, would have a multiplicity of identities²⁵ that help to (re-)produce social cognitive structures. These structures feed back in the sense that they constitute the conditions of possibility for identities and agents' range of social manoeuvre. Since Hopf notes that the ways identities are socially constructed is missing in the literature (e.g., in social psychology), scholars would

²⁵ For Hopf, 'the presence and operation of identities is the human desire to understand the social world and the consequent cognitive need for order, predictability, and certainty', that is, they 'operate like cognitive devices or heuristics' (2002: 4).

need to ask the question what *the social* is made of. Accordingly, and while arguing for contingency and constant empirical testing, Hopf criticises Bourdieu and like-minded scholars for providing rather pre-established and materialist conceptualisations of social structures. For Hopf, any assumption that takes identity-related questions – that is, questions of belonging, Self/Other-constructions or the possibility of a rational approach towards one's own identity – as already given must be declined until verified empirically. Instead, he focuses on the recurring daily habits²⁶ and (discursive) practices of individual agents that constantly construct those agents' identities and have effects for the way states perceive themselves and others. In this regard, he holds that identities might be thought of as the outcomes of processes of habitual constitutions of 'Self and Other through a collection of discursive practices' (Hopf 2002: 11). Even if individuals would conceive of constraints to their options of behaviour 'as objective', they are 'the product of an intersubjective social structure', that is, a 'particular sociohistorical temporal space within which particular intersubjective meanings predominate' (Hopf 2002: 5). He derives this from notions developed by theorists such as Foucault, Geertz, Husserl, and, indeed, from Bourdieu's habitus. Hopf further develops his argument in an article on the 'logic of habit' (2010). He criticises the frequent presuppositions made in IR approaches based on the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness and claims that these pay too much attention to 'agency, rationality, and uncertainty' (Hopf 2010: 539). What would be needed instead is a reading of social agents' behaviour the way they supposedly are, that is, as embedded in relatively stable social structures and driven by habitual dispositions and practices. Emphasising habits would mean emphasising the constraints, stasis, and inertia of social structures on the one hand, and unthinking and subliminal social action by individuals vis-à-vis the social world on the other hand. Connecting the notion of habit with Bourdieu's doxa, he refers to the latter as 'taken-for-granted background habits' that would only come into play if the social context changes dramatically for agents (Hopf 2010: 543). This is, again, meant to delineate the difference between his *agency-shrinking* logic of habit and other logics such as Pouliot's logic of practicality (2008, 2010). Hopf characterises the latter as a misinterpretation of Bourdieu's work because it would overlook his structuralist core and the extent of doxa's stabilising qualities, that is, it would overemphasise agency and change. In short, he follows the critics

²⁶ Hopf defines habits as 'unreflective reactions we have to the world around us: our perceptions, attitudes, emotions, and practices' (2010: 544).

of Bourdieu and interprets him as a structuralist opposing change or having no theory thereof. Hopf contributes to our understanding of security policy by exploring the link between identity construction, habit, and practice, and by highlighting that *the social* is always constituted by the interdependence of both contingency and persistence. We could, hence, ask how this interdependence appears in a FNSP and how agents' identities play a role in producing (their) practices. As I show in Chapter 3, however, Hopf's structuralist reading of Bourdieu differs significantly from mine. For example, Hopf does not really discuss where the concept of habitus comes in, that is, how we should conceive of the relation between habit and habitus and why we would need the former if Bourdieu is a structuralist in any case. Inasmuch as Bourdieu talks about the incorporation of the principles of the social world 'in minds (or in *bodies*)' (1994: 13; my emphasis), I am troubled by Hopf's interpretation as if they were 'stored as cognitive structures in the brain' (2010: 546). For Hopf, this shall raise awareness for the opportunities provided by combining cognitive neuroscience with habit-based positivist research in IR. Basically, the latter foils large parts of Bourdieu's scientific project which is formulated as a critique of any forms of positivist social sciences. Hopf's emphasis on habit is all the more unconvincing given Bourdieu's move towards the use of the term habitus to overcome the 'common conception of *habit* as a mechanical assembly or performed programme' and 'to demonstrate the active, inventive and 'creative' capacities of the habitus and the agent' (1977: 95; my emphasis; 1996b: 179).

An author combining questions of foreign policy with Bourdieu's work more explicitly is Jackson (2008). He is interested in how cultural international history – that is, international history after the cultural turn in the academic field of history – can profit from Bourdieu's sociology. Jackson sees 'culture as an interpretive framework for understanding human behavior' and believes that what Bourdieu's work offers is 'a more rigorous and systematic approach to understanding the cultural roots of [foreign] policy formulation and decision-making', without falling into the agency-structure dichotomy (2008: 157, 156). For Jackson, policy formulation and decision-making appear to be instantiated in agents' practices, which are the outcome of the reciprocity between their 'ideas, beliefs and identities' (i.e., the dispositions of habitus), and the social structures of the world (2008: 163). Introducing field, habitus, capital, and doxa, he claims with an emphasis on culture that habitus is an 'engine of cultural action' but without making it a device of determination (Jackson 2008: 164). He applies the field concept to the empirical (and historical) example of the foreign ministry of

France during the periods of World War I and II. The field's stakes are believed to be the 'influence over policymaking and career advancement' (Jackson 2008: 169). If individuals want to participate in this game, Jackson argues, then they need cultural capital in the form of an elitist education, economic capital to pay for the education, and symbolic capital in the form of adequate personal qualities (e.g., ways of dressing and talking) enabling them to be ranked as diplomats. Yet the foreign ministry would not be the only field, because of the 'wider interministerial field' of the state (Jackson 2008: 170). The latter field is populated by other ministries that compete over the allocation of resources to have a voice in policymaking on the state level. Jackson claims that ministries (or other units within the state) are themselves agents with a habitus, and that they make use of their strategies and capitals accordingly. This foreign policy field is, as one would expect, also influenced by processes taking place in the international sphere.

Concerning the analysis of a FNSP, it is of interest that Jackson speaks about *fields* of foreign policymaking, even though he joins the chorus of scholars pointing out that Bourdieu defines fields only imprecisely. Jackson is truly right to say that Bourdieu's sociology is not the place to look for if one wants to make theoretical claims about why certain foreign policies were decided on and implemented afterwards. However, he sees the opportunity to investigate the ways in which agents' foreign policy habitus – for example, questions of identity and field-adequate policy options – are constituted in the first place and how cultural factors contribute to this. While I agree that we need to analyse the constitution of habitus (e.g., by means of mapping positions), Jackson does not provide a developed account of how to do so. This is related to the problem that he is rather unclear what he means by cultural factors. He emphasises that field analysis is less prone to internal-external distinctions, yet it seems as if his account still conceptualises the various forms of constraints to agents' behaviour to be mainly located in an external realm beyond the field. Finally, it is not apparent how doxa resembles what IR constructivists perceive to be 'norms and normative standards' (Jackson 2008: 167f.).

Neumann (2002) attempts to show how the linguistic turn in the human and social sciences – with its emphasis on the relevance of language in social life and the analysis of texts and speech acts by methods such as discourse analysis – applies to IR and why it is necessary to combine it with practice-theoretical reasoning. He holds that the 'analysis of discourse understood as the study of the preconditions for social action must include the analysis of

practice understood as the study of social action itself', because research only relying on a theoretical exploration of texts (and meanings) would not be able to grasp how agents in fact interrelate with the social world in terms of perception and action (Neumann 2002: 627f.). 'Practices are discursive', Neumann argues, because 'some practices involve speech acts' and because there are no practices that happen to be beyond the discursive realm (2002: 628). Being so closely interwoven with *the social*, practices are seen as multi-constituted actions of agents that are difficult to understand as their operation is not self-explanatory at first sight. For that reason, Neumann proposes to foreground the concept of culture 'as a dynamic interplay between discourse and practice' (2002: 630). Bourdieu would come into the picture by downplaying the role of language, since agents would be basically unable to speak about and explain their practices – making theorisation about them challenging to impossible. Using a critique from Brenda Farnell, Neumann claims that Bourdieu's related view of practices as being unconscious is misleading because a split-off between consciousness and unconsciousness is problematic from the outset (Neumann 2002: 631, fn. 9). To deepen his understanding of discursive practices, Neumann introduces the work of Michel de Certeau. Arguably unlike Foucault but similar to Bourdieu, de Certeau is interested in a 'tacit knowledge'-informed 'theory of action' based on a concept he calls 'metis' (Neumann 2002: 633f.). According to Neumann, de Certeau tries to proceed from both Foucault's emphasis on 'effects of practices' and Bourdieu's interest in 'how practices emerge' by using metis to understand agents' actions as such (2002: 634). De Certeau criticises Bourdieu's tendency towards 'reification' because he would conceive of practices as actions that only unfold in particular spatial settings (e.g., the Kabyle House) – which seem to have lost their significance in today's global economy – and because he would overlook the particularities of different cultures due to his methodological nationalism (Neumann 2002: 634f.). Neumann tries to avoid these problems by connecting his conceptualisation of culture with de Certeau's 'stories', that is, the ability of certain agents to travel to different places and to use coordinated speech acts (i.e., a story) 'ahead of social practices to open a field for them' (De Certeau 1984: 125, in: Neumann 2002: 635f.).

Neumann rightfully points to the need to engage with practice theories and to acknowledge the complexities of culture by defining it 'as a circuit of practice, discourse and stories, charged with power' (2002: 637). Yet the handling of Bourdieu's work seems to lack sufficient attention to detail and functions only as an opposite for introducing a different reading. If we

look at *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), for example, then it comes as a surprise how Bourdieu could underestimate the role of language. Although the concept of habitus involves elements of unconsciousness, Neumann seems to overestimate these in a way that is closer to the understanding of habit by Hopf (2010). Without a doubt, the context for the emergence of practices is pivotal to Bourdieu. Only, is not telling a story a practice in the first place, and making the distinction between story and practice slightly arbitrary? As I show concerning a FNSP, interpreting Bourdieusian practices to be overly attached to *physical* space – or 'geography', as Neumann has it (2002: 634) – is common, but inadequate, because it does not sufficiently take into consideration Bourdieu's discussion of *social* space.

Pouliot (2010) makes use of Bourdieu's work to develop a new reading of non-violent security relations between states. His argument is that states often refrain from violent means, because their routine diplomacy is based on 'self-evident' and 'commonsensical' practices, which are the result of the (adequate) interplay 'between the practitioners' dispositions [...] and their positions in the field of international security' (Pouliot 2010: 1). If this interplay is inadequate, he argues, then the interstate relations are likely to be conflictive due to 'symbolic power struggles over the very terms of interaction' (Pouliot 2010: 2.). Pouliot notes that the latter situation appears to initially describe the relationship between a de-facto powerful and overly self-assured NATO and a Russian state whose self-image of being a major power is not reflected by other agents' perceptions of this position. Although this would be a 'mismatch' between dispositions and positions (i.e., Bourdieu's 'hysteresis'), he claims that both players in fact have come a long way to reach a relatively stable relation 'of normalized diplomacy' and form a security community of (diplomatic) practices (Pouliot 2010: 2, 5; Adler 2008). As the focus for him is not so much on representation as 'on what practitioners actually *do*', Pouliot sees what he calls a 'logic of practicality' at work (2010: 5f.; emphasis in original). Looking at the case of the 'NATO-Russia Council', he argues that agents' 'practices are informed by a substrate of inarticulate know-how' and can be investigated by drawing upon Bourdieu's notions of hysteresis and doxa, as well as by using a 'sobjective' methodology (2010: 6f.; see Chapter 4). While Pouliot contends that the well-established 'logics of social action [...] of consequences, appropriateness and arguing' are useful for certain purposes, he is critical of their 'bias toward representational knowledge', since this would exclude practices stemming from 'practical knowledge' such as in the case of diplomacy (2010: 11, 27). His metatheoretical claim is – with an obvious reference to the practice turn – that all practices

contain elements of unconsciousness enabling agents to act even without further cognisant processes (Pouliot 2010: 12f.). Although he notes that the four different logics – which arguably could be made five if we count in Hopf's logic of habit (2010) – are believed to complement each other, he declares the 'ontological priority' of the logic of practicality in relation to questions of agency and structure (Pouliot 2010: 13, 36). For Pouliot, the logic of practicality can be approached with Bourdieu's concepts of field, habitus, and 'practical sense' (2010: 27). Introducing the concepts, he claims that habitus – which would be 'located at the subjective level' and 'constitutes the intersection of structure and agency' – and field are reciprocally related and produce together practical sense which, in turn, 'makes certain practices appear reasonable and axiomatic, that is, in tune with commonsense' (Pouliot 2010: 33, 35). Agents' practical sense is seen to be linked to 'positional agency' in the sense that agents are positioned in the hierarchy of the field through the capitals they hold and that they 'think *from*' this position, that is, practical sense as an 'inarticulate feel for the game at both dispositional and positional levels' (Pouliot 2010: 35; emphasis in original). Only this (a priori) feel for the game would allow agents to draw upon and to assess the demand for a particular logic of social action in each field and situation (Pouliot 2010: 36). The relations between states in the international security field, Pouliot argues, will be peaceful if diplomacy becomes the doxa of the field since dispositions and positions are homologous (2010: 42, 46). Yet, if this is *not* the case, then agents' practices can be incongruous with the field's doxa as agents lack a feel for the game and hysteresis arises – resulting in what Bourdieu calls 'Don Quixote effects' (Pouliot 2010: 48). The latter are the basis for what Pouliot refers to as '[q]uixotic practices [that] weaken the doxic pattern of domination and action' in a field (2010: 233). With this analytical apparatus, Pouliot examines the relations between Russia and NATO after the Cold War and finds that 'collective identity' and peaceful means are the '*result* of practice' and should thus be analysed with his 'theory of practice of security communities' (2010: 237, 238; emphasis in original). Most significantly, this would imply that the dyadic relation improves if NATO allows Russia to acquire more 'cultural-symbolic resources to have a minimally successful hand in the [international security] game', since this would relinquish its tendency for policies of a 'Great Power habitus' in the long run (Pouliot 2010: 239, 238).

Pouliot makes a key contribution to BIS and for understanding a FNSP in the form of his logic of practicality. The latter helps us to grasp the impact of practical knowledge and practical sense for making certain practices possible. These practices are sometimes a matter of course

or a less-conscious – even unconscious – normalcy in the case of a doxic configuration. I share his view that we need to *take positions seriously* (as I call it) – and this might involve analysing whether agents' objective social positions in the field under scrutiny still match their interrelated subjective dispositions – to understand how the intricate links between habitus and field tend to produce practices together. Yet I depart from his pre-established claims, which seem to be like Hopf's claim in this respect, that the logic of practicality and practical sense are ontologically superior and prior to other logics of social actions. In contrast to Bourdieusian premises, this is akin to the establishment of just another grand story of social action that undermines the ever-changing and *relational* character of a truly *positional* perspective in relation to and with(in) social space (see Section 2.6 and my own efforts to construct a point of view in Chapters 3 and 4).

Drawing upon Bourdieu's 'structuralist constructivism', Williams (2007) attempts to construct a 'theory of cultural strategies' to address both the gap between the concepts of culture and strategy and the absence of an engagement with questions of 'power and strategy' in social constructivist security studies after the Cold War, since its scholarly protagonists tried to avoid the structuralism and rationalism of these concepts respectively (Williams 2007: 3, 4, 1). He identifies a 'field of security' and claims that this field changed dramatically in the post-Cold War decade, because 'military and material [forms of] power' lost influence in relative terms to 'cultural and symbolic forms of power' due to a 'cultural field of security' that reshaped the way 'security practices' were made (Williams 2007: 2, 40). To investigate the role the security-culture link played for this transformation and its various effects in the fields of politics and knowledge production, he intends to develop a new perspective on security practices using the concepts of field and habitus, 'cultural capital and symbolic power', and 'interests and strategies' (Williams 2007: 4, 24). Like others, he claims that these concepts are the appropriate vehicles to construct the missing bridge over the agency-structure abyss and to show that producing knowledge by making statements about security in terms of 'rationalist and materialist assumptions' would itself be a problematic 'cultural practice' driven by the historico-political stances and identities of the agents involved (Williams 2007: 24, 17, 10). As he introduces the above concepts, he notes that to be able to grasp the meaning of 'interests and strategies' they have to be analytically connected to the habitus-field-capital entanglement that enables their constitution, shows that interests are always field-specific, and strategies the 'ways in which agents pursue their interests' (Williams 2007: 34, 36). Put

differently, Williams most significantly claims: 'There is no such thing as a generic or ahistorical interest' (2007: 35). Seeing the West and its institutions as the authoritative voice and holder of relevant capitals in the cultural field of security, Williams points out that his appropriation of Bourdieu's sociology remains on a metatheoretical level and thus without analysing the intricacies of the mechanisms of construction of this field (2007: 41). It is for this reason that he asks what Kant (e.g., 'processes of recognition') and Bourdieu (e.g., 'strategies of disinterest') can contribute to the discussion about the 'symbolic power of the [liberal] democratic peace', how the field of cultural security and forms of cultural and symbolic power are interrelated and mutually constitutive with the enduring significance of NATO (e.g., via NATO's 'powerful cultural and political narrative'), and how this field and these forms of power are crucial to understand the neoconservative 'culture wars' of the US security policies in a post-9/11 world (Williams 2007: 43, 91, 92). Williams concludes that culture sometimes functions 'as a strategy and a form of power' and that understanding power necessitates understanding the link between – and not the prioritisation of only one of – agency and structure (2007: 123f.). It would follow that agency (and its room for manoeuvre) is highly contextual because of variegated constellations of power(s), fields, and practices (Williams 2007: 124f.).

Williams illustrates how non-material forms of power matter in fields and how agents' interests and strategies, followed by their practices, can only be understood as the product of the historical combination of ideational and material factors – factors that can be revealed with Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus. Williams' account of a cultural field of security appears to be, however, too abstract with its broad categories of culture and security and its logic still too undisclosed for approaching a FNSP. That said, his exploration of the interest-strategy-practice link – and his emphasis on its historicity – is of value for mapping relevant agencies in the field.

2.4 Taking Objectivity Seriously – Emphasising *Field*

Elhardt and Senn (2014) use Bourdieu's concepts to approach an assumed field of nuclear weapons and the question how agents might be able to change taken-for-granted assumptions about it. They identify the necessity of researching 'the sources of authority' and 'rhetorical tools of persuasion' that dominant agents can use for their purposes and to analyse

the 'conditions under which and the mechanisms through which discursive power operates' (Elhardt/Senn 2014: 317). Their empirical concern is why the 2007 initiative of Shultz and colleagues towards the abolition of nuclear weapons was met with a relatively successful response from 'security elites' (Elhardt/Senn 2014: 317). The argument is that the impact can be explained by the coming together of a 'favourable historical context' in the end of the Cold War, the role played by the high volume of 'symbolic capital' the initiators have 'as nuclear elites', and through their 'inclusion of several commonplace understandings [that] made their narrative appealing to security elites' (Elhardt/Senn 2014: 318f.). Introducing the concepts of doxa, field, and (symbolic) capital, they refer to the field's doxa as the state of knowledge about nuclear weapons that is (widely) taken-for-granted. Drawing upon Villumsen Berling (2012), the authors highlight that this doxa is not fixed because of permanent 'doxic battles' (Elhardt/Senn 2014: 321). Being a strong contender in such battles would necessitate adequate symbolic capital and the ability to construct narratives other crucial agents in the field might be interested in. Narratives can become more interesting by using well-known meanings (e.g., the 'existential risk' of nuclear weapons) that are already present in, for example, the 'national field of power' of the US (Elhardt/Senn 2014: 322).

With their discourse-oriented framework, Elhardt and Senn can demonstrate how doxa, agents' symbolic power, and different forms of narratives work together. Therefore, it would be possible to ask how agents in a FNSP construct narratives to change its doxa. It is, however, problematic that the authors' treatment of context seems to be superficial as they equate it with the end of the Cold War, but without specifying any further mechanisms. A related concern is that their use of the concept of field is under-complex, because it misses its positional aspects. Arguably, a field is an ever-changing network or web of objective positions occupied by agents that perform interrelated and subjective position-taking moves. Without engaging with (these) positions in more depth, the authors' claim that this field exists in the first place is rather weak and does not allow for understanding the field's logic. A logic that will be difficult to grasp devoid of analysing agents' habitus (to some initial extent). As such, Elhardt and Senn's account of a field of nuclear weapons remains a vague description.

Go (2008) uses Bourdieu's field concept to explain the related but 'different forms or modes' of governing of the British and US empires 'during their respective cycles of hegemony (1815-1918; 1946-present)' (Go 2008: 201). Distinguishing between 'formal' (i.e., the direct rule of classical colonialism) and 'informal' (i.e., the multiple practices of indirect rule and power

projection) forms, he claims that the British empire represents the former and the US empire the latter form (Go 2008: 202). Go holds that exploring the variance between the two empires necessitates studying the role of 'global factors' by analysing the states' 'larger *global fields*' (2008: 203; emphasis in original). He further argues that existing interpretations (i.e., what he calls realist-materialist and norm-culturalist IR theories or world-systems and world society theories) are of interest but share the same problem: They operate with pre-established assumptions about how the global is constituted and which processes and factors are (causally) relevant for the behaviour of agents at lower levels (Go 2008: 204f.). Proposing a 'global fields approach' to circumvent this problem, he underscores the conflictive nature of fields and sees them both as 'objective configurations of actor-positions' and as 'subjective meanings guiding actors' (e.g., 'rules' and 'cultural or symbolic capital') (Go 2008: 206). Populated by a variety of public and private collectives fighting *for* capitals (i.e., in the case of 'stronger states' also for symbolic capital), the approximately five-hundred-years-old European-induced global field is relational in principle, globalises its own logic, and produces with the help of integrated and more specific fields the habitus of individuals, the practices of diverse agents, and the characteristics of these collectives (Go 2008: 207f.). Thinking with fields would entail looking at agents' capital-related strategic actions (e.g., by challenging the doxa of the field) instead of presupposing that 'a particular field configuration or cultural content [...] in turn explains all outcomes' (Go 2008: 209f.). For his comparison of the historical modes of governing in both empires, he conceives of two empirically interrelated yet analytically distinctive fields and uses in-depth case studies of British and US imperial policies in their global economic context (Go 2008: 210). While asking how each global field's specific setting influenced the strategic choices of the states, he claims that the 'differences impacted imperial forms by shaping the *opportunity structure for formal imperialism*' (Go 2008: 213; emphasis in original). The chances for the US to employ a formal form were strongly restricted because of the unavailability of non-possession spaces, the option to use the existing European colonial system for economic interests or the installation of military bases, and the imperative to win the fight with the U.S.S.R. over the symbolic capital of (nationalist) anti-colonialism. As for the British case, there were more *free* spaces to be possessed, the implementation of colonial regimes abroad enabled its domestic political economy to prosper, and being a (benevolent) colonial power meant having symbolic capital (Go 2008: 212ff.). Without denying the role of national political and cultural processes, Go concludes with

arguing for an approach that sees these processes as non-essentialist parts of, and 'relationally' interwoven with, the web of relations forming the global field, that is, an approach overcoming internal-external and materialist-culturalist dichotomies by highlighting the 'structural configuration[s] and cultural content[s]' of fields (2008: 223).

Go's appropriation of the field concept underscores the advantages of conceiving (also) of *the global* in relational and contingent terms and shows its applicability for comparative-historical research. The question arises to what extent the logic of a FNSP is constituted by and transversally related to other fields (e.g., field of power). In contrast to Go's own claims and goals, however, his global field approach still seems to construct an external structure causing subordinated agents to act in accordance with factors located at the global *level*. I use the latter terminology to stress that Go's rather Westphalia-centred macro-approach seems to me problematic, because its reference to agents' habitus is minimal. In other words, it largely fails to engage with questions of agency in a way that is substantively different from the theories criticised at the outset of his contribution. A minor point is: Do (weaker) agents not also fight *with* (symbolic) capital(s)?

Kauppi (2003) is interested in the European integration process and refers to Bourdieu's concepts of 'field, capital and habitus' to address the problems of established theories of integration, that is, the bifurcation between the statism of the 'inter-governmentalist and neo-realist model' and the supra-nationalism of the 'neofunctionalist[...] multi-governance model', as well as the lack of 'a theory of agency' in social constructivism (Kauppi 2003: 775ff.). Claiming that Bourdieu's structural constructivism is in line with social constructivist premises, he holds that the French thinker 'conceptualizes politics topologically', that he conceives of the field of politics as an ordinary field, and that this political field is fundamentally and enduringly structured into a 'binary logic' between agents fighting to maintain its existing constellation and agents fighting to transform it in order to gain dominance (Kauppi 2003: 778, 780). For Kauppi, this logic is constitutive for the political field in principle, that is, 'from political parties [...], all the way down to the habitus of an individual' (2003: 778). Emphasising the relationality of Bourdieu's sociology, he notes that making sense of questions of political positioning requires an engagement with the historic connections between positions elsewhere in the field and how they are triggered (Kauppi 2003: 779). Within the field, political capital is believed to be secured both by individuals and by the authorisation of an individual (e.g., party leader), or of a group, through others (Kauppi 2003: 779). Kauppi

interprets Bourdieu as having not much to say about the 'public sphere and the rule of law' because of the profoundly conflictive nature of his understanding of politics, that is, he assumes that Bourdieu operates with an understanding that is 'stateless' in the sense of a 'genuine shared public authority' (2003: 781). Although he believes in the basic utility of Bourdieu's sociology to study 'the formation of a transnational European space' and uses the notion of field to understand how the integration process impacts on the 'national political fields' in France and Finland, Kauppi is critical of Bourdieu's assumed tendency to exaggerate the 'mechanisms of power delegation' and to generalise them across political systems and societal realms (2003: 784f., 786).

I show in Chapter 3 that I comply with Kauppi's emphasis on the spatial facets – that is, what he calls *topology* – of Bourdieu's vocabulary. While he seems to confine this to Bourdieu's understanding of politics and unfortunately stops then, I argue that this holds for his whole sociology and should be further expanded on. Since Bourdieu identifies a multitude of (possible) fields, the question could be whether a FNSP resembles a political field and whether a (Kauppiian) binary logic is not too restrictive in the sense that, for instance, not all *challenging* agents would want to dominate the field on their own since their habitus is more complex than that. Highlighting positions, as Kauppi does, is important, yet should go beyond the objective-material domain, as Pouliot has pointed out (2010: 244; see Chapter 3). Again, the empirical analysis investigates whether there are links to be found between a public sphere – which I, in contrast to Kauppi, argue can be understood in conflictive terms – and a FNSP.

Shapiro (2002) contributes to the (Bourdieuian) discussion on hierarchies, orders, and political economies. He is critical of Bourdieu's understanding of 'social order' as a 'hierarchical system of social fractions' and instead proposes what he calls a 'fractal field, a historically effected amalgam of diverse life worlds that have been assembled by a history of state-directed nation-building and its attendant forms of political economy' (Shapiro 2002: 612). Yet Shapiro agrees with Bourdieu that what is essential is a break with 'state thinking', that is, breaking with the 'symbolic violence' of the state and its ability to impose and steer agents' principles of vision and division about the social world (e.g., seeing the state as a given entity) (2002: 615). If the state is not seen as given, then symbolic violence could be analysed and ultimately broken via tracing the social history of the state by showing how opposing social forces have constituted it and how other forces have proved unsuccessful.

Shapiro's fractal field seems to be an interesting analytical device, which would be, however, difficult to implement in methodological terms. But his insistence on the symbolic dimension of (state) power and the necessity of unpacking the state's social history will have to be a guiding feature in the next chapters regarding a FNSP. Since African IR calls for the latter (see Section 1.2), it is an opportunity to connect it with Bourdieu's emphasis on how particular agents within and beyond the state of Nigeria use their symbolic power to shape a FNSP.

Villumsen Berling (2012) draws upon Bourdieu to study the shift of 'orthodox' and 'heterodox' understandings of security towards the inclusion of non-military threats, non-state agents, and the possibility of political transformation after the end of the Cold War (Villumsen Berling 2012: 452). Claiming that Bourdieu's concepts – and particularly the concept of capital – have yet to be sufficiently and systematically introduced to IR, she attempts to do so by developing an 'action framework' that links questions of agency to the concepts of 'field, capital, and *doxa*' (Villumsen Berling 2012: 456, 452; emphasis in original). This would be decisive, she holds, since the existing IR literature from rationalism (e.g., neo-realism) to reflectivism (e.g., 'soft' and 'radical' forms of constructivism) would fail to grasp the relevance of 'symbolic power struggles' for the question of what effected the change of NATO after 1989 (Villumsen Berling 2012: 453). She argues that it is necessary to understand how in the 'European field of Security' the 'central stake' of the field's struggles shifted from military capital to capitals with a more symbolic core and what role non-state agents played in this process. That is, she is interested in how agents of academic and policy-related knowledge production such as social scientists and think tanks used their 'scientific capital' to establish what European security is (supposed to be) from their points of view (Villumsen Berling 2012: 453, 468). Focusing on *doxa* and the use of capital by agents, Villumsen Berling suggests analysing the 'field-capital-agency-doxa nexus' to demonstrate how producing knowledge about international politics and security (i.e., theory) is interrelated with and affects politics (i.e., practice) (2012: 454). She conceives of capital as a field-specific and relational concept and quotes Bourdieu to define it as 'a weapon and a stake of struggle [which] allow the possessor of that capital to wield a power' (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992b: 98, in: Villumsen Berling 2012: 455). The aspect of recognition is vital for her, since a capital is only of use or its power active, if it is perceived as such by various agents, that is, capital in its symbolic form. Villumsen Berling notes that emphasising the notion of capital has several methodological advantages: While it initially allows us to approach a field without presupposing its possible agents, their

qualities, and social relations, it later enables locating the significant agents by illustrating what stakes are at play and, hence, contributes to the (temporary) delimitation of the field's variable boundaries (2012: 455, 465). Specifically, the possession and gain of (symbolic) capitals is seen to determine the '*position in the hierarchy* in a field' of agents (Villumsen Berling 2012: 455, 467f.; emphasis in original). Since capital alone will not account for transformation, it would be crucial to understand the ways capital is put into action by 'strategic mobilization' and 'strategic practices', which resemble 'doxic battles', that is, 'the (re)production process of the basic structures of a given field' (Villumsen Berling 2012: 455, 469). Acknowledging the role of habitus for questions of agency, she sidelines the concept because of the methodological problem of assessing the multiple dispositions of agents (Villumsen Berling 2012: 460). Villumsen Berling tries to avoid hastily predetermining which agents are significant and traces the development of the stock and modes of interrelations among knowledge-producing agents and security practitioners in the European security field via text-based analysis (2012: 466). Identifying the importance of new forms of social-scientific capital, its emerging (non-state) users, and an altered doxa, she concludes that the field of security in Europe has transformed dramatically after the Cold War (Villumsen Berling 2012: 472).

With its concentration on the concepts of, and the fields' very own, capital and doxa, Villumsen Berling's account helps us to discover and accentuate what agents in fields are in fact struggling over – that is, the field's stake – and what positions (of power) they occupy while doing so. It will be necessary to determine whether we can find a specific kind of capital that is valued in and constitutive for a FNSP and/or whether we can trace similarities to the diverse kinds of capitals (and fields) already established by Bourdieu and others (e.g., political, diplomatic, social, bureaucratic, scientific, etc.). It is also possible to ask how a FNSP's doxa might look like and whether we can detect processes that might destabilise it. Yet whether capital must take on a symbolic form to be a useful agential resource is debatable, since it is possible to argue that certain kinds of material and force-related capital do not always need recognition since they are used as brute *power-over*. Although she mentions it, and although there is no direct inevitability to use the concept of habitus (or any of the others as Chapter 3 shows), it seems to be difficult to make sense of agency completely without it. Specifically, Villumsen Berling combines *agency* with the other concepts and since she wants to understand the strategic dimensions of practices. How can agents be *strategic* in any sense

of the word if not through and with their habitus?

2.5 Taking Variety Seriously – Emphasising a Relational and Mixed Use of Tools

Adler-Nissen (2008) uses Bourdieu's insights to investigate not the reasons for but the less known 'causal' and 'constitutive' 'effects of opt-outs [from the European Union framework] on national diplomatic strategies' via analysing the prolific cases of Denmark and the UK (2008: 667, 664). Bourdieu, for her, helps to show how 'practices, group pressures and identity constructions in the Councils of Ministers' account for the changing behaviour concerning opt-outs (Adler-Nissen 2008: 664). This would be necessary since existing research on the 'integration dilemma' and opt-outs would see states only as inflexible agents pursuing their (economic) interest and having the problem of either losing national autonomy (i.e., rejecting opt-outs) or influence (i.e., using opt-outs) (Adler-Nissen 2008: 666f.). In contrast, Adler-Nissen argues that states are internally constituted by individuals and groups negotiating these policies, that the diplomatic praxis is in fact 'consensus-oriented', and that outcomes are to some extent shaped by informal practices (2008: 667). Introducing the concepts of field, habitus, and capital, she conceives of the Council of Ministers as an 'obvious [diplomatic] field' – including 'sub-fields' with specific demands and possibilities – consisting of powerful individuals whose shared habitus lets them *know* that playing cooperatively is the way things are done in this field (Adler-Nissen 2008: 668f.). While these individuals have national affiliations they must consider, and that endow them also with different capitals they can bring to the field, their subjectivities in relation to opt-outs are to some extent shaped by the field and the specific habitus it produces (Adler-Nissen 2008: 670). A central kind of capital for the diplomatic field, Adler-Nissen argues, is 'political' and describes the 'political power enjoyed by politicians and leaders [...] derived from the trust' they are provided with (i.e., recognised as such) by their supporters because of the discourse of individual capability and public standing around them (2008: 670). Since written evidence appears to be sparse, she uses interviews to explore the daily cognitive encounters and the habitus of diplomats from Denmark and the UK regarding the diverse strategic handling of opt-outs, and to understand the ways in which the field structures whose speech acts have significance (Adler-Nissen 2008: 671f.). In short, Adler-Nissen finds that opt-outs are both causally effective for diplomacy in the EU and constitutive of diplomats' and their states' 'self-understanding[s]' (2008: 672, 679).

For approaching a FNSP, Adler-Nissen correctly points to the necessity of questioning simplistic depictions of states by demonstrating that these are the product of a complex interplay of various habitus-informed practices of individuals and groups. She shows how particular individuals from this pool shape politics in institutions beyond their own national realm using kinds of capitals (e.g., to enforce their speech acts) and how they develop a joint feel for the game. To investigate the latter, conducting interviews with experts and practitioners is a viable methodological option (see Chapter 4). Like many Bourdieusian scholars, however, she simply proclaims the existence of a field – an 'obvious' one, in fact – with the Councils of Ministers and sees even more sub-fields at work. Even if I preliminarily proclaim a FNSP, this act is neither provoked by obviousness nor by assuming an infinite number of sub-fields. I argue in Chapter 3 that the merit of field theory lies not in identifying as many fields as possible but in a configurational analysis of multiple positions, which Adler-Nissen underemphasises.

If we want to highlight positions, as I do, we can turn to Bigo (2002, 2008), who uses Bourdieu to analyse the changing understanding of security. He is interested in 'why the discourses of securitization [on migration] continue to be so powerful even when alternative discourses are well known' through the engagement of critical scholars or non-governmental organisations (Bigo 2002: 65). The reason is, Bigo argues, that today's politics of security in the West is structured by a 'transnational field of professionals in the management of unease' (2002: 64). As players with their own goals, these security professionals – ranging from politicians to the intelligence services – have a common habitus and feel for the game helping them to frame migration as a risk via specific speech acts. These create narratives that, in turn, steer practices according to their interests. With Bourdieu and Giddens, Bigo claims that this is only possible because security professionals can draw upon the historically established 'conception of the state as a body or a container' (2002: 65). Using the symbolic power of the state – which makes them appear as if they have natural authority – they can demonstrate having the instruments and the proper knowledge to deal with potential problems. Therefore, the role of the state is seen as fundamental because of its ability to construct and enforce the realm of legitimate action and thinking (e.g., the way the question of sovereignty is underscored). Politicians securitising migration are part and parcel of this realm, that is, their personal life-world is determined by it, and their habitus is (made) in line with the 'illusion of the political field' (2002: 69). Bigo criticises that security professionals use the proclaimed

security/migration-nexus to explain restrictive immigration policies, instead of taking it as a discursive struggle among others. In doing so, Bigo sets himself apart from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies because these authors would claim that security issues can be transformed in a way removing them from day-to-day politics and making them exceptional. The Copenhagen School would fail to see that this is the result of the effects of the field and not something given, that is, out of the reach of political struggles in democracies. To overcome this shortcoming, Bigo attempts to combine Foucault's concept of governmentality with Bourdieu's emphasis on how 'positions of authority' enable certain powerful agents to define discursively what is at stake (e.g., what a 'threat' is) and what the conceded range of statements is (i.e., how it should be spoken about) (2002: 85). For analysing the 'discursive interaction' among 'the positions of authority of the enunciators, the spokespersons, [and] of the institutions', he makes the case for an approach that takes *positions* and *relations between positions* seriously (Bigo 2002: 85). Bigo extends his idea of the field of professionals in the management of unease (PMUs) to the global scale in a later piece (2008). He argues that PMUs in (predominantly) Western states would seek to collectively and transnationally address the assumed endangering problems of 'global (in)security' by technology-enabled practices of de-nationalisation and 'global policing' with the result of a growing dissolution of internal-external and civil-military distinctions of security (Bigo 2008: 10). While Bigo claims that established interpretations emphasise consistency and steering among PMUs' subjectivities, he sees the manifold field-constituting security agents as rivals with their very own habitus, which fight for dominant positions in the quest for enforcing their 'standpoints on how to prioritize threats' or to reach 'the monopoly of the legitimate knowledge on what constitutes a legitimate unease' (2008: 11, 12). Bigo sees PMUs flourishing in the domestic fights of their nation states because they can exploit the 'symbolic power' and competence that comes with the extent of their transnational embeddedness – making notions of 'national interest' and states-as-containers antiquated while 'localiz[ing] the spaces of political decision-making' (2008: 13). Because the 'transnationalization of bureaucracies' determines the field's de-nationalised habitus, PMUs would develop into 'transnational guilds' (Bigo 2008: 15). In outlining these empirical phenomena, Bigo sets the stage for his methodological postulate to break with the inside/outside-thinking in political and scientific social arenas because it would no longer represent a social reality constituted by constantly shifting networks of informal and formal security agencies and their practices of increasing

amalgamation. Both Elias' concept of 'figuration' and Bourdieu's complex of field and habitus are seen as possible ways for analysing the current state of affairs, yet an analysis will have to involve an understanding 'of the process of differentiation [...] of the Western state' and a 'genealogy' of how a field operates as a (possible) antagonism (Bigo 2008: 17). For Bigo, a field must be conceptualised at the same time as a 'field of force', a 'field of struggle', a 'field of domination', and a 'transversal field' (2008: 22). These different qualities are interrelated with and configure agents' practices by 'effects of the field' or 'field-effects' (Bigo 2008: 26). Yet, in his analysis, the main empirical question is whether and to what extent PMUs can establish their speech acts as the *true* voice for defining and handling risks, that is, whether they can play out their authority or appear as if having it. On the one hand, the state can be conceived of as a field in need of analysis. On the other hand, Bigo holds that Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the state as 'the space of convertibility [...] of social capital' is misleading because it remains too state-centric and does not acknowledge the transformation of the state in the present global political economy (2008: 28). This is one of the reasons why Bigo combines the notion of field with Foucault's concept of *dispositif*. By interpreting the *dispositif* as transversal, flexible, and open, he sees it to be able to make sense of field-effects in their entirety because they are the product of the variegated practices and relations existing between agents in more than one field. In a similar way, Bigo re-frames Foucault's panopticon into a 'ban-opticon' to apprehend today's complex discursive and practical reality of '(in)security at the transnational level' (2008: 32).

Although Bigo's argument develops from stressing the shared habitus of similar agents and the symbolic powers of the state to stressing the different habitus of and conflicts among agents, and the diminishing role of the state, we can probably draw on both viewpoints for analysing a FNSP. Looking at the literature on African IR and Nigeria, commonalities and state-strength, conflicts and state-weakness, as well as dissolving inside/outside-distinctions, seem to go hand in hand. What remains is to locate and map positions of authority in the discursive struggles over the (symbolic) power to define the stake (e.g., what security *policy* in Nigeria is). Thus, I do share Bigo's emphasis on objective positions in social space and how these are deeply interrelated with subjective individual or collective position-takings based on agents' habitus, that is, taking positions seriously in both ways. In other words, what is needed is an in-depth exploration and deciphering of the logics of fields – of which a FNSP might be seen as a *single* field. It follows that I do not see the necessity of integrating insights from Foucault

in the analysis to account for the field-effects of more than one field. Problematic is that Bigo's two contributions seem to be entrenched with the historical configuration of the modern European state in one way or another. It is, hence, necessary to translate his insights for my own focus on a FNSP.

Leander (2001, 2002, 2005) discusses the merits of Bourdieu's sociology for elucidating the fields of IPE and Security Studies. Instead of proposing even more general laws or macro-theories on the operations of economies, Leander claims that IPE scholars would be well advised to follow Bourdieu's accentuation of factual social relations (i.e., a focus on *the empirical*) as the starting point for analysing economies. Bourdieu helps researchers to prevent the 'scholastic bias' of retreating from the particularities of the social world in favour of universal theorising (Leander 2001: 345). On the one hand, scholars could make use of his field theory as a '[thick] structuralist attack on agency centred explanations', since 'structure has effects independently of the interactions of agents and even independently of their consciousness' (Leander 2001: 347f.). On the other hand, questions of agency are stressed with the concept of habitus and how agents develop and exert strategies. Having said that, Leander criticises in her book review²⁷ that Bourdieu, who seldom shies away from pointing to the specificities of fields and their bounded nature (e.g., to national settings), seems to enter equivocal scientific territory by claiming that the principles of the analysed field (i.e., the economic field of the French housing market) can be partly transferred onto the international level (2001: 349). Besides this criticism, Leander underscores Bourdieu's concern that (social) science as a practice should be done in a reflexive manner as it is always both a process of abstraction from the social world and a meaning-producing activity 'from somewhere' (2002: 602). If the role of the researcher is to shed light on agents and processes in the social world by designing studies, making observations and, ultimately, proposing judgements, then doing this without problematising one's very own position becomes an impossible undertaking because these supposedly enlightening scientific procedures – including the subjectivities of the researcher – are already and in any circumstance part and parcel of the same world. Although a constant self-positioning can be a tedious process and Bourdieu's thinking tools difficult to grasp, Leander argues for an engagement with these questions because they would improve the credibility of research and highlight its 'impact [...]

²⁷ The reviewed book is Pierre Bourdieu (2000): 'Les structures sociales de l'économie'. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

on social hierarchies' (2002: 604). In 2005, Leander engages with a different set of agents and practices by claiming that Private Military Companies (PMCs) are among those social forces that have influenced world politics profoundly since the end of the Cold War. She argues that we, with the help of Bourdieu, need to rethink the concept of power in constructivist terms to make sense of the decisive role of PMCs. Drawing upon the concept of habitus by 'locating power relations in the field-specific dispositions' (2005: 805), Leander wants to scrutinise 'the indirect effects PMCs can have on other actors' [identities and] interests by influencing their understanding of security' through forming 'meaning in discourse', that is, using their 'epistemic power' within 'the evolving logic [...] of the field of legitimate security expertise' (2005: 811). Since Leander understands power in structural terms, the power of PMCs would vary in this field and it is for the researcher to determine how their set of practices – ranging from information processing and allocating to consulting and lobbying – help to constitute their 'positions of authority' (e.g., by performing influential speech acts) in the discourse on security (Leander 2005: 812). For Leander, these practices are arguably able to shape the security understandings of agents (e.g., security experts) and thus to gradually change their habitus over time in favour of an appreciation of the work of PMCs, that is, helping PMCs to gain strength whether this is intended or not by other agents. The strengthening is due to the configuration of the field and the relations between various discourses (on security).²⁸ Because of their capabilities, self-interested PMCs are believed to be more and more important players in an increasingly privatised process of defining what a security issue is and whose speech acts are to be considered relevant in 'the production of legitimate knowledge' about it (Leander 2005: 820). In times of neoliberal globalisation, PMCs and other private or less-public agents seem to dominate the discursive negotiations about security and, therefore, to contribute substantially to the conditions of possibility for related political decisions and actions by public institutions such as governments, which operate in an atmosphere of shrinking democratic control. If speech acts emphasising non-military and non-private approaches to security are commonly silenced in the field of security expertise, then PMCs become a form of self-fulfilling prophecies (Leander 2005: 825).

Underscoring the ambiguous role of theory and, especially, theory production through the

²⁸ Importantly, Leander points out that an 'analysis of the relative strength of discourses would require an analysis of the 'field' of security, the *habitus* of all its actors and the weight of different forms of capital within it' (2005: 812; emphasis in original).

researcher, Leander provides valuable assistance for what researchers ought to look for while doing their business. I come back to the issue of reflexivity in Chapter 4 (Methodology). Looking at her criticism of Bourdieu, it can be said that there is the (enacted) danger for this thesis to presume a field – specifically, a *national* field – of security policy in *Nigeria* prior to empirical analysis. As said before, I do this for analytical reasons in the form of a FNSP to some limited extent. The question whether its principles could or should be generalised cannot yet be asked. Leander also introduces valid points concerning the role of discourses and how certain agents can use their positions of authority in a field to establish particular meanings as legitimate knowledge and how this knowledge impacts on other agents' subjectivities. For a FNSP, I will have to identify the practices and dissect the habitus of those powerful agents that are able to forge understandings of security policy in Nigeria (e.g., via specific speech acts) regarding my own cases. Compared to Leander, this will involve a more detailed engagement with the constituting aspects and ruling principles of a FNSP as her field of security expertise appears to be amorphous from time to time. The reader also marvels about the link between PMCs' practices and the field's (shifting) doxa.

Mérand (2010) applies Bourdieu's concepts to analyse why the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established, since he argues that common IR theories would not be able to account for it. Based on their 'material structuralism', realists focusing on 'balancing' the hegemony of the US would fail to see that European agents are as human individuals deeply embedded in and occupied by the daily practices of the 'European foreign policy field' and the NATO-dominated 'international defense field' (Mérand 2010: 347, 343f.). Likewise, constructivists interested in (macro)-'ideational factors' and the 'convergence of strategic cultures' would fail to sufficiently engage with agents' habitus on the level of individuals (Mérand 2010: 343f.). Claiming that Bourdieu's insights fill the gap between both approaches as well as between 'structure and agency' more broadly, Mérand notes that understanding the ESDP requires valuing the importance of the introduced 'transgovernmental' fields, the habitus of involved agents, and how the ESDP was constructed by the 'field-specific strategies of a handful of [politicians,] diplomats and military leaders' (2010: 366, 343). Because he ontologically prioritises relations over structures, Mérand claims that the analytical stress should be on how these agents – driven by their habitus and perception – assess their situation in relation to agents in the same field or other fields, and how they employ concrete strategic actions to prevail in the respective struggles. While

habitus functions as the foundation for 'a robust conception of agency', he wants to unpack the notion of the state as a solid entity by conceiving of the state as a field – or a composition of fields – analysing how different capitals are used by 'interest groups and bureaucratic actors in a unified model of social power' (Mérand 2010: 350f.). It would be necessary to explicate the relationship between the 'illusio' of the field (i.e., the particular interests agents have in it), agents' habitus-induced and field-specific strategies, and how 'symbolic representations' discursively shape fields in terms of 'principles of vision and division' (Mérand 2010: 351). Finally, Mérand engages with what he calls Bourdieu's 'theory of action' by underscoring that any actions of agents are axiomatically interrelated with their own 'structural position' in social space, that fields are binary spaces of struggle between order-keeping dominating and order-questioning dominated agents, and that a field is 'in crisis' if an 'external shock' allows agents to alter the governing logic of the field (2010: 352). He claims that analysts should study the principles of the two fields, their main illusio (i.e., NATO and EU), and how informed agents are able to reign these fields with the help of the appropriate 'practical sense' and 'military and diplomatic capital' (Mérand 2010: 352, 354). With the end of the Cold War as an external shock putting these fields and the reigning agents' capitals in crisis, the ESDP is seen as the likely outcome of institutional histories driven by an autochthonous and common 'European habitus' of agents – a habitus that is partly adopted through social learning in frequent personal encounters and that makes agents lean towards cooperative policies (Mérand 2010: 356, 360). Since he conceives of these ESDP agents as 'political entrepreneurs' forming a powerful 'epistemic community', Mérand sees his approach to speak to constructivist theories (2010: 372).

What can Mérand provide for understanding a FNSP? He stresses the incisive role of the (learned) habitus of (groups of) individuals and how these individuals' practices can only be thought of within the context of relational networks which enable and require certain strategies. We can identify the notion of and necessity for seeing states as fields and ask about the existence and form of a FNSP's habitus and illusio. Although the idea of symbolic representation sounds useful, it appears to be underdeveloped. The same might be said about the relation between and understanding of agents' practices and strategies, and how these intersect with a *theory of action* related to *structural positions* in social space if the initial focus was on habitus.

Like Go (2008), Steinmetz (2008) draws upon Bourdieu's field concept to approach questions

of colonialism. Yet his focus is more on the national realm, since he 'theoriz[es] the colonial state as a semi-autonomous field with its own specific form of symbolic capital, its own specific stakes of competition', in order to explore why varying modes of governing – that is, from genocide to preservation – were used in German colonies before 1914 and what consequences these had for 'native cultures' (Steinmetz 2008: 591, 590). Steinmetz calls for such an approach because of world-systems theory's indifference to different colonial practices, Marxism's constriction on metropolitan economic agents, and postcolonial theories' unwillingness to acknowledge that there is more to colonial practices than European discursive formations (2008: 590). Specifically, he himself holds that the variance in governing is due to changing constellations 'among the main elite groups competing inside the colonial bureaucracies' (Steinmetz 2008: 590). Steinmetz claims that while a field 'is a structured space of objective positions that operates as a universe of possible stances [and with a] distribution of specific capital', it is at the same time (related to) 'a homologous space of struggle between opposed postures or position-takings' (2008: 591). Habitus, in this reading, seems to be a form of negotiator between these two spaces (Steinmetz 2008: 591). The state is a semi-autonomous field because neither is it fully externally determined or controlled by the colonial power abroad, nor internally by its economic and governing agents on site (Steinmetz 2008: 591). Besides using tactics of divide and rule, the latter's focus was on framing natives discursively as all-embracingly different from themselves (Steinmetz 2008: 593). For Steinmetz, these governing agents' ability to *know* the natives and to assess their *difference* is thus the central stake of the field, that is, its 'ethnographic' capital allowing for the creation of 'ethnographic representations' and colonial policies (2008: 594, 607). If the state is seen as a field, then those agents working directly or indirectly for the state are members of the field and define the boundaries of it (Steinmetz 2008: 595). Since Bourdieu's notion of the 'political field' would be related to autonomy-restricting democratic practices, Steinmetz sees the colonial state field in the light of more autonomous fields such as the 'literary and scientific fields' – which have their very own 'form of symbolic capital' – and to be 'settled' in the case the ruling state agents were 'able to impose a specific definition of ethnographic distinction' (2008: 595f.). Although any agential phenomena (e.g., moves of imposition, the possession of capital, cognitive qualities, etc.) are related to the varying conflictive nature of fields, Steinmetz rejects arguments reducing fields to this setting since they are simultaneously 'space[s] of mutual recognition', that is, these phenomena will (have to) be recognized by

other agents (2008: 596). The most relevant recognising agents in this (non-exclusionary) case of the German colonial state fields – which are themselves embedded in a series of overarching colonialism-related fields – are *imported* individuals from the ruling groups of society 'in the German empire (1871 to 1918)' whose habitus needed to be adjusted to the rules of the local colonial game (Steinmetz 2008: 608, 597). Yet this local game is not all there is: Imported individuals and natives are at the same time part of a wider 'social space' and specific governing practices are thus only partially the direct result of the colonial state field-effects due to causal overdetermination from multiple sites (Steinmetz 2008: 601f.).

Steinmetz' interpretation is of interest for understanding a FNSP for several reasons: It highlights the specificity of fields' stakes, conceives of states as alternating fields, and is one of the few contributions to BIS to address – though only for a colonial setting – questions of African politics. His article clarifies that a field is an ambiguous concept concerning questions of objectivity and subjectivity through his reference to the two (or three) mentioned spaces. Even if their (precise) relations and the role of habitus as an intermediary is not further specified and needs clarification, this positional approach to fields and the stress on social space as a relationality-increasing dimension matches the sociospatial reading of Bourdieu's sociology I propose in the following.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed in-depth relevant contributions to BIS to reflect upon and evaluate how and why Bourdieu's sociology offers a promising route of social inquiry and imagination to develop a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study how African states' security policies are shaped.

In short, I agree with Abrahamsen and Williams that the transfer of his sociology 'to the international' remains often abstract and involves 'problems of scale and depth' (2011: 327). And Villumsen Berling correctly assesses that the appropriation of his sociology for such contexts has still a long way to go whether we seek, as she does, a 'comprehensive framework for analysis' or not (2012: 456). I am very sceptical whether comprehensiveness is a desirable goal for a Bourdieusian analytical framework. Doubtless, this framework should not be based on pre-established and static 'positivist standards' of 'validity, reliability, and replicability' in the first place as it calls for different episto-methodological premises (Swartz-Shea/Yanow

2012: 94). That said, I argue that many BIS scholars all too often engage with Bourdieu's insights in a way that appears to resemble a form of 'superficial' and limited *cherry-picking* – which is fostered by theoreticist readings of the tools to some extent – that does not always do justice to the complexity of his work (Bigo 2011: 225; see Chapter 3). The latter is likely to be said about most leading thinkers and their work. But it becomes deeply problematic in the case of Bourdieu because of the structure of and ambition behind his core arguments concerning the *attempt to* address the objectivist-subjectivist divide in the social sciences. On several occasions in the review, it seems to be illogical and reductionist to leave out or underplay – notwithstanding all their limitations and weaknesses – either habitus or field. Specifically, we can argue that it is in fact their *Gordian Knot*-like relation, making them illuminating as tools of a relational mode of thinking. Arguing for the notion that habitus and field form an inseparable entity as they actualise two sides of the same coin, Bigo contends that the very possibility of conceiving of habitus and field as having ontological meaning without each other is problematic, since 'habitus is the limit condition of the embodiment of the field' (2011: 238). While I have indicated throughout this chapter that I share Bigo's scepticism on this matter in the interpretation of Bourdieu's work by other scholars, *there is more than one way to skin a cat*, and I carve out my own *skinning device* fitting my empirical concerns in the next two chapters. Indeed, for engaging (with elements of) *the international* or *global*, it seems to be significantly easier to often declare the existence of a field as a presumption than to study the constitution of habitus. It is thus not surprising that BIS scholars tend to identify a plurality of (possible) fields – on different spatial scales and however intangible they may be – in their own research (e.g., cultural field of security, field of international defence/security, colonial state field, field of foreign policy/ministry, diplomatic/political field, and global fields).²⁹ I have above pointed out my reservations with some of these claims in the literature and pick this up in the next chapter. Yet I will join the chorus myself with a FNSP, so to speak, for it is possible to make use of several insights generated in BIS:

Putting Bourdieu's insights to work to think the international, we should always ask for the social conditions of possibility of X (e.g., dispositions, perceptions, socio-political categories,

²⁹ Wacquant criticises the scholarly practice of spreading the thinking tools throughout the social sciences by simply speaking 'Bourdieuese' instead of using them for 'the scientific construction of the object' (Wacquant 2014b: 125).

and kinds of capital) by emphasising its ongoing production(s) via concrete social relations. Among other things, we can thus conceive of the state and the realms of security policy (making) as a field or an ensemble of fields. Considering the African context and its specific problematics to be translated for a FNSP, we need to unpack the state through examining its social history to be able to see that it is constituted by a variety of agents (e.g., individuals, social groups, and institutions) with their own habitus and that this habitus stems from personal and group-specific histories and trajectories. Agents have a feel for the game(s) played (i.e., its social proclivities and situational demands) in the various negotiations and contestations taking place, since they are equipped with and learn over time the fitting practical (background) knowledge and sense for it – a sense that operates unconsciously to some extent but should not be confused with habit. In other words, habitus can be conceptualised as a resilient and deeply contextual form of a more-than-individual and inventive agency, if we conceive of it as one constituting part of the *field/habitus-intersection*. It is not simply the old agency-ingredient of the same agency-structure wine in a new bottle as provided by our fellow logics of social action wine producers (see Chapter 3). Our goal should be to always try to avoid the *scholastic bias* by encouraging reflexivity and by positioning ourselves in the research we are doing. Political agents are, moreover, part of an understanding of politics, the political, and the public sphere that is in some distinctive ways spatial and conflictive. From this perspective, we can start to approach a FNSP through analysing the role and position of powerful (rival) agents, their field-specific habitus, and particular daily practices. We can ask how agents' socio-historically constituted interests and interrelated strategies (i.e., practical modalities) inform their attempts to establish and draw upon their positions of authority – that is, to be the authoritative voice in the field – by making use of different kinds of both material and non-material capitals as weapons in the quest for defining what the *true* stake of the field's struggles is: Again, a specific capital (see Chapter 3). This, first, implies a form of relational power analysis that concentrates on how different kinds of capital are recognised by other agents and thus on exploring how powerful agents can exert their symbolic power and violence. This also allows for avenues of critique and a break with taken-for-granted ways of (often state-endowed) thinking and praxis. Second, it means to emphasise the discourse-practice link and to interrogate how agents can shape from their dominant positions relevant meanings in discourses by constructing narratives via specific speech acts. Third, it involves showing how these meanings shape an *official* and

commonsensical understanding of security policy issues (i.e., the doxa) that has implications for the understandings and habitus (e.g., principles of vision and division) of other agents in a FNSP and for producing legitimate(d) and accepted knowledge-claims eventually. Fourth, it comprises of asking whether and to what extent a FNSP is similar or associated to already examined fields and their specific (discursive) struggles, illusions, and effects (e.g., bureaucratic field, scientific field, or political field). Fifth, it is crucial to conceive of a FNSP specifically *not* as fixed and with a presupposed set of agents and relations, since all fields are permanently under transformation and related to, and intertwined with, other contingent fields. A FNSP will be both embedded in wider fields and potentially function as an embedding space for narrower fields. That is, agents' practices might be shaped also by *spaces of positional struggles, recognition, and play* (and so forth) beyond our own (field-)focus. We need to understand that making generalising statements about a specific field and its effects is always a risky undertaking, since the *where* of politics and political power shifts among different scales. These shifts force us to reconsider our various bifurcated socio-political concepts and their enactments.

As I have briefly indicated in this chapter at different places, my own tactic to develop a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study how African states' security policies are shaped means taking seriously the *interrelatedness* of agents' objective positions and their subjective position-takings. For I employ and emphasise a sociospatial reading of Bourdieu's work in the next two chapters by stressing the 'coexistence of points of view' (i.e., a Bourdieusian social space) of agents (and myself) on and with(in) a FNSP (Bourdieu 2000: 183).

3. Theory – Thinking Space(s) and Nigeria

'The world encompasses me, comprehends me as a thing among things, but I, as a thing for which there are things, comprehend this world' (Bourdieu 2000: 130; similar in Bourdieu 1984: 482 and Bourdieu 1996a: 21).

'It is because we are implicated in the world that there is implicit content in what we think and say about it' (Bourdieu 2000: 9).

3.1 Introduction³⁰

The words *me* and *we* in the above quotes are ambiguous: They encapsulate both the social scientific researcher and his or her possible object of analysis. This is one – if not the central – feature of what makes the work of Pierre Bourdieu stand out in the social sciences. It is the reason social agents' practices and their 'social conditions of possibility' constitute a key element of his sociology or, what he calls following Austin, his '*fieldwork in philosophy*' (1992b: 214; 1990a: 28; 1992: 247; Liénard/Mangez 2015: 183; emphasis in original). To start, this chapter introduces the wider *practice turn* in the social sciences and IR to situate Bourdieu's sociological project in this turn and to explore its role for it (Section 3.2). If Bourdieu's particular modus operandi of analysis is 'Neither Grand Theory nor Empiricism', so Swartz, what kind of 'metaprinciples' guide his thinking and how can we approach and use his key concepts (Section 3.3) (Swartz 2013a: 19; 1992b: 113; 1996b: 177)? Against this background, I argue for emphasising the interrelatedness of his concepts and, especially, for how field and habitus intersect. I argue that exploring the latter in and through an in-depth, sociospatial reading of his work enables me to develop a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study how African states' security policies are shaped (Sections 3.4-3.5). The chapter's conclusion summarises and evaluates this specific appropriation and paves the way to the next chapter on methodology (Section 3.6).

³⁰ Since the explorations in the following chapters rely heavily on Bourdieu's own work, all (in)direct citations belong to him unless stated otherwise henceforth. This includes all citations referring to *Wacquant 1993*; *Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992b* becomes *1992b*.

3.2 Bourdieu's Sociology and the Practice Turn in the Social Sciences and International Relations

Studying global/world politics, international relations, 'or whatever term one prefers', as Jackson has it (Jackson 2015: 943), is possible in a variety of ways and scholars usually take on (implicitly or explicitly) a position towards questions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Jackson 2011: 26; Kurki/Wight 2010: 15; Monteiro/Ruby 2009: 25): What is the social world made of and what is the research *object* of interest in it? How is knowledge (about the research object) created? What kind of methodological devices can be used to analyse them and for what purposes? What are and to what end do scholars use theories? Does *doing* social theory always mean to explain agents' social actions in a universal manner?

A Bourdieusian perspective on social life necessitates a critical reflection on these questions and their underlying principles, since it is a perspective that attempts to develop a reflexive and intelligible way of approaching the empirical particularities of the social world – for example, its constantly emerging social phenomena, agential practices, and the various ways 'social conditions' shape social facts such as the supposedly *objective* constructions of scientific objects by scholars and their subsequently generated artefacts (1977: 1; Wacquant 1992b: 3).

Yet foregrounding the role of practices and social conditions of possibility ontologically and epistemologically did not start or end with Bourdieu, and I briefly introduce the current discussion here. Philosophers and social theorists such as Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Pierce, Foucault, and Merleau-Ponty are often referenced to have contributed to the development of practice-oriented points of view on *the social* (Schatzki 2001a; Bueger 2014; Bueger/Gadinger 2014; Bueger/Gadinger 2008). The idea to put practices first is, then, more directly argued for in the symbolic interactionism of Mead and Goffman, the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel, the anthropology of de Certeau, the structuration theory of Giddens, and Bourdieu's own theory of practice or '*social praxeology*' (Wacquant 1992a: 11; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 6, 11; emphasis in original). Insights generated by these authors are the key sources for the *practice turn* in social and political theory (Knorr Cetina et al. 2001; Schatzki 2003; Schatzki 2002; Schatzki 1997; Schatzki 1996; Reckwitz 2008; Reckwitz 2002; Berard 2005), and its appropriation for the field of international politics and the discipline of IR in what some call the early 'project of International Practice Theory' (IPT)

(Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 5; Adler/Pouliot 2011a, 2011b).³¹ Since practice theories do not form a cohesive body of scholarly work, Bueger and Gadinger argue that IPT scholars only share 'core commitments' in the sense that they 'emphasize process, practical knowledge, collectivity, materiality, multiplicity and performativity' (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 19; Schatzki 2001a: 11). Rather than being 'an oxymoron', as Pouliot has it (Pouliot 2010: xi), practice theories collapse the practice/theory-distinction since both would not exist without the other (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 4). IPT scholars conceive of practices as the smallest, most cardinal and efficacious units of analysis – and creative origins of – social life and its order, recurrent (inter)action, meaning, language, relations of power, and 'social causation' (Swidler 2001: 89, 94; Neumann 2002: 630; Reckwitz 2008: 191; Bueger/Gadinger 2008: 275; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 77; Schatzki 2001a: 10, 21; Schatzki 2001b: 56; Leander 2008: 18).

Scholars have provided for a range of definitions to practice(s) in sophisticated detail.³² For example, Schatzki notably argues that most 'practice theorists conceive of practices as embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding' in 'field[s] of practice[s]' (Schatzki 2001a: 11; for example, used in: Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 10; Aradau et al. 2015b: 3). Writing within and for IR, Adler and Pouliot lean more towards positivist analytical goals by conceiving of 'practice as either *explanans* or *explanandum*' and as 'competent performances', that is, 'socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world' (Adler/Pouliot: 2011b: 6). Like other critics, IR scholars adopting a socio-theoretical inclination towards the importance of practices and practical knowledge argue that agents' actions are not sufficiently understood and/or explained by mono-causal theoretical strands such as neorealism (Waltz 1979) or neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1989). The first strand focuses on the systemic effects of forces located in the structure of the international system (which is a false, ahistorical 'realism' for Bourdieu) and the second conceives of actions as the effects of social agents' cost-benefit calculations driven by their inner *homo economicus* (which is 'impossible' and an 'illusion' due to being innately 'egoistic' for Bourdieu) (1990b: 52; 1977: 30; 2005: 48, 44; 2000: 197). Therefore, both strands are

³¹ For the influence of practical philosophy and American pragmatism on these issues, see, for example, Haas/Haas 2002; Bohman 2002; Kratochwil 2011; Kratochwil 2007.

³² For an overview and review of different meanings of the term *practice*, see, Kratochwil 2011: 40-43.

problematic because their overly simplistic representations of the social world remove complexity from its multifaced social relations (e.g., Ashley 1987). This holds even without considering questions of how agents and scholars link-up with the social world from a methodological and epistemological perspective (e.g., Jackson 2011). Scholars such as Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1987; Wendt 1998; Wendt 1999) – who draws upon Roy Bhaskar's scientific realism and Giddens' structuration theory – and others identified this conundrum regarding the agent-structure debate and argued for different approaches to a constructivist IR theory and social ontology (Neumann 2002: 631, fn. 9; Dunne et al. 2013: 413). Both constructivist approaches – with their implausible *states-as-persons* conceptualisations – and other mainstream IR approaches incorporating practice-theoretical insights can be criticised for their rather static, essentialist, and superficial appropriation of these insights (e.g., Doty 1997). Leander reminds us how crucial it is to question the notion that 'actors in IR are only (or mainly) anthropomorphized states and/or institutions' and to recognise that the discipline remains driven by unsatisfying 'inside/outside, public/private, state/market distinctions' (though, she might establish the first distinction re IR/not-IR herself here) (Leander 2011: 298, 296). Or, in Bourdieu's own words, this objectivist notion 'personifies collectives and makes them subjects responsible for historical action' as if they had 'individual consciousness', yet without accounting for the genesis of its own social context (1990b: 37; 1977: 29, en. 49, p. 203).

It is for these kinds of insights that scholars searched for inspiration in his work and highlighted, for example, the relevance of his concepts (e.g., field of practice, habitus) for a critical study of international relations without relying on 'miraculous origin[s]' (Ashley 1987: 408, 403). His ideas were used as early munition in the 'Fourth Great Debate' between 'rationalists and reflectivists' on questions of epistemology and so-called 'objective structures' (Adler-Nissen 2013b: 7). Bourdieu informed the former discussion by his insistence on a reflexive social science, and the latter discussion by pointing out that objective structures are never pre-given entities but always the product of particular and recurrent socio-practical constructions of agents within wider historical configurations of 'social relations' – relations which themselves undergo 'a process of continuous creation' in what he calls 'the fleeting contingency of historical things' (1977: 189, 83; 1992b: 156). Because his sociology shares with mainstream IR an interest in the 'sources of cohesion, conflict, power, and domination' (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 25), scholars drew upon him, for example, to strengthen their

systemic and structuralist arguments 'from neo-realism to Wendtian constructivism' (Adler-Nissen 2013b: 14).

Yet these attempts are often problematic, since they focus too strongly on the assumed structuralist orientation of his later sociology.³³ Two crucial problems remain: First, to what extent we should read Bourdieu as a structuralist (e.g., Hopf 2010) is a matter of sociological debate given claims such as these: 'The social world is, to a large extent, what agents make of it, at each moment' (1985: 734). Second, using Bourdieu to further strengthen structuralist claims in IR is possible, but it seems more rewarding and convincing to use his sociology to scrutinize these and other claims from the very beginning. That is, Bourdieu and his fellow practice theorists offer instructive and reflexive ways to thoroughly (re)think questions of agency and structure, of ideational and materialist assumptions, and of transformation and stasis (Bueger/Gadinger 2008: 285; Adler/Pouliot 2011b: 5, 11). It is precisely the notion to take these questions, oppositions, and prioritisations of one over the other *not* for granted that contributed to the interest scholars have in theories of practice, for they perceive global politics and international relations as a multiplicity of practices and start asking 'what practitioners do' (Adler/Pouliot 2011b: 3). And what they often do, so Adler and Pouliot (with Bourdieu, Foucault, and Searle), are 'bodily' practices and, indeed, 'discursive practices' understood as 'socially meaningful speech acts, according to which saying is doing' (Adler/Pouliot 2011b: 14). Although these points might sound trivial to critics, who could claim that this is true for other social scientific representations as well, the practice-

³³ Using insights from within the Bourdieusian sociological universe – of which some appear to be located on rather difficult to reach planets – involves coming to terms with his complex, sometimes confusing, and interlaced ways of writing (Vandenberghe 1999: 47, fn. 31; Burawoy 2012a: 11, 13). Critics lament this and point out that his attempts of re-articulating terms for his own purposes (e.g., *capital* and *interest* from the field of economics) produced a variety of vague neologisms and concepts without ever fully developing them in a consistent way (Dimaggio 1979: 1466ff.). Burawoy conceives of Bourdieu's writings even as a 'form of symbolic violence' (Burawoy 2012a: 20). Certainly, Bourdieu works on and calls for a 'complete reinterpretation' of such ideas and 'words', specifically, concerning their symbolic contexts (1990a: 48; 1992b: 118; Lebaron 2003: 561). In contrast, Bourdieu and his followers argue that his opposing writing style against his *intellectual enemies* fulfils the function to overcome the 'common sense understanding embedded in common language' (e.g., of the French social theory of his time) and to represent his version of the hierarchical complexities of the social world more accurately (Wacquant 1989: 31; Wacquant 1992b: 23; 1990a: 51ff.; Swartz 2013a: 24). While it is often a conditional quality of a follower to claim that the work of the leading intellectual under discussion is persistently poorly read and understood, it seems to be possible to agree with Wacquant on this issue at least to some extent (Wacquant 1989: 27). Yet Bigo argues that Bourdieu can be 'sometimes contradictory and unclear', since he tends to start his meandering analyses from a subjective point of view moving towards more objectivist (and substantialist) claims on the social, for example, when he conceives of different kinds of capital as widely pre-established instead of scrutinising the social relations producing them (Bigo 2011: 235; Wacquant 1992a: xiii; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 13).

theoretical approach is based on a simple but fundamental renunciation of what is commonly regarded as representations of mainstream IR and social theory. Rather than theoretically pre-conceiving what agents (will always) do, what kind of subjectivity they have, or at what 'scale' social and political phenomena are to be located and efficacious, the concern is with the variety of agents' practical 'doing' and saying in specific time-spaces (which, though, might lead to newly constructed scales) (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 3, 65ff.; Bigo 2011: 119; Schatzki 2001a: 13).

More precisely, Bourdieu is interested in the daily encounters of social life – the 'real actions', 'body movements' and 'words, feelings, deeds, works, and so on' of agents in fields – and how these constitute their 'doing' and their non-scholastic relation to and being-in-the-world, that is, the(ir) enactment of the(ir) presence (1977: 118; 1998: 80; 2005: 47). Leander argues that what matters most for Bourdieu is the 'centrality of practices (*what people do*) [in specific settings] rather than overarching discourses and representations (captured by what they say and write)' (Leander 2008: 14, 18; my emphasis). Yet practice-oriented scholars do not make the claim that agents' doing is to be thought of as if taking place in a theory-less and ahistorical void: Bourdieu notes that the social world – which is neither 'pure chaos' nor 'totally structured' for him – is lived and relational 'plurality', that is, a plurality 'of possible structuring', 'of visions of the world', 'of points of view' and, therefore, never constructed 'in a social vacuum' (1989: 19, 20, 18; 1999a: 3). Practice-oriented scholars assume that understanding and/or explaining the social world and social facts necessitates starting the analysis with looking at 'the social' first, that is, how agents' practices are always interrelated with specific social relations, locations, 'contexts and situations' (Kratochwil 2011: 57; Abbott 1997: 1152). To paraphrase Wacquant, and whilst being hopefully aware that *flat ontologies* have their limits as soon as any form of vocabulary is introduced, the practice-theoretical project *tries to* problematize and *wishes to* foreclose a kind of epistemological and 'methodological imperialism, i.e., the forced definition of objects' and subjects by means of pre-defined ideas, concepts, categories, and theories (Wacquant 1992b: 28; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 65).³⁴ Regarding the agent-structure debate, wherein proponents seem to frequently search for the ultimate solution to it, a perspective influenced by practices questions pre-established and fixed notions about how and why social agents (e.g., individuals, groups,

³⁴ This kind of 'imperialism of categories' and their 'symbolic violence' is particularly problematic when forced upon social life in the Global South (Hoeber Rudolph 2005: 5; Basaran et al. 2017b: 3; Connell 2007a).

states, institutions) behave in the first place. It puts into question the theoretician's desire to make definite and bold statements prior to empirical analysis. Specifically, the question becomes how certain categories, theories, or perspectives have been constructed. Who can do so how, with what specific practices, and with what means and technologies of power? Since specific socio-historical relations, contexts, and their transformations over time are given ontological relevance in practice research, any arguments about the behaviour of agents in the past, the present, and the future must engage with the former in-depth. This means trying to avoid *predetermining* what the social is always meant to be under the auspices of universalising scientific moves by scholars. Moves that *tend to* lead scholars, as Bourdieu argues, to 'slip [ontologically] from the model of reality to the reality of the model' (1977: 29; 1990a: 48, 55). In other words, most scholars would put forward a 'very peculiar point of view on the social world' based on their 'neutralizing disposition' and an 'epistemic doxa' in which they as social beings and 'thinkers leave in a state of unthought [...] the presuppositions of their thought, that is, the social conditions of possibility of the[ir] scholastic point of view' (1998: 127ff.; Leander 2001: 345). Lahire points out that labelling others *scholastic* can be a silencing tactic (Lahire 2015: 62; Steinmetz 2013: 112). Bourdieu, however, correctly criticises that scholars tend to take the personal assumptions they have about the 'regularity' of social life of other individuals and groups – that is, their own theories and perspectives – as if they were the lived experience of these agents, and as if agents always followed 'a rule' (i.e., fixed 'plan'), despite scholars lacking the 'practical mastery' of these agents (1977: 29, 120, 2; 1990a: 9; 1998: 130ff.; 2000: 60). Scholars presume to be able to externally construct an 'impartial', general and objective reality from their fictional 'monopoly of the total point of view', ultimately enforcing onto the agents a modelled reality of experiences they must live up to (1977: 1; 1990b: 28). It is necessary to address the gap between theories as artificial constructs with their own history devoid of the 'native experience' and praxis of knowledgeable 'agents who [typically] ignore the model' (1977: 18; 1992b: 70, 94).

Contra Adler and Pouliot, I argue that the practice turn in social theory and IR is unlikely to produce an all-encompassing 'ontological core concept', since the essence of reasoning with and on practices contradicts searching for *the* core (Adler/Pouliot 2011b: 10; for a powerful critique, see also Ringmar 2014). The latter risks, among other things, to misconstrue Bourdieu's tools of habitus and field as being widely synonymous with outdated notions of

agency and structure, as a 'conceptual solution to the structure-agent problem', or to see habitus as the intersubjective 'point of dynamic intersection between structure and action' (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 26, 29; Mérand 2010: 366; Pouliot 2010: 37). It is more instructive to conceive of these two conceptual pairs to rest upon what Bigo calls 'different modes of reasoning', for habitus and field would otherwise surrender their imaginative capacity and practices would simply become another 'level of analysis' (Bigo 2011: 238, 237; Bigo 2013: 125; Wacquant 2014a: 6). As Section 3.3 lays out, ambiguity and dissent are rife about the scope, ambition, and possibilities offered by Bourdieu's project and how he has framed it himself. Yet it seems to be problematic to try to further expand the pluralisation of logics of social actions in IR with his insights, that is, to narrate another *solution*, *core concept* or *foundationalism* for and to the ontological complexities of social and political life-worlds and their 'irreducible plurality, plurivocality, and diversity of [ways of] knowing' (Jackson 2015: 964). In parts brilliantly argued for by the authors, adding a new and allegedly superior 'logic of practicality' or 'logic of habit' to those logics operating with notions of consequences, appropriateness, and arguing will in the last analysis institute another *scholastic imperialism*, which enforces essentialising knowledge-claims and counteracts Bourdieu's Pascal-informed 'refusal of the ambition of foundation' (Pouliot 2010; Hopf 2010; 2000: 2).

And, looking beyond Bourdieu, it is paramount to ask critically to what extent and with what gain we can speak of a practice turn in the social sciences, since we are well advised to remain as careful as we hopefully were with, for instance, the linguistic, cultural, and spatial turns in the past (e.g., Neumann 2002; Jackson 2008; Lippuner/Lossau 2010). Specifically, all turns seem to have a similar problem: The diversity of approaches to practices and the 'different vocabularies' are likely to hinder a comprehensive understanding – which is, arguably, less of a problem per se – and it is not apparent what value the search for a new paradigm or metatheory really has to offer (Kratochwil 2011: 36f.; Chowdhury/Duvall 2011: 336; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 10). Although the variegated approaches foregrounding the role of practices are more likely to construct 'new perspective[s] on social action rather than a new theory' (Kratochwil 2011: 58), they still tend to operate with 'theory laden' illuminations themselves to some extent (Barnes 2001: 28). For these reasons, we might with Bueger and Gadinger adopt a perspective wherein we understand the coming-together of these *theories* as an 'intellectual space in which different scholars 'trade' ideas on how to study practices, and cooperate' (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 6).

3.3 Approaching Bourdieu's Metaprinciples and Thinking Tools

Before I explore in-depth Bourdieu's thinking tools and develop a meaningful reading of these for my empirical concerns in the next section, it is necessary to understand his basic analytical tactics and sociological imaginations to think the social world. For Bourdieu, thinking the social world does not only mean to recognise 'that the real is the relational' (1992b: 97; 1989: 16; 1998: vii; Vandenberghe 1999), but to 'break with *linear thinking*' and with the socially constructed and 'fictitious' Cartesian dualisms – of which *objectivism* and *subjectivism* are the most basic forms establishing an erroneous 'canonic opposition' (1984: 107; 1990a: 118; 1977: 3f., 5, 84; 1990b: 25, 41; 1989: 14; Wacquant 1992b: 5; Abbott 1988; emphasis in original).³⁵ The problem would be that scholars tend to unconsciously construct what he calls 'a prefabricated series of oppositions, mind vs. body, subject vs. object, ego vs. alter, reflection vs. action, reason vs. emotion, etc., which *prevents us from understanding practice and the logic of practice*' (2005: 48; my emphasis). For Bourdieu, making sense of practice and its logic involves grasping 'that *understanding and explaining are one*' (1999c: 613; Pouliot 2013: 55; emphasis in original) and escaping the habitual and 'ritual either/or choice' in our thinking through 'radical doubt' (1977: 4, 84; 1990b: 41; 1990a: 31; 1992: 241, 235).

Although the subjectivism-objectivism opposition is a well-known theme in the numerous interpretations of Bourdieu's sociology, I argue that its overall importance is still often underestimated. We need a deeper exploration of the epistemological and ontological *problematics* Bourdieu associated with both, since it is paramount for how he conceived of and practically mastered his social scientific project, how I understand it at large, and how his thinking tools can be approached to develop a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study how African states' security policies are shaped. Since for Bourdieu the social world's genesis closely relates to how the subjective and objective moments of

³⁵ It is necessary to critically engage with the notion that Bourdieu's problematisation(s) of – and, arguably, various attempts to overcome – the subjectivist-objectivist divide, or contradiction, contribute themselves to the establishment of this divide in the first place (Martin 2003: 25). For example, Mouzelis is critical of *transcending* the objectivist-subjectivist divide and calls for analytical efforts to *bridge* it (Mouzelis 2000). Bigo argues that Bourdieu would be a profound analyst and critic of these 'polarities' but would be unable to overcome them in his work (Bigo 2011: 235, 233; Bigo 2013: 123). Weik holds that Bourdieu wanted 'to circumvent or abolish' the 'traditional emphasis' of the two polarities (Weik 2010: 494). Wacquant, in contrast, believes Bourdieu wanted 'to overcome' the dualism (Wacquant 2013a: 15, en. 1, p. 24). Bourdieu is explicit on this question sometimes: The 'intention guiding my work has been *to overcome* it' (1989: 15; my emphasis). That said, Bueger and Gadinger claim that practice theories are 'at constant risk of introducing new binaries and dualisms' (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 100).

social life are co-constitutive through their *dialectical* – yet conflictive – relationship, they need to be thought and constructed together. Only then is a 'genuine epistemology' possible, can we study the intersections of the internal with the external and the particular with the general, and can we reach for the 'limit' of 'historicism', as he urged us (1992b: 178, 156; 1977: 72; 1990a: 160, 31, 46; 2000: 31). Only then can we develop analytical devices to arrive at a fitting 'theory of the mode of generation of practices' (1977: 72; 1990b: 103).

As for the scientific enterprise of *subjectivism*, Bourdieu conceives of it as the analytical 'description' and taken-for-granted primacy of individual agents' practical 'familiarity with' their own direct social context(s) and how they construct meaning through their ever-dominant social interactions (1990b: 25f., 44, 135; 1977: 3, 5). Yet scholars such as Sartre, Garfinkel, and Schutz would fail to engage in a self-reflexive way with 'the conditions of [their] own possibility' (1977: 3; 1990b: 25f.) and would falsely believe it possible to 'reduce the social world to the representations agents have of it' (1989: 15, 17; 1984: 244; 1977: 81). That is, they would be unable to understand and account for 'the necessity' objective social realities impinge on agents and how these realities are cognitively sedimented in agents' subjectivities as a form of 'inertia' (1990b: 52; 1977: 74; 1990b: 46).

As for the scientific enterprise of *objectivism*, Bourdieu conceives of it as an analytical perspective operating with a 'logical logic' externally imposed on agents by a privileged 'observer' who conceptualises the law-like, objective behaviour of agents as 'the acting-out of roles [...] or the implementation of plans' beyond the reach of agents' own subjectivities (1977: 142, 37, 3ff.; 1990b: 160, 267, 52, 135; 1998: 82; 1989: 15). Yet this 'imaginary anthropology' of scholars such as Durkheim, Marx, and Saussure would 'reify abstractions' by 'treating social facts as things', rather than seeing them as social constructions and as 'objects of knowledge' in which different forms of knowing (e.g., 'misrecognition') play a crucial role (1977: 27; 1984: 244; 1989: 14, 15; 1990b: 136). That is, they would take what is a scholarly invention – for example, the *social fictions* of 'culture', 'structures',³⁶ 'social classes', 'modes of production', and states – 'as realities endowed with a social efficacy' from which we can 'deduce' practices, and as if these *realities* did not interrelate with socio-historically produced, objective 'conditions' which are, in turn, themselves the products of the interplay between agents' subjectivities and these conditions (1977: 29f., 27, 9, 78; 1990b: 37, 26f., 40f.; 1998:

³⁶ For example, *structures* are for Bourdieu 'nothing other than the objectified product of historical struggles in the form in which this product can be grasped at a given moment' (1990a: 161).

12; 1989: 17).

Based on this – here very much shortened – meticulous critique of subjectivism and objectivism in their multiple *theoreticist* renderings, Bourdieu endeavours to construct a socio-scientific propensity towards illuminating the relationality of the social world. For he is primarily interested in the question of how the dynamic relationships between the subjective and objective moments of social life are in effect the responsible *socio-philosophical parents* of practices. Throughout his writings used here, Bourdieu repeatedly makes claims like these:

'The proper object of social science [...] is neither the individual [...] nor groups as concrete sets of individuals sharing a similar location in social space, but the *relation between two realizations of historical action*, in bodies and in things. It is the double and obscure relation between habitus, [...], and fields, [...]; and, of course, of everything that is born of this relation, that is, social practices and representations, or fields as they present themselves in the form of realities perceived and appreciated (1992b: 126f.; emphasis in original).

'The principle of action [...] lies in the complicity between two states of the social, between histories in bodies and history in things, or, more precisely, between the history objectified in the form of structures and mechanisms (those of the social space or of fields) and the history incarnated in bodies in the form of habitus, a complicity which is the basis of a relation of quasi-magical participation between these two realizations of history' (2000: 150f.; for example, used in: Pouliot 2013: 46f.).

From the most vital and *proper object of social science*, sociology or history (with their varying understandings of causality), passing through the governing principle or – very cautiously – *philosophy* of historical and future action, practice and representation, to agents' social constructions and perceptions of the(ir) world and its genesis, Bourdieu's framing remains broadly the same: Typically, it is the relation(ship), complicity or dialectic between two different – yet intermingling and inseparable – *states of the social* in all their varying subjective and objective tropes we need to understand, explore, and make use of. *Table 2* illustrates that the terminological pairs of field/habitus, thing/body, and structures/dispositions mentioned in the quotes are examples only.

Table 2

<i>Area</i>	<i>Trope</i>	<i>Object</i>	<i>Reference</i>
science of the structures	govern both	practices + representations	1977: 21
science	dialectical relations between	structures + dispositions	1977: 3, 83 1989: 15
perception as product of	double social structuration	objective + subjective side	1985: 727 1989: 20
history of the social field	both in	materialized form + embodied form	1985: 738f.
[analysis]	twofold social genesis	habitus + social structures	1989: 14
social science	must take both	reality + perception of reality	1989: 18
world of commonsense	act together to produce	objective + subjective side	1989: 20
analysis	is inseparable from	objective structures + mental structures	1990a: 14
source of historical action	relation between	habitus + field	1990a: 190f.
motor	relation between	habitus + field	1990a: 194f.
principle of practices	relationship between	external constraints + dispositions	1990b: 50
practice	site of the dialectic	structures + habitus	1990b: 52
practices	relating to	habitus + social conditions	1990b: 56
future; present practice	relationship between	habitus + certain state of changes	1990b: 64
social science	[both as]	material properties + symbolic properties	1990b: 135
[analysis]	dialectical relationship between	properties + habitus	1990b: 140
social science	encompasses all	individual + collective struggles	1990b: 141
habitus; field	methodologically inseparable from; must be analysed together	field of positions + field of stances or position-takings	1992: 105
habitus; field	relation operates in two ways	of conditioning + of knowledge	1992b: 127
theory of time	relations between	habitus + field	1992b: 138
[analysis]	relations between	habitus + field	1992b: 140
sociology	two-way relationship between	objective structures + incorporated structures	1998: vii
philosophy of action	relations between	potentialities inscribed in body of agents + structure of the situations	1998: vii
position-takings; choices	relation between	social positions + dispositions	1998: 6
human actions	product of encounters between	habitus + social universes	2000: 116
symbolic productions	to construct [both]	space of symbolic position-takings + space of the positions	2000: 178
experience of time	relationship between	dispositions to be + regularities of social cosmos	2000: 208

[various practices and sensations]	confrontation between	dispositions + positions	2005: 47
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Formulating in a sense an analytical inclination to approach the *between-ness of relational social life*, Bourdieu risks here, as emphasised before, to discursively constitute what he intends to avoid. Yet this challenge remains a defining element of his sociology in the end (see also Wacquant 1992a: 11; Wacquant 1992b: 19; Fogle 2011: 61; Swartz 2013a: 23; Pinto 2015: 111). Understanding how practices (etc.) are *born* clearly and most importantly involves for him understanding that the subjective and objective moments of social life are anchored in rather disparate philosophical ocean beds. But they need to be analysed together for and in empirical research, to explore and flesh out that the very produced nature of the social is both at stake in the struggles and a stake of the struggles.

As for these reasons, it is vital to understand that Bourdieu's own thinking tools lie in a box with a specific imprint: *For practical research only!* With Wittgenstein, Bourdieu argues that it is the very orderly *openness* that makes these tools 'heuristically powerful' if, and only if, they are mobilised for directing, structuring, and doing non-positivist, empirical research (1990a: 40, 107; 1992: 228; 1992b: 95f., 161; Wacquant 2014b: 119; Wacquant 2004: 391; Pinto 2015: 104).³⁷ As 'temporary construct[s]' to engage with concrete questions posed by the social world's contingencies, the tools 'are only visible through the [interrelated] results they yield' (1992b: 161, 160; Wacquant 1992a: ix). There is *simply no way* to invent fully generalizable, parsimonious, and one-size-fits-all theoretical and methodological devices to make sense of the whole, complex, and ever-changing social world. On the one hand, Bourdieu claims that there can be no 'transhistorical universals of communication', concepts or theories, and that all attempts to do so in the social sciences, philosophy, and history are flawed lacking 'real historicization' (2000: 110, 31; 1990a: 17). On the other hand, he holds that 'science' basically means 'generalization' and that he wishes to engender a 'model [of social space] which aspires to universal validity' (1992: 233; 1996a: 8; 1998: 3).

It is thus disputed how we ought to read his oeuvre in terms of the universality of the thinking tools, for he seems to leave the reader in doubt whether they should be applied across time,

³⁷ Bourdieu rejects *positivist* social science, since it only resembles 'an exhibitionism of data and procedures', forgets to 'display the conditions of construction and analysis of these data', and simply accepts what is '*socially produced*, in and by a *collective [and conflictive] work of construction of reality*' (1992b: 65; 1992: 239, 244; 1984: 94; emphasis in original).

space, and social formations (Calhoun 2013: 36; Calhoun 1995). Bigo, for example, opposes a universal application claiming that the tools are not meant to be 'transhistorical instruments' and that scholars should not try to come up with just another absolutist theory or 'grand narrative' (Bigo 2011: 232, 230; Bigo 2013: 126). It is possible to interpret Bourdieu as radical in his rejection of any form of universalising move by the researcher concerning both ontological questions of historical change vis-à-vis stability and epistemic issues of knowledge production such as scientific conceptualisations. Above all, he connects the tools so very closely to empirical particularities and the individual researcher's point of view. Calhoun claims that the French thinker seems to employ the tools universally, which risks diminishing socio-cultural differences, yet does not deny the option to use them to analyse specific social settings and transformations (Calhoun 1995: 135ff.; see Chapter 2 for similar concerns by Kauppi 2003: 786; Leander 2001: 349). Some conceive of habitus as a universal tool (Calhoun 1995: 137; Sweetman 2003: 541) and question whether this also applies to capital (Calhoun 1995: 137). Others claim that the 'regional' inclinations of Bourdieu's field *theory* render it non-universal (Hilgers/Mangez 2015b: 269; Lahire 2015: 75, 77), link his sociology to "methodological nationalism" (Gorski 2013c: 364), and criticise that he generalises his empirical case studies unjustifiably (Burawoy 2012b: 192). While IR scholars point out that his sociology and empirical research foci remain mostly embedded in and concerned with inner-national social relations, they emphasise the opportunity to enlighten global politics and international relations with it, and mention his late interest in how ideas circulate beyond national containers (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 24, 32, 35; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 9; Mérand 2010: 350; Villumsen Berling 2012: 451). In fact, Bourdieu claims that his thinking tools allow for asking 'universal questions' about the unique things we study without employing forms of 'geographical or epistemological regionalism' (1977: 31). 'Praxeology is a universal [or 'general' and 'differential'] anthropology', he asserts, which should employ contextual 'historical analysis' to explore 'specific properties of contemporary societies' and to highlight that 'agents are [always] the *product of history*' with related and particular 'cognitive dispositions towards the world' (1992b: 139, 159, 136; 2000: 16; emphasis in original). Leander argues that eventually 'the *ambitions* of his sociological theory are '*global*' in the sense that the concepts are applicable to any variety of issues and contexts' (Leander 2002: 607; Wacquant 1989: 26; my emphasis). Indeed, I argue that the tools are applicable to the postcolonial African condition and Nigeria's current social universe (see also Schlichte 1998

and Go 2013).

How, then, to proceed in the research process with putting the tools to work? Should scholars make use of one tool, combine a few tools, or apply the whole set? This question remains a matter of debate and conceptual preference (see Section 3.4 and Chapter 4). As Leander and others argue, 'an all-or-nothing approach' creates an unnecessary orthodoxy and Bourdieu uses the tools separately if the empirical particularities call for it (Leander 2011: 309; Wacquant 2014b: 124; Lahire 2015: 76; Vaughan 2008: 67, 70). Only, what to do next with the tool or tools – describing, defining, operationalising? Bourdieu claims that his central tools 'can be defined, but only within the theoretical system they constitute, *not in isolation*' (1992b: 96; Vandenberghe 1999: 45, 47; Swartz 2013a: 26; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 24; my emphasis). Scholars sometimes delimit their research projects by a prior operationalisation concentrating on one tool (e.g., a specific location for the habitus) and/or specific agents and their practices in a designated field (Leander 2008: 20ff.).

Problematic is that the thinking tools are all too often read and employed in an orthodox and 'theoreticist mode' or 'vein' (e.g., what is laid out in his book *Distinction*) (Wacquant 2014b: 128; 1990a: 107, 119; Swartz 2013a: 25; emphasis in original). Arguably with reasonable substance, Bourdieu takes note that these readings are a common fallacy in themselves and, particularly, if used to criticise his work, since his critics would 'invariably apply to [the tools] the very modes of thoughts [his...] analyses are aimed at destroying and overcoming' (1990a: 107). Whether for criticism or affirmation, this form of scholarly, modelling 'epistemocentrism' and 'ethnocentrism' would be at odds with the practical ways of being and knowing (i.e., the practical mastery) of both social agents and proper scholars, since the tools are not self-explanatory per se, and thinkable and assessable within practical research only (1992b: 69, 161; 2000: 51; 1996a: 7f.). We have seen in Chapter 2 that this problem is reinforced by scholars tending to start their analysis with individual portrayals of the tools sometimes bordering on positivist definitions. They misjudge, in so doing, the key epistemological idea behind the tools and why they are precisely called the way they are called: Tools *for thinking* about and approaching empirical realities. Risking sounding repetitive, the latter needs to be made very clear: As Swartz and others explain, the thinking tools 'are not intended to be [definitional] reflections of empirical reality' as such and should, hence, not be used in the sense of *theorising beyond* the realm of praxis (Swartz 2013a: 20, 27, 31; Wacquant 2014b: 126; Salter 2013a: 4; Martin 2003: 24; Leander 2008). Swartz

clarifies the difference to conventional theorising as follows:

'While it is very tempting to talk about field, capital, and habitus as theoretical constructs and thereby evaluate them in terms of logical consistency, contradiction, affiliation with theoretical traditions, indebtedness to classical theorists, and so on, I recommend that we think of them more as forms of sociological practices that have a practical, dispositional orientation for understanding the social world' (Swartz 2013a: 20f.; Bigo 2013: 126).

How can scholars go about this for their purposes? How can they employ the thinking tools in a less-theoreticist or, better, non-theoreticist way and, thus, carefully stress their own 'practice[s] of problematizing' (Hughes/Montesinos Coleman 2015: 142)? How to use the tools to approach, imagine, and (re)think the empirical particularities of the complex, social universe of Nigeria? A complexity taken to be *true* in the Bourdieusian sense of a possible *non*-universal and relative 'truth', that is, as 'something people struggle over', as 'a stake in the struggle' in and of history, and as something where shifting 'points of view' exist (1990a: 185; 1996b: 297f.; Wacquant 1992b: 47; Wacquant 2013a: 22; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 28). A complexity that is, as stressed in the Introduction, deeply entangled with the space of (in)security of Boko Haram and the ways it reshapes Nigeria's security policy. The next sections engage with these questions in-depth.

3.4 Of Interrelatedness and Social Space – Towards the Field/Habitus-Intersection in Nigeria
Because this thesis draws closely upon the distinct body of work proposed by Bourdieu, it was indispensable to review the BIS literature in Chapter 2, situate his sociology in the practice turn, and understand the wider scope of his analytical tactics and sociological imaginations. Only now can we really comprehend that different readings of his sociology are possible and that different empirical phenomena call and allow for his thinking tools to be used in diverse ways. As shown in Chapter 2 and the last section, the options range from analysing only the habitus of agents to Villumsen Berling's lavish 'action framework' and its 'field-capital-agency-doxa nexus' (Villumsen Berling 2012: 454ff.). I have argued, however, that the thinking tools are both often applied in an abstract, superficial, and somewhat *opportunistic-theoreticist*

way, as well as not yet used for making sense of African states' security policy agency and its multiple constitutive social fact(or)s and conditions.³⁸ A central claim was the necessity of engaging in what I called 'taking seriously the *interrelatedness* of agents' objective positions and their subjective position-takings' (Section 2.6, p. 54). Since scholars tend to overlook this interrelatedness, they risk jeopardising the full potential of Bourdieu's sociological project and verge upon misinterpreting it, especially if they do not *even consider* the integrative arrangement these tools express. It was also pointed out that omitting this arrangement is particularly problematic in relation to the tools of field and habitus, since these interrelate closely and produce each other as will become clearer below.

Therefore, I argue that taking this interrelatedness seriously necessitates tracing, exploring, and putting at centre stage what I called the intricate *field/habitus-intersection* in Bourdieu's reflexive and relational sociology. Explicating the field/habitus-intersection allows me to later carve out and render useful the analytical device I construe as a FNSP, to study how Nigeria's security policy is shaped towards Boko Haram (see Chapter 4). In the process of (re)introducing and interpreting Bourdieu's thinking tools in the following, I argue that reading him closely reveals the field/habitus-intersection, make the case for this intersection, and trace and explore it by moving from social space, via field and habitus, to capital. I (re)introduce the tool of capital, because it helps us understand how fields function and how they stand for the very possibility of agency and change in conjunction with habitus. It is important to note, nevertheless, that I conceive of capital here primarily *as an outcome of the empirical analysis* concerning a FNSP and not as something we can infer a priori (see also Chapter 2, especially, Bigo 2002; Bigo 2008). This is shaped by my understanding of a FNSP as an *exploratory thinking space*, that is, the empirical analysis investigates what it is that is at stake in a FNSP (i.e., the capital) and asks what it produces and values (e.g., agents' interests or *illusio*, their strategic moves, and the cultural products of the field). Yet, as will become more evident below, the tools of field and habitus are also considered to be an outcome of the analysis to some extent. Their interplay structured the following three chapters and guided my fieldwork in Nigeria: Chapter 4 (Methodology) offers a self-reflexive account of my attempt to construct a FNSP practically and contains sections on how to map a FNSP with a

³⁸ In line with Chapter 2, Martin and Gregg criticise that scholars often try to grasp what is incomprehensible to them by declaring an abundance of 'invisible [sub-]fields' through *identifying* so far 'unclaimed form[s] of capital' without much value for scientific progress (Martin 2003: 8; Gregg/Martin 2015: 55).

sociological discourse analysis (Section 4.4) and on how to study the more informal insights of a FNSP (e.g., its habitus and capital) through interviews and observations (Section 4.5). Empirical Chapters 5 (Writing (In)Security) and 6 (Dialoguing (In)Security) are shaped accordingly.

To arrive at this thinking space called FNSP and to understand how my own point of view becomes (a minor) part of it, I apply and foreground a sociospatial reading of Bourdieu's sociology in what follows (e.g., 1985; 1989; 1996a; 1999a; 1999b; 2000; see also Fogle 2011; Savage 2011; Painter 2000; Hillier/Rooksby 2005a; Kühne 2008; Bridge 2005; Cresswell 2002; Kauppi 2003; Bigo 2008; Wacquant 2014b; Loughland et al. 2015).³⁹ Writes Bourdieu:

'[T]o grasp the inner logic of the social world, we need to look at the particularity of the empirical reality being determined *spatially and temporally*, but only to construct this reality as a '*particular case of the possible*', [...], that is, as an individual case of a finite universe of *possible configurations*' (2006: 354; my translation and emphasis; similar in 1998: 2 and 1996b: 183).

While foregrounding such a reading arguably offers one of the most convincing approximations to what Bourdieu calls (with Gaston Bachelard) 'a particular case of the possible', we do not necessarily have to transform the case of Nigeria and of a FNSP into 'a model' with 'a mathematical or abstract form' (1990a: 191; 1992: 233; 1990b: 63; 1992b: 75; Fogle 2011: 171). Rather, this reading helps us to relate to the analytical goals formulated by and for scholars of Nigerian politics and society: These do not only call for ways to illuminate Nigeria's *particular instance of postcolonial mess*, but also try to make sense of the Nigerian state through 'zones or spaces of [conflictive] encounter', want to approach it 'as a totality', study the 'collusion and collision of the powerful and the powerless', and investigate its 'complex interplay of conditions and dynamics' (Adebanwi/Obadare 2009b: 11; Adebanwi/Obadare 2011b: 21; Adebanwi/Obadare 2013b: 13; Owen 2013: 148).

³⁹ This reading will *not* focus on notions of social stratification across different regions of social space and how this might affect agents' tastes and preferences, as explored by Bourdieu in *Distinction* (1984). Frequently cited and too often taken at face value for his whole (spatial) thinking, *Distinction* contains, for example, the rather reductionist 'formula: [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice' (1984: 101; Leander 2008: 19). Since *Distinction* and *Outline* (1977) comprise more than 50 per cent of all citations of Bourdieu's works in 'Anglophone social science', there is the scholarly tendency to focus on these books, which emphasise aspects of social reproduction (Gorski 2013b: 3, 2). Painter critically engages with Bourdieu's own 'spatialized vocabulary' (Painter 2000: 255).

So, given my close, sociospatial reading of Bourdieu's sociology, I start with his overarching notion of *social space* and the role played by *positions, differences, and classifications*: Bourdieu establishes his notion of social space by initially distinguishing between different, always 'hierarchized' *social formations* (1996a: 13; 1999b: 124; 1989: 19). These produce 'different forms of practice', social organisation, structuring, and reproduction over time based on what he calls their (group-specific) 'principles of vision and division', 'practical mastery', and '*sense of limits* [and] *reality*' (1990a: 65; 1989: 19; 1990b: 146; 1977: 88, 164; emphasis in original). On the one hand, 'highly differentiated societies' like today's Nigeria tend to develop increasingly complex *fields* (e.g., economic, scientific, political, bureaucratic, cultural, religious, field of power, etc.) and would, thus, 'appear as social spaces' shaped by 'modes of domination' widely '*mediated* by objective, institutionalized mechanisms' such as modern statehoods (1992b: 97; 1998: 32; 1977: 187, 184; 1990b: 130; my emphasis). On the other hand, less differentiated societies tend to be shaped by modes of domination that are widely *organised* 'in and through personal interactions', as well as by embodied principles of vision and division (e.g., the binary gender structures of the Kabyle people) stemming from the role physical and 'inhabited space[s]' such as houses play for their daily practices (1990b: 130, 271-283; 1977: 184, 142, 89, 90-95; 2000: 174f.).⁴⁰

As for highly differentiated societies, Bourdieu's never finished project of a 'theory of fields' consists of a 'plurality of worlds' constructed by social agents as particular fields of social activity through their various ways 'of world-making' – ways that can be 'magical or technical, emotional or rational, practical or theoretical, instrumental or aesthetic, serious or ludic' (1990a: 65, 21; 2000: 16; 1996b: 13; 1984: 101). These fields constitute in their entirety social space in its Bourdieusian version. As far as it is *possible* in each *particular case* given different contexts and their chances for a Leibniz-informed '*analysis situs*', Bourdieu calls upon researchers to construct this space as an analytical tactic to understand and study agents' practices and the ways these relate to what he considers to be rarely explored but decisive, namely, the 'principles of construction of social space' and its (re)productive modalities (2000: 134, 183; 1984: 244; 1985: 723; 1996a: 18; 1998: 3, 10, 31; emphasis in original; Fogle 2011: xi, 155; Pinto 2015: 104).

⁴⁰ Critics point out that such a sharp distinction is problematic, because it overlooks the continuities among different societies, and because 'not every relevant [social] context of action is necessarily a field' (Lahire 2015: 63, 76f.; Hilgers/Mangez 2015b: 258, 260, 262).

Given my earlier elaborations, I argue that Bourdieu's social space resembles with its own objectivist and subjectivist moments a field/habitus-intersection writ large: 'Sociology, in its objectivist moment, is a social topology' (1989: 16, 15; 1985: 723), Bourdieu claims, and social space can be understood figuratively (!) as a 'multi-dimensional space of positions' of, and as 'a *space of relations[hips]*' between, a variety of 'agents and groups of agents' (1985: 725, 724; 1998: 31; 1990a: 192; emphasis in original; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 11). These positions and relations institute social space as an 'invisible reality' hard to grasp in empirical terms, since they largely escape our sensations (1996a: 18, 12; 1998: 10, 31; 2006: 362; 1989: 16; 1992: 231). Yet agents hold 'different properties' in that very space and, consequently, occupy different and objective positions in it (1989: 19). Since these relative, 'distinct and coexisting' positions relate closely to each other, *agents and groups of agents* are shaped by and live in interrelation with both the entire social space and its more specific fields with their variegated characteristics, that is, 'in and through *difference*' (1996a: 11; 1999b: 124; 1998: 31, 12, 9; emphasis in original).⁴¹ Although Bourdieu conceives of social agents to be like 'things' because they 'are appropriated by [other social] agents and hence constituted as properties', they also differ from things because agents are always 'situated' and 'occupy a *place*' as bodily, biological human beings (2000: 131, 134; 1999b: 123f; 1996a: 11; 1990a: 50; my emphasis). Being *placed* in this way has for agents two consequences: First, they strongly relate to and engage with the various '*powers* that are active [and 'effective'] within' social space and each field individually (1985: 724; 1998: 32; my emphasis). Second, it is often possible to describe their position by means of spatial classifications such as 'proximity', 'distance', or 'above, below, and *between*' – classifications which tend to configure fields and their relations of power by 'spatial oppositions' (1996a: 11, 12; 1998: 6; 1999b: 124; 2000: 134; 1989: 16; emphasis in original; Loughland et al. 2015: 29).

Social space and specific fields also have the same two qualities when it comes to the mentioned powers and the relations they create: First, both are a 'field of forces' in the sense that their 'objective power relations [...] impose themselves on all [agents] who enter the field' widely irrespective of the agency of these agents (1985: 724; 1998: 32; 1984: 110). Second, both are a 'field of struggles' in the sense that agents are placed, strategic beings who

⁴¹ Rather than being merely a space 'of differences', social space embodies for Bourdieu the social world's relationality and is ubiquitous, (re)productive, and conflictive *difference* (1992: 231; 1996a: 11, 21, 22; 1998: 13, 31, 32; 2006: 356, 358; 1977: 69).

struggle against one another, because they make use of the field's active power(s) and, thereby, secure or change the 'structure' of the field (1998: 32; 1990a: 194; 1984: 244; 1992b: 99, 101). Due to these more structuralist and objectivist propositions of social space, Bourdieu claims that agents are to some extent 'characterized' and 'defined by' their place, and that these places can be analysed to partly infer agents' overall positional constitution or 'condition' (2000: 134; 1985: 724f.; 1996a: 12f.).

At this point, social space's more cognitive and subjective propositions come into play: Positions, relations, places, and their 'objective future' – difference, so to speak – are both linked to how agents (and their habitus) represent them(selves) and to how other agents (and their habitus) perceive them, that is, positions (etc.) are only really constituted if recognised, 'being-perceived' by *others* (1984: 344; 1990b: 135; 2006: 361; on habitus, see Section 3.5). As 'socialized' beings, agents can recognise how 'practices or representations and positions [or places] in social space' relate and can make judgements on their significance, since these agents *sense* the 'social realities' places convey (1989: 19; 1990a: 79; 1984: 471f.; 1985: 728). Drawing mainly upon Erving Goffmann's notion of a 'sense of one's place' (1985: 728; 1989: 17; 2000: 184), Bourdieu thus conceives of agents to have a 'practical, bodily knowledge of her present and potential position' accumulated through experience and allowing them to grasp the 'social meaning' of their position (2000: 184; 1989: 19). Knowledges, experiences, and senses are shaped during the '*social trajectory*' of individual agents, since they are exposed to the distinct social conditions of a '*series of positions* occupied by the same agent or the same group of agents in successive spaces' (1996b: 258; emphasis in original). Because their habitus is active in this 'practical space', agents have a 'practical sense of' this space and persistently assess and estimate whether certain practices are and will be necessary and effective in specific contexts (1977: 118; 1984: 169; 1990b: 34; 1996b: 259; 1977: 77; Guzzini 2000: 166; Bigo 2013: 124). While Bourdieu claims that variation among 'individual *habitus*' is ultimately to be found in each agent's own trajectory (1990b: 60; emphasis in original), this discrete trajectory is always a structural 'specification of the collective history of his group or class' *and* the entire social space (1977: 86; 1992b: 136; 1998: 3; 2006: 355). Rather than conceiving of these classes and groups of objective positions as material realities like others do (e.g., Marxism), he sees them as tending to be close to each other in subjective terms and to exist as social constructions only in 'virtuality', 'on paper', and always '*to be done*', that is, as 'theoretical classes' and groups (1996a: 21, 18; 1998: 10ff., 32; 1985: 723, 725; 1990a: 75;

1989: 18; 2006: 362; emphasis in original). These classes and groups are realised and become visible only if, and to the extent that, they can discursively constitute themselves by means of 'speaking publicly, officially', and if other agents recognise them in hierarchical social space (1989: 24; 1984: 480f.). And so, if 'doing' and 'speaking with authority' become essentially the same in a fitting context (1990a: 53), agents can employ specific 'words or oppositions that serve to classify' for the construction of classes and groups (1990b: 85).

Indeed, for Bourdieu, agents are classifying, subjective beings that have, and make use of, cognitive-communicative *classificatory principles*.⁴² These classificatory principles both 'organize perception and structure practice' (1977: 97, 164, 114) and are 'genuinely explanatory' (1996a: 18; 1998: 10; emphasis in original) and a 'generator of practices', since they 'continuously transform[...] necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences' (1984: 175). Classificatory principles work two-way: As we have seen in the case of how agents and places relate, agents do not only 'classify themselves' and other agents in terms of 'properties and practices' but are perceived by others as those who are and can be classified as well (1990a: 50; 1984: 482). Calling classificatory principles '*structuring structures*' (1989: 18; 2000: 98; my emphasis), these structures are only effective as far as they are socially '*structured*' themselves (1977: 97; 1989: 18; emphasis in original).⁴³ This latter structuring

⁴² Bourdieu, rather puzzlingly, deviates in and mixes his terminology referring to classificatory principles also as, for example, 'practical taxonomies' (1977: 97, 114, 163), 'systems of classification' (1977: 97, 164), 'cognitive structures' (1989: 18; 1984: 468; 1994: 14; 1992b: 139), 'classificatory system[s]', 'schemes' and 'principles' (1984: 175, 468f., 477; 1996a: 18; 1998: 10; 2000: 98), 'categories of perception' (1985: 728), and 'symbolic forms' (1984: 468; 2000: 16). I use the term classificatory principles here, since it underscores both the praxis of classifying based on socially constructed principles and the distinction towards the interrelated schemes of habitus.

⁴³ Among other things, it is because Bourdieu uses terms such as 'structured structure', 'structuring structure' or '*intentionless invention*' that he risks being misinterpreted as a structuralist, *non-transformationalist*, and *agency-reducer* (see, for example, 1977: 72, 79; 1990b: 53; 1996a: 15; 2000: 98; 2005: 46; emphasis in original; Bigo 2011: 237). Few of Bourdieu's various readers and outright critics go as far as Burawoy seeing a 'pseudo-science that is unfalsifiable' at work, which universalises reason eventually (Burawoy 2012b: 190; Burawoy 2012c: 45). Still, many hold with different emphases that his sociology is too structuralist, functionalist, (economic) materialist and determinist, focuses mostly on social reproduction and domination – that is, it deprives agents of their room for manoeuvre, creative agency, and freedom – and would, hence, not provide for a profound theory of social change, history, and transformation (e.g., Burawoy 2012b: 204, 189; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 28, 29, 61; Bueger/Gadinger 2008: 288; Burawoy 2012c: 39; von Holdt 2012: 91; Emirbayer/Schneiderhan 2013: 152; Fogle 2011: 30; Sweetman 2003: 534; King 2000: 426, 428; Calhoun 1995: 141, 142; for related discussions, see Wacquant 1992b: 52; Vandenberghe 1999: 54; Jackson 2008: 170; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 40; Leander 2011: 299f.; Martin 2003: 24). Yet rather than following these and other critics' claims (e.g., Michel De Certeau, Judith Butler), Leander points out that Bourdieu's 'ethnography of feelings and improvisations' addresses most of these critiques, and Bigo holds that what really counts is less individual agency than 'a relational individual' (Leander 2011: 300; Bigo 2011: 242; Gorski 2013b: 2, 12). Bourdieu claims that his later research was more structuralist, but, only to the extent that his objects of analysis of that time made this necessary and that his critics ignore his more constructivist earlier research (Bourdieu 1989: 14).

occurs because agents internalise and embody the socio-historically produced 'objective structures of the social space' – for example, the frequently unequal configurations, representations, and 'social divisions' such as 'age groups, genders, social classes' – which, in turn, become principles of vision and division shaping their perceptions (see Section 3.5, on habitus) (1985: 728; 1984: 471, 468, 175; 2000: 98; 1989: 18; 1977: 164). Thinking the objectivist and subjectivist propositions of social space together allows us, I argue, to understand why Bourdieu conceives of social space as a 'relatively stable site of the coexistence of points of view' (2000: 183). Writes Bourdieu:

'The social world embraces me like a point. But this point is a *point of view*, the principle of a view adopted from a point located in social space, a *perspective* which is defined, in its form and contents, by the objective positions from which it is adopted' (1998: 13; emphasis in original).

Drawing upon the works of Flaubert and Pascal, he claims that these points of view can be understood and should be analysed as 'structured and structuring position-takings on the social space or on a particular field [which] are by definition different and competing' – even 'antagonistic' at times – since they are always taken 'from a point (*situs*) in social space' (2000: 183; 1989: 18; 1999a: 3; 1996b: 48; 1985: 734; Martin 2003: 25; emphasis in original). Always shaped by the 'struggle of points of view, perspectives, classifications' (2000: 183), social space governs and arranges the everyday 'practices and representations' of agents and instructs how they represent social space (1996a: 18, 22; 1998: 10, 13; 1984: 244). That is, social space becomes 'the *real principle* of the behavior of individuals and groups' (1998: 31; my emphasis). Yet, if we want to analyse this principle in practical research and understand the workings of the field/habitus-intersection, we need to turn to the thinking tools of field, habitus, and capital in more detail in the next section.

3.5 Of Field, Habitus, Capital

Consequently, the thinking tool of *field* comes into play, emphasising *relations, nomos, and position-takings*. Bourdieu claims that using the tool of field means 'to *think relationally*' (1992b: 96, 75; 1992: 228; emphasis in original) and writes in his trademark idiosyncratic style:

'In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc. [such as 'complementary or antagonism'])' (1992b: 97; emphasis in original; similar in 1996b: 231).

Sometimes also called 'social universe', 'microcosm', or 'system[s]' and 'spaces of objective relations', fields have the following properties (1996b: 61, 169; 1998: 83f.; 2000: 99; 1992b: 97): First, a field is a space of *specificity*, because it has, is structured by, conveys, and imposes a 'specific logic', 'necessity', 'stakes', 'rules and regularities', and a 'principle of vision and division' (1984: 112, 101; 1992b: 97, 104; 2000: 11, 99, 186; 1990a: 64, 108; 1996b: 199; 1998: 83; Wacquant 1993: 42). As 'rigorous mechanisms',⁴⁴ field-dependent specificities structure the condition of possibility for agents' practices by constructing the 'fundamental law', or '*nomos*', of each field, which differentiates it from other fields and makes it partly self-governing against external influences such as 'economic and political power' (1996b: 61; 1998: 83f.; 2000: 96; 1994: 13; 1977: 184; 1990b: 131; 1992b: 97; emphasis in original). Fields are 'relatively autonomous' in what they produce, how they work, how they affect 'being and knowledge', and how they develop 'specialized persons or institutions' with their specific vocabularies (1977: 184; 1990b: 131; 1992b: 97, 132; 2000: 102, 99; 1990a: 87; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 7, 6). Since such specificities are always realised in and through 'a specific habitus' and 'in things' (see below on habitus), the field/habitus-intersection becomes alive (2000: 11, 99; Pinto 2015: 110). Yet the 'meaning and values' of certain practices differ among fields and in 'opposing sectors of the same field' (1984: 94). While agents outside of a field might find its specificities difficult to grasp or even imperceptible, those who recognise and internalise them become part of the field and incapable of seeing it from the outside

⁴⁴ While Martin points out that Bourdieu's frequent use of terms such as mechanisms and his interest in 'the concrete' and 'local action' have similarities with causal mechanistic analysis, he underscores that in field theory explanation is rather discernible since it 'stops at the constitution of the field' (Martin 2003: 12, 43). As Gorski explains, for Bourdieu, 'there is no single, final, or even correct explanation for anything, only more complete, developed, [and] adequate explanations' (Gorski 2013c: 356).

since they acquire a matching, internal viewpoint – a 'specific mode of thought' (2000: 99, 97; 1996b: 132). This mode is the condition for the (un)imaginable of the field and the 'right of entry' to it (2000: 99, 100; 1996b: 223). Gaining this right is the more difficult for agents, the more the limits of a field are turned into a 'juridical frontier' and the more they are secured with a kind of 'code' serving both 'as a *censor*' and 'a *means of expression*' (1996b: 226, 270; emphasis in original). Precluding certain possibilities and enabling others, this code shapes the ways certain 'cultural works' are created and disseminated, and agents can only appropriate it if they hold the right (amount of) 'cultural capital' and can use it (1996b: 270, 279; 1999b: 128).

Second, fields are largely '*independent of the populations which these [objective] relations define*' and Bourdieu asks scholars to study the dominance of the entire space vis-à-vis its social agents (1992b: 106ff.; emphasis in original). Yet these highly energetic agents – who are 'individuals', in the last analysis – and their daily and composite practices continuously construct, transform, and destroy fields (1988: 541; 1992b: 107). Put differently, 'endless change', 'struggles', and 'historicity' are constitutive for fields, changes unfold without the dominant location of linear causalities (e.g., personal responsibilities) or the 'parts, components' of positivism, and newer and 'younger' agents lacking 'specific capital' tend to be those who strive for change (1992b: 104, 102; 1990b: 137; 2000: 96; 1996b: 239, 169, 1990a: 192).⁴⁵ Other fields or external influences only shape a field if they profoundly shape social space and the 'field of power' themselves – for example, through 'economic crisis, technological change, political revolutions' – and this restructuring only takes place in an indirect and mediated way 'translated' by the field's nomos and depending on its *autonomy* (1996b: 127; 1988: 544; 1992b: 105; Martin 2003: 23; Gregg/Martin 2015: 52; Leander 2008: 16, 21; Leander 2011: 298). The idea is, then, to analyse as far as possible both how its 'structural causality of a network of factors' produces a form of 'over-determination',⁴⁶ and how its 'limits' are defined by an assessable space in which these determinations (i.e., what is sometimes called *field effects*) weaken and end at some point (1984: 107; 1992b: 100; 1996b:

⁴⁵ Bigo highlights how Bourdieusian agents have a 'capacity to act in a *certain spatiotemporal configuration*', how fields allow for 'creativity and *résistance*', and how multiple struggles in and among fields shape their constitution and boundaries (Bigo 2011: 239, 240, fn. 17; my emphasis). Certainly, struggle and change are defining elements of fields and Bourdieu's work more broadly (Wacquant 2013b: 275; Leander 2011: 296, 298; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 11; Williams 2007: 126).

⁴⁶ All social phenomena are in a sense *overdetermined* for Bourdieu, since they are always shaped by multiple causal structurings stemming from both within *and* outside the field (Gorski 2013c: 356; Steinmetz 2008: 602).

226; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 24; Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 7; Bigo 2011: 239). These limits are continuously contested within a field and in relation to other fields, since all fields have conflictive and 'dynamic borders' (1992b: 100, 104; 1990b: 228).⁴⁷ Agents are part of a field (i.e., a member) and inside its limits if, and to the extent, they shape it and are affected by it (1992b: 100; 1992: 232; Leander 2011: 299).

Third, in a field, an agent's *subjective* 'position-taking [...] is defined (objectively and sometimes intentionally) in relation to the universe of [possible] position-takings' it offers (1996b: 233, 235). Position-takings are field-enabled and field-internal classificatory practices of agents – for example, 'political acts and discourses', 'opinions, representations, judgements', notions, assertions, speech acts, works – which are 'symbolically meaningful' in relation to other agents and their position-takings (1996b: 231; 2000: 130; Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 14; Fogle 2011: 12, 13; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 33; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 20). Since a field is thus always a 'space of works' and 'of cultural production' in which goods are produced and consumed in specific ways (e.g., 'artistic', 'literary', 'scientific'), understanding these (possible) position-takings and uses necessitates that its 'producer' and 'consumer' know its specificities and history (1988: 544; 1996b: 243, 199; 1990a: 140, 87). Even if position-takings tend to interrelate with and signify certain *homologous* positions and dispositions,⁴⁸ there is no direct causal and determinist mechanism at work between agents' positions and dispositions since these interrelations are, principally, the product of 'practical strategies' employed by agents (see below on capital) (1996b: 231, 234, 266; 2000: 151; Bigo 2011: 244). Rather, Bourdieu usually conceives of a mutual and 'strong correlation' between positions and dispositions, that is, positions and their properties are 'retranslated into' position-takings through the workings of the mediating habitus (1984: 110, 345; 1996b: 265; 1996a: 14; 1998: 7; 2000: 183). A field's 'mechanics' always shape the strategic 'choices' of

⁴⁷ Mérand and Pouliot state that fields 'overlap, interpenetrate, mutually determine each other', but critically remark the problem of demarcating fields (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 34, 40). Given the various contestations about the limits of fields, however, there is no convincing solution to the question where fields start and end or who a member is (Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 8; Steinmetz 2008: 595).

⁴⁸ Bourdieu claims that a 'range of structural and functional *homologies*' exist in and between fields and understands homology as a kind of 'resemblance within a difference' (1992b: 105, 106; 1996b: 182; emphasis in original; Loughland et al. 2015: 30). Homology occurs *in a field* if agents' subjective dispositions mirror their objective positions in the field (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 39). Homology occurs *among fields* in social space if similar agential positions can be identified in two or more fields, for example, among dominant positions or among dominated positions (Fogle 2011: 24; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 13, 15). Calhoun states that homologies among fields are often more postulated by Bourdieu than empirically shown (Calhoun 1995: 153). This is of less interest to me, since I concentrate on a FNSP as a single, exploratory field.

agents to some extent, yet it is only under conditions of 'equilibrium' that this positional arrangement '*tends to command the space of position-takings*' (2000: 120; 1992b: 105; 1996b: 231; emphasis in original).⁴⁹

Since understanding these position-takings necessitates a deeper engagement with agents' subjective dispositions, the thinking tool of *habitus* comes into play, emphasising *dispositional schemes, feel for the game, and knowledge*. Intended to overcome the 'usual antinomies' of social life such as between unconscious, objective (and causal) mechanisms and conscious, subjective (and intentional) finalism, Bourdieu developed the tool of habitus in relation to historical fields over decades into a 'peculiar philosophy [or 'theory'] of action, or better, of practice, sometimes characterized as dispositional' (1990b: 55, 145; 1992b: 135; 1996b: 179; 2005: 35, 44; 1990a: 107; 1977: 73, 79, 82; 1998: 8; 2000: 138, 136; Wacquant 1992b: 27; Wacquant 2004: 391). For the late Bourdieu, habitus is a

'system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking, or a system of *long-lasting* (rather than permanent) schemes or structures of perception, conception and action' (2005: 43; emphasis in original).

While Bourdieu undoubtedly speaks of agents' dispositions to be 'durable', 'permanent', and 'long-lasting', they are never 'eternal' but, rather, 'open' (1990b: 53; 1992b: 133; 2000: 136, 175; 1977: 90; 2005: 43, 45). Conceptualising dispositions – with some variation(s) – as 'schemes of perception, thought, and action' (1977: 90, 86; 1989: 14, 19; 1990b: 139; 2000: 136, 138, 175; 2005: 43),⁵⁰ he sees these schemes as always the product of specific social

⁴⁹ Scholars refer to several assumed problems concerning Bourdieu's thinking tool of field: Some state that it is unclear what precise context is needed for practices to construct a field, how overlap and (power) relations between fields can be understood, how fields relate to social space, how agents' positions precisely relate to capital, and how field-external processes should be incorporated (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 32; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 28; Gregg/Martin 2015: 39). Others find it unconvincing to treat fields as if they were always embedded in larger fields (until the field of power is reached) (Eyal 2013: 160; Lahire 2015: 66). As Leander shows, pragmatist scholars hold that field theories construct just another distinction 'between the field and its outside' (Leander 2011: 297). Swartz mentions the issue of 'circularity', since field-effects are both the outcome of fields and their constituents (Swartz 2013a: 30, 31). In accordance with Chapter 2, Martin criticises that scholars all too often spread 'invisible fields' to grasp what is incomprehensible to them (Martin 2003: 8). Gregg and Martin criticise that scholars tend to declare fields by *identifying* so far 'unclaimed form[s] of capital', leading to an abundance of (sub-)fields without much value for scientific progress (Gregg/Martin 2015: 55).

⁵⁰ Once more deviating in and mixing his terminology (and/or being differently translated), Bourdieu also speaks of 'system[s] of schemes' (1990b: 139; 2000: 138; 1989: 19; 2005: 43) and 'practical' schemes (2000: 136, 175). The second, *thought*-part is sometimes also called 'conception' (1977: 86; 2005: 43) or 'appreciation' (2000: 138, 175; 1990b: 139; 1989: 19). I use this *thought*-version here, since it most clearly accentuates the profoundness

conditions and 'conditionings' (1977: 85; 1984: 101; 1985: 725; 1989: 17; 1990b: 43, 53; 1992b: 133; 2000: 146, 183; 1998: 7; 2005: 45). These conditionings are the product of what Bourdieu calls in different terms 'objective regularities', that is, fields (1990b: 55, 139; 1984: 101, 470; 1977: 78).⁵¹

Again, the field/habitus-intersection becomes evident: Habitus is produced by 'the *intersection* of [two] partly independent causal series' – of field and, indeed, of habitus itself – shaping the conditions of possibility for agents (1990a: 91, 191; 1977: 83, 86; emphasis in original). That is, the dispositions of habitus 'are only formed, only function and are only valid in a field', since they relate in direct and objective ways to the demands of a field's nomos and its evolving structure (1984: 94; 1990a: 108, 90; 2000: 164, 64; 2005: 47; Wacquant 1992b: 19; Swartz 2013a: 31; Wacquant 1992b: 19; Guzzini 2013: 86). Habitus is continuously produced by, and expressed in, the practical '*opus operatum*' of everyday life and its countless, decidedly contingent situations, that is, whenever positions and dispositions struggle with each other (1990b: 52; 1977: 78, 18, 83; 2000: 210, 149, 211; 1992b: 135; 2005: 47; emphasis in original). This results in all kinds of practices ranging from the 'systematic', via the changeable, to the conflicting (2000: 64, 149; 2005: 47, 44). Habitus *tends to* (!) produce both practices that are sensible, approving, coordinated, 'harmonized', and 'common-sense' given a field's nomos, as well as those excluding practices that seem to contradict the nomos (1990b: 55f., 59; 2005: 45; 1984: 173; 1977: 83). Several 'principle[s] of production of practices' exist, so Bourdieu, but habitus is the most crucial one often trumping 'rational calculation' and other principles (1990a: 108; 2000: 64; 1990b: 145, 160).⁵²

With the intersection of field and habitus, a form of 'ontological complicity' emerges realised

of habitus for his work.

⁵¹ Scholars refer to several assumed problems concerning Bourdieu's thinking tool of habitus: Some claim that habitus is basically (and only) linked to the notion and practice of social reproduction (Friedmann 2005: 315; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 2). King conceives of habitus as exemplifying Bourdieu's 'very objectivism' (!) (King 2000: 417). Burawoy holds that habitus is such a popular tool since its vagueness allows for universal explanations, but without providing ways to study an 'individual's habitus' beyond exploring its effects (Burawoy 2012b: 204). Crossley is troubled by the puzzling nature (e.g., whether it is 'plural' or 'singular') and ubiquitous use of the tool devoid of 'a definitive statement' (!) (Crossley 2014: 107). In contrast, Wacquant and others criticise the frequent interpretations of habitus as 'rigid, frozen, unchanging and unchangeable', considering Bourdieu's latest clarifications (Wacquant 2014a: 6; Hillier/Rooksby 2005d: 400f.). Bourdieu would simply underscore 'the *tendency* of habitus to become stable, coherent, congruent with its operant milieu', given how often agents and social conditions tend to co-produce empirical realities with non-transformational inclinations (Wacquant 2014b: 128; Hillier/Rooksby 2005b: 37; emphasis in original).

⁵² Bourdieu points out that in specific contexts 'rational choice' may take over, at least among those agents who are in a position to be rational' (1992b: 131; Ermakoff 2013).

in and through a 'feel' for the game' which is linked to the notion of 'a socialized body' (1990a: 108, 9; 2000: 136). We all permanently internalise and incorporate through personal and collective experiences the social world (i.e., the conditionings of social space, of fields, of principles of division and vision) 'in our minds, that is in our bodies', and these bodies learn over time enabling a form of '*corporeal knowledge*' of this world (2005: 46; 2000: 140f., 183, 135; 1990b: 59; 1990a: 12; 1984: 471; 1985: 731; 1977: 82, 77; 1996b: 9; emphasis in original; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 29). Habitus is thus more than pure individuality, since it is 'socialized subjectivity' in the sense of being 'collective, or transindividual' – though collectives lack the corporeal knowledge of human individuals (1992b: 126; 2000: 157; 1977: 86; 1990b: 57; Williams 2007: 25, 27; Leander 2011: 299, fn. 14; Wacquant 1992b: 18).

Historically contingent and produced by history, habitus is formed mostly invisibly and steadily in the daily encounters of agents' personal histories and '*acquired through experience*', 'education', and 'training' – all of which tend to transform or strengthen a habitus as a kind of 'acquired characteristics' in which key elements such as the 'primary habitus' are incorporated early on by family-related socialisation processes such as childhood experiences (1990a: 9; 2005: 45; 1990b: 54, 57; 2000: 11, 161, 164; 1977: 82; emphasis in original; Wacquant 2014a: 7). Bourdieu differentiates between a primary and a secondary habitus: The former is the generative basis upon which the latter develops over time leading to what Bourdieusian scholars call 'a multiplicity of (specific) habitus' with different, composite forms (Wacquant 2014a: 7; Fogle 2011: 15; Steinmetz 2013: 120; Hillier/Rooksby 2005c: 14). While early experiences are important for understanding how 'different conditions of existence produce different habitus', habitus 'is not a fate, not a destiny', and not a habit (1984: 170; 1977: 78; 1990a: 9; 2005: 45; 1992b: 133; Pouliot 2010: 33).⁵³ Rather, habitus changes if it lacks sufficient match with a situation over time. This change is mostly gradual since the incorporation of the social world causes habitus to have a 'specific inertia' called 'hysteresis' creating in agents – in combination with their capital(s) – an inclination towards a likely trajectory for them (1992b: 130; 1996b: 10; 2000: 136, 161). It is through experience, learning, and incorporation that agents develop schemes of perception, thought, and action enabling them to get a feel for the game played in a field and to behave appropriately with the right practical knowledge and sense of it. As a 'sense of position', agents' practical knowledge both

⁵³ Bourdieu disregards the notion of habit since it resembles 'a mechanical assembly or performed programme' and 'repetition' (1977: 95, en. 44, ch. 2, p. 218; 2005: 46; 1996b: 179).

interprets the practices and imaginations of other agents (i.e., the 'information' obtained) and regulates their own practices and imaginations accordingly (2000: 184; 1977: 11, 10). Agents have a feel for the game (or not) when they can act upon the conceivable 'moves' offered by the situational configuration of a field, and when they are a 'native' of it for whom all internal processes and practices appear '*sensible*' and apt (or not) (1990a: 9; 1990b: 66; emphasis in original; Williams 2007: 28; Gorski 2013c: 347). It means to *know* a field's present practicalities and its 'immanent future' – that is, all the necessities and (im)possibilities of 'things to do or not to do, to say or not to say', to think or not to think – to which the habitus initially and directly *answers* without any instruction manual or calculator (2000: 211, 148, 11; 1977: 21, 76ff.; 1990a: 11; 1990b: 82, 53).⁵⁴

Consequently, the field/habitus-intersection is at work again – also since a feel for the game is subjective and objective at the same time: It ascribes both a subjective 'meaning' and 'raison d'être' to a field, and an idea of the present and future opportunities (i.e., the 'still-to-come') of its objective 'economy' (1990b: 66, 53f.; 1990a: 90; 1977: 76; 1998: 80; 2000: 217, 64; 1996b: 329). Yet history and the historicity of habitus remain key for an understanding of habitus as a thinking tool and for how it is '*universally* put to work' by agents, since habitus 'produces individual and collective practices [and discourses], and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history' (1992b: 139, 135; 1977: 82; 1990a: 90; 1990b: 54; 2000: 210, 217; 1989: 19; emphasis in original). In this light, practices are never the product of the causal efficacy of specific 'historical events' or structures, since a responding habitus, or class of habitus, transferring such capabilities to them is necessary (2000: 149). As a '*modus operandi* informing all thought and action', habitus has 'a generative capacity; it is a [socially] structured principle of invention' allowing for agency and the 'active', 'creative' and 'regulated improvisation' of agents under social constraints (1977: 18, 78; 2005: 48, 46; 1977: 78; 1990a: 13; 1990b: 52; 1996b: 179; 1998: 8; 1989: 18; emphasis in original; Bigo 2011: 242; Wacquant 1992b: 19; Wacquant 2014b: 121; Hillier/Rooksby 2005d: 403). Put differently, habitus provides agents with 'a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying power', enabling them to represent themselves and others with the help of classificatory principles and by acts of classification (2000: 136, 138; 1977: 18; 1989: 19; 1990b: 139). Since it follows that agents' creativity and the locus of the 'creative project' for their position-

⁵⁴ Martin critically remarks that it is not entirely clear how these necessities are produced by the field's positions (Martin 2003: 42).

takings are always field-internal and habitus-related (1988: 541; 1996b: 169), habitus becomes for Bourdieu what he calls a "can-be" that works as a 'strategy-generating principle' by closely envisaging and situationally adjusting to the likely possibilities and impossibilities of each agent's future in relation to other agents in his or her field(s) of activity (2000: 217, 150, 210; 1977: 72, en. 1, ch. 2, p. 214).

To make sense of agents as creative, strategic beings, the thinking tool of *capital* comes into play, emphasising *kinds, games, and strategies*. Intending to develop '*a [more] general science [or 'theory'] of the economy of practices*', Bourdieu wishes to employ 'economic calculations to *all* the [desired] goods, material and symbolic' which fields produce and value (1977: 183, 177f., 67; 1985: 737; 1990b: 122, 51, 41; emphasis in original). Agents require, make use of, have different amounts of, fight for, and (re)define those 'resources', 'stakes', 'trump cards', 'legitimate means' or 'fundamental powers' that are specific to a field and that are constantly at stake in it, that is, its capital (1984: 114, 246; 1985: 734; 1992b: 98; 1989: 17; Villumsen Berling 2012: 455; Jackson 2008: 168; Swartz 2013a: 27). The *analytical* use of capital allows for a shortened portrayal of social space and shows, again, how the tools interrelate. Writes Bourdieu:

'A capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field. It confers a power over the field, over the materialized or embodied instruments of production or reproduction whose distribution constitutes the very structure of the field' (1992b: 101; 1984: 246; 1985: 724; emphasis in original; Guzzini 2013: 80).

As 'a social relation', capital constrains and enables agents' opportunities in a field, since it is both a 'principle of [hierarchical] differentiation' and a 'differential capacity to appropriate' (1984: 113; 1977: 183; 2000: 217; 1985: 737; 1990b: 140). The positions of agents and their capability to act (i.e., their 'relative strength') depend on the deployment of specific capital in a field and on how the 'different types' – or 'forms', 'kinds' and 'species' – of capital are distributed and weighted in a field at every moment (1984: 246, 113; 1999b: 99; 1989: 17; 1985: 737; 1990b: 122; 1977: 183; 1992b: 99; Abrahamsen/Williams 2011: 313). All capitals have a 'relative value' in different fields and are 'mutually convertible' with some effort; however, the *power* of capitals is highly field-specific, depends on the field's genesis, and changes with the level of autonomy of the field (1992b: 98; 1984: 113; 1977: 183; 1990b: 122;

Pouliot 2013: 48; Calhoun 1995: 140; Gorski 2013c: 342).⁵⁵ Since new fields usually imply new kinds of capital, the 'inherited' capitals agents bring with them from previous positions are transformed into their 'present' capitals shaping their new positions and future trajectories (1984: 110, 109; Gorski 2013c: 342). Agents are placed in social space, first, due to the 'overall volume' and, second, due to the 'structure' – or 'composition' – of their capital (1996a: 14; 1998: 7; 1985: 724; 1984: 114; 1992b: 99, 108). This *volume of different kinds of capital* remains an analytical metaphor only, so Bourdieu, but often tends to consist of 'economic capital (in its different kinds), cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital' (1984: 246; 1989: 17; 1985: 724; Gorski 2013c: 388). It is, indeed, one of his most celebrated insights to have identified and explored different – and 'immaterial' (i.e., cultural, social, and symbolic) – kinds of capital (Calhoun 1995: 140, 139).

I do not further elaborate different kinds of capital here, since *my focus is on an exploratory FNSP and an understanding of capital primarily as an outcome of the research process* (see above and Chapters 4 to 7). Rather, I continue to trace the field/habitus-intersection and ask how it relates to the tool of capital: Bourdieu frequently employs the 'least inadequate' analogy of a *game* to understand a field as a 'potentially open space of play', daily struggle, contestation, and negotiation – a space wherein capital is re-evaluated over time since agents tend to put forward and enforce those capitals that strengthen the goods they produce themselves (1990a: 64; 1992b: 99, 104, 101; 1996b: 169). A relevant and successful agent has the appropriate capital, can use it as a resource to fight the struggles of the field, and his habitus permits him to fulfil its necessities (1990a: 63). Even though both dominant and dominated agents can only profit from a game if they fully immerse themselves in it, capital is often distributed unequally, determines the 'chances of profit', and allows certain agents to become dominant by steering the field's configuration and seizing its 'material and/or symbolic profits' (2000: 215, 153; 1985: 724; 1977: 184; 1990b: 131).⁵⁶ Agents are dominant if they occupy a dominant position in a field, if they accumulate more of the fitting capital, and if their capital is more valuable than that of other holders (Jackson 2008: 168; Loughland

⁵⁵ On the relation between Bourdieu's sociology and the concept of power, see, Guzzini 2013. For a more general discussion of the concept of power, see, for example, Baldwin 2002; Allen 2003; Allen/Cochrane 2010; Hindess 1996; Haugaard 2002.

⁵⁶ As Martin and others point out, Bourdieu risks here overemphasising the 'agonistic' and competitive character of the social world by focusing mainly on its 'winner(s) and loser(s)' in their quest for *more (economic and immaterial) capital(s)*, rather than integrating 'nonstrategic' and benevolent social relations as well (Martin 2003: 33, 34; Hillier/Rooksby 2005d: 404; Fogle 2011: 16).

et al. 2015: 28). As Swartz explains, agents fight for and over capital both by transforming various existing goods into fitting capital – that is, challenging and altering established 'definitions and classifications' – and by practices through which they 'accumulate, transmit, exchange, and convert one type of capital for another to maintain or improve their position' (Swartz 2013a: 28).

Agents play and modify this 'rule-bound activity' called game without following stringent rules, yet they understand that it '*obeys certain regularities*' devoid of a clear author (1990a: 64; emphasis in original; Jackson 2008: 167). Consequently, Bourdieu urges scholars to replace the 'universal interest of utilitarian theory' with the more appropriate ideas of '*investment*' and '*illusio*', since agents' *interests* are always socio-historically constructed in relation to specific fields and their habitus (1992b: 116, 115, 98; 1990a: 31, 48, 88; 1998: 76; 1996b: 33; emphasis in original; Bigo 2011: 244). Likewise, on this topic, Bourdieu calls upon scholars to provide 'a complete description' of the intersection of field and habitus (1977: 76). With each field having its interest, interest is always an agential 'investment' in a field, allows entrance to it, and is key to its mechanisms, for agents are only truly *interested*, 'being invested' if they fight the game's struggles (1990a: 48, 87, 99; 1998: 77; 1992b: 116; 2000: 11; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 33). Since *illusio* is a 'fundamental belief in the interest of the game' and the significance of its stakes by agents, they secure the field's existence and actively engage in its 'illusion' (e.g., political, scientific, religious) – though agents often try to conceal this by presenting themselves as 'disinterested' (2000: 11; 1996b: 227, 166; 1990b: 67; 1998: 76; Williams 2007: 35; Leander 2011: 306). Based upon *interest-as-illusio*, agents usually have, and need to have, specific *strategies* understood as practices to employ their capital most successfully, to acquire more capital and profit, and to secure and advance their position in the field. Writes Bourdieu:

'The language of strategy, which one is forced to use in order to designate the sequences of actions objectively oriented towards an end that are observed in all fields' (2000: 138; Forget/Mérand 2013: 97).

An agent's possible strategies relate to and depend on his/her volume of different kinds of capital in specific fields, the genesis of this volume, and how the chances created in that way are assessed relationally by him/her and other agents from their positions and habitus (i.e.,

these strategies are not necessarily useful in other fields) (1992b: 99, 129, 101; Go 2008: 209; Williams 2007: 36; Forget/Mérand 2013: 98; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 16; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 29; Jackson 2008: 168). In other words, the field/habitus-intersection produces the strategic moves of agents. This holds for both individual agents' strategies and the 'collective strategy' of groups of agents as different 'interested parties' tend to merge their strategies (1977: 59; 1990b: 188). While agents' ambitions are developed concerning what they imagine as (un)available in a field, their strategies are only partly shaped by what is forthcoming since these are often constructed without a 'true strategic intention' and have their own 'time' and 'rhythm' (1998: 81; 1990b: 64, 61; 1977: 9). In short, rethinking the notions of capital, interest, and strategy provides for Bourdieu and us the opportunity 'to construct the object differently, to ask different questions' (1998: 131).

The last three sections established the relevance of how agents' objective positions and subjective position-takings closely interrelate in Bourdieu's sociology and, consequently, traced and explored the field/habitus-intersection within it, to move towards the thinking space of a FNSP. The next section continues in this direction by concluding this chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

To develop a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study how African states' security policies are shaped, this chapter explored how Bourdieu's sociology intertwines with the practice turn in the social sciences and IR and developed a suitable approach to his – global – thinking tools by reading his work sociospatially. Drawing upon the introduced Bourdieusian vocabulary and the ways in which I argued for and traced the field/habitus-intersection in it, I understand the social universe called Nigeria both as a specific case of wider African social formations and as a social space with specific principles of construction. Itself a governing principle of social conduct, social space resembles a multi-dimensional space of objective positions of, and (imposed) power relations between, diverse agents and groups of agents. Social space is, thereby, permanently constituted and performed by a variety of social fields of activity and their specific ways of world-making – one of which I construe as a (possible) FNSP. As a relatively self-governing space of specificity, a FNSP conveys an autonomy-increasing and ever-shifting nomos with its specific relations, logics, vocabularies, and principles of vision and division. This is enacted by and in the acquired

characteristic named *habitus* with its gradually changing, dispositional schemes of perception, thought, and action. If agents recognise and internalise this internal viewpoint, they become field-constituting members and turn a FNSP into a space of work and of cultural production within which, and for which, specific goods are generated. To some extent characterised by their overall social trajectory (of places) and the current place they occupy, creative and improvising agents continuously perceive, interpret, evaluate, and classify themselves and others in an interrelated fashion in terms of the specific properties of places and the social power and necessity of practices and representations. For realising their strategies and for fulfilling their ambitions (e.g., securing and enhancing their position and capital), agents put to work the classificatory principles of their *habitus* through strategic moves which are, in turn, produced by the field/*habitus*-intersection. These moves are expressed in subjective position-takings in the form of a variety of conceivable classificatory practices – or acts of classification – ranging from political acts to discursive statements in a FNSP. That is, the field/*habitus*-intersection of a FNSP is the locus of the creative project for, and produces the creativity of, the agents in the field.

More precisely, I study how different Nigerian agents in a (possible) FNSP shape through classificatory practices – and, in that way, arguably understand – Nigeria's security policy towards the space of (in)security of Boko Haram. Yet rather than understanding this as a *theoreticist* directive, *thinking with* and using a FNSP (and the other tools) poses a series of – *possible* (!) – questions for the empirical and exploratory analysis: (i) Does there exist, and if what agents constitute, a FNSP? (ii) Where are the field's limits? (iii) Does there exist, and if what is, a FNSP's *habitus*? (iv) What practical, bodily knowledge and mastery learned through experience do agents need to develop a native and sensible feel for the current and upcoming game played in a FNSP – an open, lively and ever-reconstructed game with specific requirements? (v) Does there exist, and if what is, a FNSP's specific (and new?) kind of capital agents struggle over and with? (vi) What is the specific interest – or *illusio* – produced by the field/*habitus*-intersection of a FNSP? (vii) What kind of and how are classificatory practices employed by agents in a FNSP? (viii) Who are the dominant agents (i.e., those who occupy dominant positions by having the right capital and *habitus*) and who are the dominated agents in a FNSP? I will come back to most of these questions in the empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) and the conclusion (Chapter 7) of this thesis. I will, however, *not* be able to answer all of them in full detail given the empirical case studied and my limited resources. To approach

these questions and the more specific research interests of this thesis, the next chapter details its methodological stance.

4. Methodology – Constructing a Field of Nigerian Security Policy

4.1 Introduction

Up to now, this thesis introduced its core aims, research questions, rationales and empirical foci, reviewed the BIS literature of interest to it, and delineated its philosophical and metatheoretical perspective. This chapter develops the methodological stance of this thesis. To start, its Bourdieusian, field-analytical and reflexive stance is situated regarding other stances to establish why it was a deliberate decision to rule these lines of reasoning out and to underscore that *doing research* always involves 'a series of [personal] choices' (Hansen 2006: 73; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 2) (Section 4.2). Such choices and the possibility of researching specific phenomena are always partly structured by the social conditions of both the researcher and his or her object of analysis. The question is, therefore, in what ways I can analytically construct and practically enquire a Field of Nigerian Security Policy (FNSP), since it enables and forecloses certain practical steps and avenues of thinking simultaneously (Section 4.3). By highlighting the practical fieldwork in Nigeria throughout, this chapter provides an account of the personal experiences *in the field* to develop a mapping and understanding *of the field* – of a FNSP, that is. Why were certain choices made considering social conditions and eventualities on the ground? How is access to research sites and interviewees negotiated (or not), and what is the role of intermediaries and personal contacts in this? Given these conditions and the analytical tactics they inform, this chapter demonstrates how I approached and decided on fitting and sound research methods – that is, text/discourse-analysis and interviews and observations – in the first place, how these allowed for the collection of empirical data/evidence, and what forms of analysis were employed (Sections 4.4 and 4.5). This chapter concludes with evaluating the ways in which an analytical device called FNSP helps us to study how Nigeria's security policy is shaped towards Boko Haram and orients the reader towards the next two empirical chapters (Section 4.6).

4.2 Philosophy of Science, Methodological Plurality, and Reflexive Sociology

Are there imperative routes scholars ought to take in the study of all that is social and political on the planet for the sake of producing new and electrifying knowledge in comprehensible and sound ways (Jackson 2015; Law 2004; Jones 2014, Nederveen Pieterse 2013a; Nederveen

Pieterse 2013b; Acharya 2014; Neumann 2015; Neumann 2014)? Certainly, today's scholarship often remains fragmented into particularistic *camps* both in terms of 'meta-theoretical lines' and the various 'distinctions' in styles of research and supposedly fundamental issue areas and ideas (Monteiro/Ruby 2009: 17; Basaran et al. 2017b: 1). Since particular methodological claims frequently discredit *other* methodological stances as not scientific (enough) and meagre, there is the unfortunate tendency among scholars to dismiss plurality, dialogue and the willingness to listen to and value those *alien* knowledge-producing claims – and what Jackson calls their 'appropriate intentional context' – which are made by scholars sitting on different branches of the philosophy of science tree (Jackson 2015: 965, 946; Jackson 2011: 18, 32, 39f., 208ff.; Wight 2002: 40).

Bourdieu's work, in contrast, demonstrates the possibility and productivity of being *methodologically* open-minded, of drawing upon and combining different *research methods*, and of avoiding the recurrent *either/or* of philosophy's 'great intellectual games and the methodological rigour of [...] positivist research' (1990a: 26; 1992: 225f.). Specifically, all scientific endeavours are for him restricted in the sense that each of them 'try to establish the truth of these struggles over truth and to grasp the objective logic behind the way the stakes and *camps*, the strategies and victories, are determined' (1996b: 298; my emphasis). As a fierce critic of all 'methodological watchdogs', Bourdieu tended to use the quantitative method of *correspondence analysis* as a device to examine the structure of social spaces (1992: 227; Pouliot 2013: 54; Vandenberghe 1999: 46; Savage 2011: 514; Emirbayer/Johnston 2008: 33).⁵⁷ Practicing pluralism in questions of methodology and methods can be a useful strategy to account for the contingencies of the social world or what Salter calls the 'complex web of facilitating conditions, localized spheres of influence, and networks of embodied, feeling actors' (Salter 2013b: 16; Salter 2013a: 2). Yet Bourdieu's field-analytical and reflexive sociology contrasts with the *applied* methodologies of, for example, the (neo)positivist stance of the philosophy of science.⁵⁸ Researchers need to be critically aware of, and constantly assess, their own positions and points of view both within the social world and the research

⁵⁷ It should be clear by now that I am neither intending nor being able (e.g., lack of resources and knowledge) to replicate in any form the multi-perspectival approach of how Bourdieu approached his research projects. These projects were often conducted as a '*quintessentially collective activity*' with the help of other researchers or in entire research communities (Wacquant 2013a: 20; Wacquant 1992b: 36; emphasis in original).

⁵⁸ See, for example, Jackson 2011: 41ff. For related discussions (e.g., on causation), see, for example, Keohane et al. 1994; Mahoney 2010; Bennet/George 2005; Bennett/Elman 2007; Collier 2011; Gerring 2007; Gerring 2005, Brady 2008; Kincaid 2009; Reiss 2009.

project. They also need to carefully reconstruct the object of analysis over time, that is, the possible field in relation to the research questions posed (1992: 220f.; 1999c: 625).

So, if I want to explore the delimitation of a FNSP eventually, empirical work is crucial since field-analytical research is always 'inseparably empirical and theoretical' (1992b: 160; 1996a: 8; Wacquant 1992b: 33; Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 32). And, like every other researcher, I am part of the social world and (re)produce among other things 'social structures of race, class, gender, sexuality, and nationality' which (in)directly influence me or shape the context for my own (im)possible practices of the research I want to do (Salter 2013b: 20; Jackson 2011: 35; Bleiker/Brigg 2008). Because of our specific history, positionality, and habitus, we come with personal preferences and preconceptions to *our* object of analysis. Our dispositional constitution is intermingled with and will consciously or unconsciously structure what object of analysis we envision, what kind of (meta)theoretical assumptions we tend to highlight, and what set of research methods we tend to apply (Löwenheim 2010: 1026; Leander 2002: 603; Salter 2013b: 22; Swartz 2013a: 24; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 25). Our ability to analyse the object is, then, constrained by our cognitive-corporal constitution, external conditions such as the (un)availability of analysable data/evidence, and the resources we can draw upon in terms of money, time, and institutional settings (Salter 2013b: 21; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 100). Our capacity to grasp the complexities of the social world is limited and the very possibility of discovering, understanding, and explaining its 'chaotic flux of phenomena' is always partial, especially if we try with Bourdieu to avoid making lofty academic claims by realising that 'complexity lies within social reality' (Lefebvre 1991: 8; 1989: 24).

As touched upon in the last chapter, there is no Nagelian 'god trick [or eye] of seeing everything *from nowhere*' in relation to our object of analysis and/or in producing knowledge more generally, if we truly sociologise ourselves through an 'autoanalysis' *in and of* the entire field of (social) science, and if we account for the latter's tendency to merge practical and conceptual worlds (Harraway 1988: 581; 1996b: 25; 1992: 253; Villumsen Berling 2013: 63f.; Leander 2011: 307; Wacquant 1992b: 40; my emphasis). All knowledge-claims – of which many are performed instituting an unwarranted objectivism by using an objectivising, *all-knowing* vocabulary – are done '*from somewhere*' (i.e., from specific socio-political positions and physical locations), 'inherently political', and shaped by how different historical spaces construct multiple 'objects of knowledge' (Gusterson 2008: 108; Leander 2002: 602; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 10; Crang/Thrift 2000b: 3; Löwenheim 2010: 1024, 1032; Jackson 2011: 39; my

emphasis). Calling thus for 'a sociological eye' (1992: 251; 1990a: 195), Bourdieu finds it ironic that scholars who engage in professional struggles over such issues would often try to 'fix what seems to them to be the one true meaning of objectively ambiguous, overdetermined or indeterminate symbols, words, texts or events' (1990b: 17). Rather, he asks us to strive for 'objectifying the objectivity' of our own subjective and historical knowledge-claims, and to dissect the ways these interact with the habitus of agents and other 'supposed sites of subjectivity' (1990b: 21; 2000: 31; Leander 2002: 602; Emirbayer/Schneiderhan 2013: 148). We are all more than likely to produce just another point of view, reading or story. Therefore, questions of personal reflexivity and ethics are – or should be – part of the research we do (Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 22).

One wonders about one's own position, identity, and entitlement to pursue the avenues of thinking proposed here. Specifically, I consider(ed) myself to be a clear outsider to both the wider Nigerian social universe and a FNSP. Despite a background in African Studies and eight months of living and working experiences in Ghana with the German political foundation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), I was a German PhD researcher from a university in the UK coming to Nigeria for the first time and for rather short spells of about three months in 2015 (May-July) and three weeks in 2016 (March-April).⁵⁹ Yet it was precisely the notion to study how *Nigerian* agents conceive of questions of (in)security that motivated my wish to partly map positions and relations of a FNSP, to move closer to an understanding of its agents' different points of view and strategies, and to grasp the stake of and feel for the game of the field to some extent. Using Bourdieu's sociology can, in addition, contribute to the creation of interesting personal insights – and, hence, '*more science*' – through what is called *self-reflexivity* and what typically entails critically scrutinising and elucidating our own processes of thinking, researching, and writing stories (1992b: 194; 1990a: 25; emphasis in original; Leander 2008: 24; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 100, 103, 128; Jackson 2011: 157).⁶⁰ While the study of such subjective processes is for Bourdieu often as vital as the actual focus of research, he does not deny objectivity altogether but argues that self-reflexivity helps to

⁵⁹ Apart from a week in Lagos at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in 2015, the entire fieldwork was carried out in Abuja. Plans to travel further North (e.g., Jos) were discarded due to security concerns about terrorism and a recent surge of kidnappings.

⁶⁰ Self-reflexivity also serves to evaluate and criticise the claims of other scholars. Writes Jackson: '*Any claim can be reflexively criticized by calling attention to the social conditions of its production, and doing so holds out the possibility of improving the claim's scientific status by embedding it in its social context*' (Jackson 2011: 173; emphasis in original).

disrobe the straightjacket of objectivism and to destabilise the notion of 'the knowing subject' (1996b: 207; 2000: 10, 119; Hughes/Montesinos Coleman 2015: 147). Consequently, the next section explores the general (im)possibilities to construct a FNSP as an object of analysis for this thesis in combination with efforts of self-reflexivity.

4.3 Approaching a Field of Nigerian Security Policy

This thesis focuses on constructing and studying a FNSP in a reflexive manner concerning the (in)security space of Boko Haram, that is, in relation to what Bourdieu calls thinking 'in and through theoretically constructed empirical cases' – constructions which shape the very nature and range of possible findings (1992b: 160; Wacquant 1992b: 29; Hughes/Montesinos Coleman 2015: 145). As for practice-oriented research strategies, it is to some extent possible to *see* – and less so to *learn* – practices (e.g., participant observation), to *talk* about them (e.g., interviews), and to *read* them (e.g., analysing texts) (Pouliot 2013: 48f.; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 84; Swartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 86; Reckwitz 2008: 196). *To some extent* refers here with Reckwitz to the impossibility of fully accounting for practices through these measures, since the important role played by what is implicit, embodied knowledge (e.g., habitus) can be studied only indirectly through what is explicit such as statements and actions (Reckwitz 2008: 195f.). This is not to speak of the obstacles facing both domestic and foreign researchers when conducting fieldwork in social universes such as Nigeria, for example, when the main 'mode of communication' in Africa is oral rather than written (Denzer/Guyer 2013: 56; Bayart 2009: 35). Certainly, it would have been beneficial to immerse myself in an ethnographic sense into the field for as deep and long as possible, because an immersion enables the continuous identification and contextualisation of agents and their everyday practices. A close '*proximity to practice*', for example through the participant observation of practitioners in their daily spaces of activity, allows for an engagement with data/evidence such as 'bodily movements, emotions and smiles, utterances and silences' (Bueger/Mireanu 2015: 118, 127; emphasis in original). Yet this was simply not feasible beyond what is reported here.

Prior to fieldwork in Nigeria, I conceived of the appropriate conditions for performing participant observation⁶¹ to be highly doubtful given that the relatively closed nature of the

⁶¹ The concept and practice of participant observation can be problematised concerning the role the researcher plays for its epistemological foundations. Bourdieu, for example, conceives of participant observation to be inconsistent and just 'another way of avoiding the question of the real [sociological] relationship of the observer

sensitive practice realm of security policy in Nigeria (and elsewhere) would almost certainly restrict physical access to ethnographic research sites of interest (Pouliot 2013: 48; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 58). In comparison to other policy fields, the assumption was that this relative closeness would restrict the access to relevant data/evidence (e.g., making it less openly available). Sites for ethnographic research range from places open to the public (e.g., shopping malls) to widely impenetrable places (e.g., military facilities). Differences in terms of levels of access are thus often vast and questions of social position, identity, etc., steer researchers' options to an extent that they are sometimes forced to concentrate on sites they can access, consider alternatives to the observation of practices, or even change their entire focus of research (Gusterson 2008: 96; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 70; Pouliot 2013: 49). While only being at a site creates the ethnographic opportunity for what Geertz calls a 'thick description' of specific situations and practices (Geertz 1973: 5; Salter 2013a: 3), Bourdieu claims that this technique – like many others – enforces a 'scholastic view of the world' researchers should at least try to avoid by having a curious and open-minded 'new gaze' for as long as possible (2000: 52, 206, 31; 1992: 251). Writes Bourdieu: 'The difficulty, in sociology is to manage to think in a completely astonished and disconcerted way about things you thought you had always understood' (1991: 207).

The habitus of researchers can complicate this, since it limits our understanding of the ongoing practices in a field we are not a native of and can lead to misperceiving things as data/evidence that are neither meaningful nor relevant (Leander 2011: 307). But lacking a feel for the game of a FNSP also has its upsides: It is highly unlikely *to get too close*, for walking the walk and talking the talk of the field-constituting agents might deprive researchers of their intended critical stance (Salter 2013a: 4). It was a *former Chief of Defence Staff* (fCDS) who suggested that my outsider position would enable me to explore a FNSP in productive ways (fCDS 2016, interview). What some call the benefit of having 'less access' and more 'distance' and 'alienness' can be helpful to perceive 'what for situated knowers is taken-for-granted,

to the observed and its critical consequences for scientific practice' (1990b: 34). Therefore, he calls for a 'participant objectivation' of researchers, since these often wish to be objectivising authorities on social phenomena but would forget to 'objectivize themselves' concerning the object of analysis (1992b: 68f., 1992: 253). Vandenberghe states that this operation has its logical flaws, since it assumes an 'independent position on the field within the field itself' (Vandenberghe 1999: 60). Burawoy remarks that Bourdieu provides neither a self-reflexive engagement with his role in 'the field of French sociology' nor of this field more generally (Burawoy 2012a: 20). While Leander shares the former concern to some extent, she holds that Bourdieu's overall work engages deeply with these issues (Leander 2001: 351).

common sense, and tacitly known' (Kuus 2014: 58; Hughes/Montesinos Coleman 2015: 151; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 29). Certainly, too much distance is problematic as well. The fieldwork later confirmed through personal experiences and conversations how very difficult it was to receive apt information from relevant agents and to organise interviews with (incumbent) practitioners.

For these reasons, I approached the Nigeria office of FES in Abuja before the fieldwork to become a Visiting Researcher with them. I assumed that their long-lasting networks in Nigeria could function as an intermediary platform allowing me to build trustworthy contacts with Nigerian agents, to open doors at gatekeepers, and to organise interviews. As a Visiting Researcher in 2015 and a guest in 2016, my fieldwork benefited greatly from the collaboration with and hospitality of FES (e.g., secure guest room, contacting possible interviewees and research institutions). The only exception was most likely an episode of self-inflicted closure in terms of organising interviews within the Nigerian *Defence Headquarters* (DHQ). Since a contact placed centrally in Nigeria's *official security policy (research) community* would not act as a facilitator, FES and I decided to stop putting forward an interview request while using their platform because of concerns that I might be perceived as someone with *more* than academic interests.⁶²

In any case, constructing a FNSP and understanding its realities (i.e., including the imaginations of its agents) is possible for me only in a very partial manner and I am thus forced to mobilise in an eclectic way multiple possible encounters with different research sites, methods, and sources. Mobilising such different encounters and engaging different points of view onto, and 'points of entry' into, a field is truly at the heart of its process of construction (Swartz 2013a: 24; Pouliot 2013: 45; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 7). Most interpretivist and practice-oriented research engages in a continuous, simultaneous, and combinatorial 'back and forth between theory, methodology, and empirical material' (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 80; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 27f.). Bourdieusian scholarship also attempts to go back and forth between the objective (i.e., positions) and subjective (i.e., position-takings) moments of the research to 'hold both points of view at once' (Fogle 2011: 80; Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 33;

⁶² FES remains highly respected in Nigeria for its forty years of work on socio-political education and democratic (security) governance (SIRA Meeting 2015; NINSED Meeting 2015). For Udeh, FES has been 'a critical stakeholder' for developing Nigeria's 'security governance', 'security sector reform', and 'in shaping our understanding [...] of the security [issue]' (Udeh 2016, interview; similar is Zabadi 2015, interview).

Kuus 2014: 43). Moreover, emphasising methodological over ontological concerns and triangulating different data/evidence (e.g., the analytical combination of documents, novels, interviews, etc., *speaking about* the same phenomenon) allows one to substantiate the research process and the findings (Salter 2013b: 15; Pouliot 2013: 45f.; Barkin 2008: 218f.; Balzacq 2014).

Two of Bourdieu's central methodological premises inform and reflect these propositions: First, researchers should attempt to use 'all the techniques that are *relevant and practically usable*, given the definition of the object and the practical conditions of data collection' (1992: 227; my emphasis; Wacquant 1992b: 30). Second, the tool of field is 'a *conceptual shorthand of a mode of construction of the object* that will command, or orient all the practical choices of research' (1992: 228; my emphasis). In an ideal world (not possible here), the analysis of my conceptual shorthand called FNSP would encompass an inductive, thorough, and interpretive examination of its own (history of) positional configuration, the social conditions enabling it, and its relations to different fields such as the *field of power* (1990a: 88, 191; 1996b: 47, 199; 1992b: 90). Bourdieu proposes for a practical field analysis his by now arguably *classic* three-step research process which I use with some modifications⁶³ (see Sections 3.3-3.6): First, researchers should 'analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power' (1992b: 105; Salter 2013c: 88; Swartz 2013a: 32). Second, they should 'map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate form of specific authority of which this field is the site' (1992b: 105; 1992: 232; Salter 2013c: 87). Third, they should 'analyze the habitus of agents' (1992b: 105; Swartz 2013a: 32).

As for the first step, it entails the identification and localisation of the key space of struggle in social space – that is, a FNSP, here – and the question of what the field's agents struggle over (Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 32; Swartz 2013a: 27; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 19). Besides some clarifying words,⁶⁴ I am not engaging (with) the notion of *field of power* any further, because

⁶³ Pouliot, for example, suggests a somewhat different research strategy that seems to start with Bourdieu's second step and constructs 'the positional logic of practices' as a third step. The latter step includes the following: '[F]irst, interpreting the [intersubjective] rules of the game; second, mapping the distribution of resources [across players]; and third, historicizing social struggles' (Pouliot 2013: 48, 52; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 81). While this strategy builds upon what Pouliot calls his 'subjective' methodology focusing on practical knowledge and the study of both 'objectified (or experience-distant)' and 'subjective (experience-near) knowledge', I am sceptical whether such a *merging* is preferable to an emphasis on an *intersection* (Pouliot 2010: 6; Pouliot 2013: 50).

⁶⁴ Bourdieu argues that realist and substantialist notions of *the dominant* (e.g., 'elite', 'ruling' or 'dominant class')

of a lack of resources and time, and because we can follow Gregg and Martin in saying that it unnecessarily 'weld[s] Bourdieu's field theory into a larger substantive theory by abusing terminology' (Gregg/Martin 2015: 49, en. 14, p. 58).

As for the second step, it speaks to the objective moment of Bourdieu's sociology and entails the process of *mapping* a field. The mapping usually involves in BIS different research methods and/or combinations of methods, for example, 'quantitative' ones such as 'social network analysis' or 'qualitative' ones such as forms of '*discourse, policy, historical, and legal research*' (Loughland et al. 2015: 26; Salter 2013c: 87; Salter 2013b: 18; emphasis in original). On the one hand, it is neither necessary nor viable to map and analyse the field's entire phenomena (Vandenberghe 1999: 52). On the other hand, it is necessary to engage in the field's *topography* early on (Go 2008: 213; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 32; Loughland et al. 2015: 32). This usually necessitates concurrently detecting the field-constituting agents, locating the field's 'dominant, dominated, and intermediate positions' agents occupy, relating these positions to the employment of different kinds and volumes of capital by agents, and explicating what products agents create, disseminate, and consume (Swartz 2013a: 28, 32; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 32; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 21). In doing so, researchers can outline the field's (symbolic) structure and illuminate its most crucial features such as connections, oppositions, distinctions, and hierarchies, as well as (possible) homologues between positions and position-takings (Swartz 2013a: 28; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 20f.; Bigo 2011: 245; Bigo 2008: 30). That is, a field is constructed and empirically explored through its – often wrongly pre-theorised – effects, for these effects (re)produce the field's *specificity* such as the

– which only operate with '*populations* of agents who occupy positions of power' and who coerce their will and power on others – are inappropriate, since they do not explore the historical (re)production and condition of possibility of these agents (Wacquant 1993: 19-21; 1992: 229; emphasis in original; Wacquant 2013b: 278). In contrast, he calls for a historically more sensitive and active notion of domination understood as an 'indirect effect of a complex set of actions engendered within the network of intersecting constraints', that is, a *field of power* in which agents occupy a position if they hold enough capital to dominate the other field(s) they are engaged in (1992b: 114; 1994: 5; 1996b: 215; 1998: 34). While agents in the field of power fight for changing or preserving the ways in which different kinds of capital are valued by their 'exchange rate', the field's structure is subject to what kinds of capitals are negotiated within it (2000: 103; Wacquant 1993: 24). The field of power is different from all other fields of cultural production, since it is a more intangible, horizontal 'meta-field', which structures these other fields and partly incorporates and overlaps with them (Liénard/Mangez 2015: 185; Wacquant 1992b: 18, fn. 32; Vandenberghe 1999: 53; Guzzini 2013: 85). Bourdieu closely relates the notion of field of power to how he conceptualises *the state*, since both develop together and agents in the former 'struggle in particular for power over the state' and its institutional capacity to alter the exchange rate of capitals (1992b: 114; emphasis in original). That is, the state holds a 'meta capital', acts as a 'referee' among agents fighting for symbolic power, and constrains this struggle (1994: 4, 5; 1998: 34; Wacquant 1993: 43; 1989: 22; 2000: 186; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 36; Guzzini 2013: 85).

(symbolic) capital in question,⁶⁵ principles of vision and division, etc., which can be traced until the boundaries of the field are reached (Swartz 2013a: 30; Hilgers/Mangez 2015c: 18, 20; Salter 2013c: 87; Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 8, 12). This kind of mapping must, doubtless, fit the specific practical conditions and logics of the field under scrutiny. It allows us to perceive and trace what Bourdieu calls the field's shifting 'main force lines', struggles, and key constituting practices, to explore where the practices of one field end and the practices of another field start, and to ensure a certain degree of coherence, data sufficiency, and replication (e.g., other researchers can map the same positions) (1992: 233; 1990a: 181; Salter 2013a: 3f.; Salter 2013b: 18; Salter 2013c: 87; Loughland et al. 2015: 32).⁶⁶

As for the third step, it speaks to the subjective moment of Bourdieu's sociology and involves the frequently difficult exploration of agents' habitus. The most common methods used in BIS to explore habitus are interviews and, if possible, participant observation during times of fieldwork (though researchers also use methods such as 'collective biography' called 'prosopography' (Loughland et al. 2015: 28; Salter 2013c: 88; Pouliot 2013: 50; Vaughan 2008: 70). As mentioned in the last chapter, habitus – like field – can be both a focus of analysis and a thinking tool *for* the analysis at the same time (Wacquant 2014a: 4). Rather than preconceiving habitus, researchers should analyse its practical construction and concrete articulation always in relation to specific agents and specific sets of practices (Wacquant 2014a: 6; Vandenberghe 1999: 48; Vaughan 2008: 70; Hillier/Rooksby 2005b: 29). With my emphasis on the field/habitus-intersection, I clearly do so regarding a FNSP and the ways its agents' classificatory practices shape Nigeria's security policy towards Boko Haram. The question *where* habitus *works* still arises and researchers often attach it either to individuals (micro/local?) or to the whole field (macro/national/international?) (Leander 2008: 21; Hillier/Rooksby 2005d: 397). Since Leander argues that the first option lacks explanatory depth by reducing habitus to a collection of individuals' social trajectories and the second option diminishes the agency of individuals, she recommends locating habitus at the *level* of 'groups of individuals' and, if necessary, in combination with the first option (Leander 2008:

⁶⁵ Bourdieu highlights the problematic of the 'hermeneutic circle' of capital, for constructing a field necessitates an understanding of its active, 'specific capital' which, in turn, necessitates an understanding of the field's 'specific logic' or specificity (1992b: 108).

⁶⁶ There is an obvious caveat to this: While we socially construct data/evidence as such (e.g., material artefacts, practices) in relation to our focus of research, there is no final assurance that we, or others, can reproduce it in the future due to the social world's constant changes (Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 79, 95).

22, 21). These are intelligible points to some extent. And yet, there is no necessity for an orthodoxy and both the role played here by the field/habitus-intersection and the practicalities of the fieldwork (e.g., lack of access to incumbent practitioners) shift the focus towards the field, that is, a FNSP's possible habitus (see Section 3.6).

In short, mapping a FNSP and explicating its habitus are key analytical goals of this thesis. As Section 3.5 details, this includes the attempt to identify the specific capital(s) of a FNSP *without* (!) the necessity of fixing this question in advance. It is, moreover, neither necessary to always focus on the 'configured relationships of capital' in the research process (Swartz 2013a: 27), nor do we always have to engage in a full investigation of the prevalent – and often preconceived – kinds of capital such as symbolic, economic, or social capital (Salter 2013c: 88). Rather, I draw upon the work of Salter and Pouliot and completed over the course of the project *Table 3* representing the most relevant aspects of a BIS-analytical framework (Part1):

Table 3

<i>Object</i>	Field (formal and informal practices within a structured, rule-governed social space)	Field of Nigerian Security Policy (FNSP)
<i>Key Concepts/Thinking Tools</i>	Habitus (H) (subjective dispositions or understandings about the objective field) Capital (C) (symbolic, economic, cultural, social, ???) Doxa (D) (unconscious values and beliefs, paradigmatic truths, taken-for-granted rules and ideas, common- sense understanding)	field/habitus-intersection (H), (C), (D) as partial outcome of empirical analysis
<i>Collection</i>	Discourse analysis (DA) Interviews (IN) Participant observation (PO) Ethnographic walking (EW) Visual analysis (VA)	(DA) governmental documents; media publications (IN) research Institutions; NGOs; MFA; NDC; eminent individuals (PO) discussion groups (indirect, limited) (EW) Abuja; Lagos (VA) photographs, cartoons
<i>Data</i>	Practices (PRA) Discourses (DIS) Norms (NOR) Institutions (INS) Relationships (REL)	(PRA) public speech acts; policy formulation; security governance (DIS) security policy; security challenges; Boko Haram (REL) amid field's agents; of the field
<i>(Possible)</i>	Cooperation (COP)	see Chapters 5-7

<i>Relations</i>	Competition (COM) Domination (DOM) Transversality (TRA) ???	
<i>Fit</i>	Professional sector united by common meta-identity	see Chapters 5-7

(Adopted from Salter 2013c and Pouliot 2013, further extended/adjusted)

The next two sections make the case for, and lay out the procedures for, both how I map a FNSP with the help of a *sociological discourse analysis* and how I (indirectly) analyse the possible habitus of a FNSP primarily through conducting *interviews*.

4.4 Mapping a Field of Nigerian Security Policy – Text/Discourse-Analysis

Why and how can we map a FNSP with a sociological discourse analysis? Even though Bourdieu underscores that 'the order of words never exactly reproduces the order of things', that 'linguistic schemes' are only one of the ways contributing to how the field/habitus-intersection produces practices, and that researchers should prioritise the *symbolic power of language* over discourses and their analysis, he also intensely draws upon the *linguistic turn* and understands language at once as a *structuring structure* shaping all agents' epistemologies and as a *structured structure* shaped by the social world's conditionings (1984: 481; 1977: 124, 23f., 110; 1992: 258; 1991; Leander 2011: 304; Mérand/Pouliot 2013: 30). Language becomes an ongoing, embodied, and classificatory-principles-generating practice 'made to be spoken' and alive with 'rhetorical strategies, complicities, and antagonisms' (1990b: 32; 1992: 258; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 6; Guzzini 2013: 83; Shapiro 2002: 611). Critical of Foucault⁶⁷ and Derrida because of their supposed lack of real-world empirical work, Bourdieu shares with them the view that language (and its abuse) is a fundamental device of power produced by past and current socio-political struggles and that it is necessary to deconstruct related knowledge-claims (Wacquant 1992b: 47; Adler-Nissen 2013b: 6; Leander 2011: 304). Like perspectives informed by Foucauldian and poststructuralist insights, a Bourdieusian perspective implies an understanding of discourse not only as a vibrant plurality of linguistic signs, but also as a *specific form of practice* (and vice versa) which profoundly

⁶⁷ Bourdieu, as ever fighting France's intellectual *martial arts* in full swing, claims that Foucauldian '[d]iscourse analysis, which studies discourse without studying the social conditions of production of this discourse, does not understand anything', since it has basically no 'account for changes in this arbitrarily isolated and thereby dehistoricized universe' (2014: 15; 1988: 543; 1996b: 197).

shapes the social world and wherein texts can be analysed as practices (Pouliot 2013: 49; Hansen 2011: 293; Schatzki 2001a: 12). Writes Adler-Nissen: Bourdieu 'approaches discourse sociologically, i.e. as linguistic interactions manifesting the participants' respective positions in social space and categories of understanding' (Adler-Nissen 2013b: 6). Since the French thinker remains rather silent about the how-to of analysing discourses, it is necessary – and despite all difficulties very much possible – to mobilise insights from *discursive* approaches and to combine them with his (or others') *praxeological* approach (Pouliot 2013: 52; Knoblauch 2008: 221).⁶⁸

It is, therefore, a common analytical tactic to employ a (text-based) discourse analysis to map a field's agents, their positions, and their position-takings (Villumsen Berling 2012: 466; Leander 2008: 14; Pouliot 2013: 52). Analysing discourses is for me the most practical method to map a FNSP given the (im)practicalities of the field(work) described throughout this chapter. Since I define the boundaries of the investigated discourses in relation to a historical period and the feasibility of text selection (Neumann 2008: 63), I turn to the period in which Boko Haram arose to a critical (in)security space in and for Nigeria between 2009 and 2016. In view of Nigeria's 'democratic [social] space' (Aiyede 2009: 195; Ikelegbe 2016, interview) and multiple, 'heterogeneous public spheres', who are the agents employing classificatory practices to shape Nigeria's security policy towards Boko Haram (Adebanwi 2011: 43; Denzer/Guyer 2013: 57)? Having argued that agents' position-takings are best understood in terms of a range of classificatory practices (see Sections 3.5 and 3.6), I focus on the more discursive elements of these practices in the sense of *symbolically meaningful* acts of speaking and writing. For doing so, I locate the Nigerian agents (and their positions) who can attach specific meaning(s) – that is, context-dependent and (re)produced 'representations' – to Boko Haram in the discourses on (in)security and security policy in the country (Neumann 2008: 61; Schatzki 2001a: 14; Adler/Pouliot 2011b: 7f., 14; Dunn 2008: 78; Chowdhury/Duvall 2011: 347; Bueger/Gadinger 2008: 278; Reckwitz 2008: 203; Milliken 1999; Foucault 1984). Based upon their points of view, agents tend to constantly develop and put forward their very own

⁶⁸ Critics such as Lahire hold that Bourdieu disregards discourses and leaves scholars wondering how they shape social life (Lahire 2015: 90f.). He also criticises that Bourdieusian scholars would not only lack appropriate means to investigate discourses but would falsely believe in their own ability to depict and understand agents' 'points of view' simply by interrelating these with agents' positions in the field (Lahire 2015: 90). While Shapiro acknowledges that Bourdieu envisioned each 'speaker/writer' to possess agency through acts of speaking and writing (i.e., producing meaning), he holds that Bourdieu's strong emphasis on the constraining aspects of fields would hinder a more thorough engagement with the question of language (Shapiro 2002: 611).

representations. Over time and gradually, specific representations such as 'metaphors', 'illustrations, or comparisons' are used more frequently and play an increasingly significant role in the discourses, that is, they constitute what agents perceive to be the current and normal state of affairs in terms of what is and can be spoken, written, and thought about (Neumann 2008: 62; Dunn 2008: 80; Salter 2013b: 18). On the one hand, agents thus struggle over, construct, and establish *narratives* concerning the governing 'representation of reality', whether and how a specific issue is of interest, how the social genesis of a discourse is or should be understood, and what role patterns of we/Self and them/Others play (Dunn 2008: 83, 86; Hansen 2006: 6; Neumann 2008: 70; Milliken 1999: 237). On the other hand, agents also cluster their representations resulting in merged points of view, a common position in the discourse, and corresponding narratives.

In part speaking to this latter discursive situation is, I argue, Bourdieu's thinking tool of *doxa*: Agents tend to share a 'set of fundamental beliefs' – that is, doxa – concerning a specific field eventually, if its stakes and logics become 'self-evident' and 'taken for granted' through the workings of the habitus (2000: 15; 1992b: 98; Wacquant 1993: 34; 1977: 164, 166; 1984: 471). Doxa thus resembles a 'pre-reflexive, naïve, native [and tacit] compliance' to the field's nomos, that is, all what is increasingly undisputed as the nomos turns stable (1990b: 68; 1984: 471; 2000: 101; 1977: 168, 166). To some extent and with varying success, powerful and legitimated agents (e.g., agents of the state such as governments or individual politicians) produce doxa by imposing through their (discursive) classificatory practices their own version of 'common sense' in a field (1989: 22; 1984: 468; 1977: 97). Common sense is a 'consensus' on 'commonplaces' tacitly taken for granted and represented by all in a field, so Bourdieu, and powerful agents put forward their particularistic common sense mainly by constructing an 'official discourse' which tends to enforce the point of view of an 'institution' and its 'officials' (2000: 175, 1994: 13; 1992: 235; 1989: 22; 1984: 477). This official discourse must be visible, 'public, displayed, proclaimed' (1990a: 82; 1989: 22). Yet agents continue to compete over the definition of commonplaces and compete to turn them to their benefit, that is, commonplaces also allow for 'confrontation, dialogue and even conflict' (2000: 98). Since I conceive of the tool of doxa – like capital – here primarily as a possible outcome of the exploratory, empirical work, the following questions emerge for the discourse analysis: By whom and how is Boko Haram represented with certain images, metaphors, identity-describing terms, and commonplaces? By whom and how are the specific official discourses

constructed establishing a FNSP's (possible) tacit common sense? In what ways might this discursive context produce a condition of possibility for specific security policies rather than other possibilities and policy options?

We can use various representations as data/evidence for the practical analysis: As Neumann notes, '*any sign* [can] be analysed as *text*, because it conveys meaning in a particular context' (Neumann 2008: 63; my emphasis). Although often unlikely due to limited resources and/or the specificities of the object of analysis, the general idea is to apply a 'methodology of reading' to all available sources and to locate as many different 'voices' and representations in as many places of cultural production as possible (Hansen 2006: 2; Dunn 2008: 83; Neumann 2008: 62, 69). Relevance, open distribution, and the audience of texts are usually criteria for their selection, since what Hansen calls 'key texts' tend to be 'frequently quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual web of debate' (Hansen 2006: 82, 52; Hopf 2002: 24; Neumann 2008: 67; Mutlu/Salter 2013: 115). Since key texts are conceived to be powerful, meaning-producing entities linked 'intertextually' through their relational and distinctive constitution to other representations, they transport authoritative representations concerning the issues to be interpreted (Hansen 2006: 8; Salter 2013b: 18; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 86). Text selection usually starts with a focus on the primary sources of '*official*', governmental *discourses* and is, then, expanded to the more peripheral voices and representations of the wider public realm (Hansen 2006: 60; Pouliot 2013: 53; my emphasis). Sources can range from official texts such as governmental publications or written and verbal statements of leading politicians and political groups, via outputs of the media and the scientific community, to artefacts produced in the sphere of popular culture (e.g., film, literature, art) (Hansen 2006: 8; Dunn 2008: 88). Write Mutlu and Salter: 'Personal correspondence, publications, newsletters, newspapers, magazines, memos, transcripts, policy documents, visual symbols, still and moving images, and PowerPoint presentations are valid sources' (Mutlu/Salter 2013: 115; similar are Pouliot 2013: 49; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 90; Reckwitz 2008: 198). The usual goal of analysis is to locate, record, map, order, compare, and contextualise relevant and recurring (clusters of) representations with the purpose of understanding how specific representations relate to each other, combine, transform, persist, and prevail (Neumann 2008: 62, 70; Dunn 2008: 90f.; Hansen 2006: 12; Denzer/Guyer 2013: 71). Trying to stay open-minded towards the different texts' varying representations is important, albeit one's own preconstructed vision will arrive fast and certain representations

will lead the way to what seems to us the most correct interpretation (Hopf 2002: 24; Mutlu/Salter 2013: 114). Analysing discourses is thus always a subjective interpretation of how objects, subjects, and relations are represented and meaning constructed. We can corroborate the analysis by the interpretation's 'logical coherence', by ensuring its intertextual reliability (e.g., how opposing points of views are included), and by disclosing that it is merely another – hopefully, convincing and accurate – discursive contribution to the object of analysis itself (Dunn 2008: 92; Mutlu/Salter 2013: 116; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 109).

I carefully examine various Nigerian sources with texts ranging from governmental publications to media outlets available to me with a focus on questions of security policy in general, as well as on Boko Haram more particularly. This examination includes visual representations, since cartoons and other visuals co-shape relations of power and help researchers to understand meaning (Mutlu et al. 2015: 85, 90; Dodds 2010). 'Jokes are serious things' in Nigeria, so Adebawu and Obadare, and the frequent public use of cartoons opens the possibility of comprehending some of the feelings, expressions, and perceptions of different agents concerning the space of (in)security of Boko Haram (Adebawu/Obadare 2011b: 6; Denzer/Guyer 2013: 56f., 63, 71; Mutlu et al. 2015: 101). An early assumption was that Nigeria's record of democratic rule since 1999, its *Freedom of Information Act* of May 2011, and Africa's most active and diverse media scene would be enabling factors to gather a wide range of texts (FG 2011a; Olukotun 2009: 160; Adebawu 2011: 49; Haruna 2012: 373; see Section 1.3).⁶⁹ In contrast, it must be said that the low availability of official texts was an obstacle to the analysis. Several sites were visited in search of such texts: The *National Institute for Legislative Studies* (NILS) offered some limited publications (e.g., books, magazines) and the supposed stock of governmental publications in the *National Library of Nigeria* was rudimentary and not up-to-date. Since an informal enquiry to access the library of the *National Defence College* (NDC) was blocked, the libraries of the *Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution* (IPCR) in Abuja and the *Nigerian Institute of International Affairs* (NIIA) in Lagos became important places to gather sources (e.g., newspapers) and to meet members

⁶⁹ *Freedom House* summarises Nigeria's media scene as follows: 'The federal government owns one national daily newspaper, one radio network (with 34 stations), and one television network (with 96 affiliate stations)' – plus 'there are 14 privately owned daily newspapers, at least six weekly news magazines, several independent television stations, and 19 independent radio stations' (Freedom House 2012). For an in-depth review of Nigeria's media scene, see Olukotun 2009: 160ff.

of staff. Independently founded in 1971 and turned into a governmental institution the same year, the NIIA is Nigeria's most important 'think tank' on issues of international relations (MFA 2012: 136; Ogwu 2005: 70; Alli 2010a: 167; Olusanya 1990: 234; Emmanuel 2011). Engaging in research, (public) lectures, seminars, symposia, conferences, and publications, it is mandated to offer advice on Nigeria's international affairs and its policy formulation process (e.g., recommendations, perspectives, options), to educate the Nigerian populace, and to establish international cooperations with similar organisations (Emmanuel 2011: 9f.; Ogwu 2005: 70f.; Gambari 2008: 68; Akinterinwa 2014: 267). Established and authorised by the *National Assembly* (NASS), the IPCR is requested to engage in the advancement and preservation of peace and in 'conflict prevention, management and resolution' in both Nigeria and Africa through 'direct intervention, research work and advocacy' (MFA 2012: 129). Like many other governmental institutions, both NIIA and IPCR face the fundamental problem of a lack of resources (Oche 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview).

Some sense of that was provided by experiencing the facilities myself (e.g., inadequate state of libraries; frequent lack of electricity) and by personal conversations. Asks Saliu: 'Where is the money?' (Saliu 2016, interview). Claiming that nobody would be willing to take responsibility for the problem, he points out that missing governmental funding would hinder research and the production of all kinds of governmental publications in Nigeria (Saliu 2016, interview; for similar concerns in the Global South, see Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 69). Therefore, such potential research material is very much limited in the country (Williams 2015, interview; Zabadi 2015, interview). Researchers must, so Zabadi, 'appreciate' the ways in which Nigeria's rather cluttered political 'environment' impinges on the research process and any related expectations (Zabadi 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview). Since existing publications are often low in number and their future availability not secured, they tend to be either out of reach of the public or outdated (Zabadi 2015, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; Meeting 2015). It is also necessary to realise how both general knowledge production and specific research on governmental institutions are still constrained, since these institutions open up only slowly after the establishment of democratic rule in 1999. As Saliu explains and some of my fieldwork episodes confirm, the politics of 'official secrecy' still prevails and produces a lack of accessible governmental publications on questions of (in)security (Saliu 2016, interview). Yet fieldwork can help us find and choose appropriate sources, since agents both steer this process through their own practices and can direct the

researcher to relevant material if personal contact is established (Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 93). Some interviewees suggested that the very limited to non-existing public distribution of governmental publications necessitates that both Nigerian and foreign researchers locate relevant representations in the Nigerian print media, that is, daily newspapers and weekly magazines (Saliu 2016, interview; Zabadi 2015, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview). Accordingly, *Table 4* provides an overview of the examined texts:

Table 4

<i>Text Form</i>	<i>Years/Sections/Contents</i>
Governmental documents Publications of key security research institutions and platforms	National Security Strategy (NSS); ⁷⁰ National Defence Policy (NDP); National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST); IPCR; NSRP; etc.
Tell Magazine (leading weekly political magazine)	2009-2016 (with exceptions)
The Guardian (leading <i>Southern</i> newspaper)	May-June 2015 and March 2016 (in-depth)
Daily Trust (leading <i>Northern</i> newspaper)	May-June 2015 and March 2016 (in-depth)
Newspapers clippings of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)	2009-2016 (various) Each day members of staff of the NIIA's library examine Nigerian newspapers and archive relevant articles as clippings into different sections to record ongoing debates in Nigeria's public sphere. I focused on questions of (in)security.
Newspaper articles (various sources)	2009-2016
Scientific literature (various sources)	2008-2022

To be noted is that Nigeria's media scene tends to reflect and (re)produce the country's socio-political, regional, and identity-related structures, strains, and contestations (Adebanwi 2011: 24, 26; Zabadi 2015, interview). Like the business sector or key federal governmental realms, the media scene tends to be dominated by agents from the South and South-West (Mustapha 2008b: 47; Olukotun 2009: 163). At the time of fieldwork, *Tell* (whose print version was discontinued since) is both Nigeria's leading political journal believed to be 'defending Yoruba/southern/Christian interests' and part of, so Olusola Olaniyan, the country's 'good-

⁷⁰ For Zabadi, analysing texts like the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) allows for assessing both Nigeria's 'official position on how to handle national security' and 'how policy makers think about security, what the practitioners also think, and all that what they are expected to do' (Zabadi 2015, interview).

governance seeking forces' (Adebanwi 2011: 30; Olusola Olaniyan 2009: 128; Olukotun 2009: 160; emphasis in original).⁷¹ *The Guardian* is widely seen to be the dominant and balanced 'voice' of southern, Christian Nigeria, and the Daily Trust to be its northern, Islamic complement (Adebanwi 2011: 30; Olukotun 2009: 160; Zabadi 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Ibrahim 2012: 231). The next section details why and how interviews and personal observations were employed as the methods of choice to analyse a FNSP's more informal insights.

4.5 Dialoguing a Field of Nigerian Security Policy – Interviews and Observations

Given the difficult conditions concerning textual analysis and my limited time in Nigeria, the fieldwork's emphasis shifted increasingly towards the creation of as many opportunities as possible to meet practitioners and experts for developing a network of contacts. Being invited by FES to the meeting of the *Society for International Relations Awareness* (SIRA) (May 7, 2015) became an early opportunity to establish contact with several of its members.⁷² The same is true for the meeting of the *Nigerian Network on Security and Democratic Governance* (NINSED) (July 9, 2015), which made it possible to observe what Yaqub calls the 'level of discussion' on security issues and to broaden my network of contacts (Yaqub 2015, interview).⁷³ Presenting my project at the IPCR (June 10, 2015) increased my visibility (and recognition?) and enabled further contacts, that is, I became 'better known in the field setting' (Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 62).

While some other contacts were approached directly per email or even met by chance, FES and other intermediaries remained crucial to facilitate – often in ad hoc and informal ways –

⁷¹ As Olusola Olaniyan states, Nigeria's print media is otherwise dominated by 'antiestablishment' agents often operating with 'words of intimidation, defiance, altercation, aggression, militancy, threat, and abuse of the Nigerian state and the managers of the state' (Olusola Olaniyan 2009: 123, 129).

⁷² Co-invented and supported by FES, SIRA is a non-profit NGO and 'epistemic community' wishing to promote 'a better appreciation of Nigeria's international relations and foreign policy' in the Nigerian public and consists of 'experts from the Foreign Service, the military, academia, labour unions, the media, civil society', and so on (Durowaiye et al. 2012b: 65; SIRA Constitution: 1; Mättig 2011: 5; Yaqub 2015, interview; SIRA meeting 2015). It wants to help democratising the country's international relations and *to be(come) a relevant voice* in policy-making processes (e.g., roundtables with policy makers; research activities, publications and position papers to disseminate own points of view; invitation by the National Assembly (NASS) to advise on regional security issues).

⁷³ Co-invented and supported by FES, NINSED brings together a range of Nigerian state and non-state agents in the security sector. It intends *to be(come) a relevant voice* in Nigeria's transforming security policy realm, to approach security challenges holistically, to create synergies and a common strategy among different security agents, and to develop inter-agency collaboration (e.g., NINSED desk officers in security institutions; recommendations and position papers) (NINSED meeting 2015).

contact to institutions and senior, experienced personnel with fitting practical and/or expert knowledge (e.g., interviews at NDC, NIIA, SIRA). In practice, homepages of institutions tended to be either rudimentary or not working, telephone numbers often inoperative, or the Chief Information Officer in the Ministry of Information (MOI) no longer responding to text messages. Finally, it was only through trustworthy relationships developed with contacts that it became possible to access the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (MFA) (i.e., interview with Brigadier General Chukwunedum M. Abraham) or to conduct an interview with former Foreign Minister and then Chief of Staff to the President of Nigeria, Prof. Ibrahim A. Gambari. In the former episode, I was initially advised to obtain a *note verbale* from the German embassy to support an official interview request. Despite a post-fieldwork diplomatic refusal of the request by a *note verbale* from the Nigerian MFA, the interview was organised more informally during my fieldwork. In the latter episode, discussions with the contact about my project and his own research interests led to the suggestion to meet with his more knowledgeable and experienced friend and mentor.

Explaining my project and its intention to contacts and intermediaries was a crucial part of the fieldwork and an appropriate tactic to overcome what sometimes seemed to be initial worries about the project's sensitive issue area. In another of these episodes, this tactic turned into a kind of negotiation with a member of staff of the *Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives* and ended with his notion to arrange one or two meetings with Representatives working on questions of security policy. The resulting meeting organised with a member of the *House of Representatives* (HOR) in his office was, unfortunately, too short for an interview given external conditions and attempts to re-arrange were prevented by mutual time constraints. Moreover, another central figure of Nigeria's *official security policy (research) community* was not eager to become an intermediary and calls by intermediaries to acting generals in the DHQ, or even to the *Office of the National Security Advisor* (ONSA),⁷⁴

⁷⁴ The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) is the 'central organ for coordination, control and supervision' of Nigeria's security in which the Federal Minister-like National Security Advisor (NSA) draws upon the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB), and the Intelligence Community Committee (ICC) (Mohammed 2011: 193f.; Agwai 2015: 233). With the NSA as its 'principal officer', the NSC gathers if deemed essential and 'shall have power to advise the President on matters relating to public security' and all related institutions (Mohammed 2011: 194; FG 1999, Third Schedule, Section K; Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 213; Alli 2012: 22). The NSC consists of the following members: President (Chairman); Vice-President (Deputy Chairman); Chief of Defence Staff; Minister of Interior; Minister of Defence; Minister of Foreign Affairs; National Security Advisor; Inspector-General of Police; other persons appointed by the President (FG 1999, Third Schedule, Section K).

either did not work out or remained an unfulfilled promise.

Then, what do interviews yield? As for a Bourdieusian framework, interviews with agents can provide early insights into their daily (strategic) practices, how (their) habitus works, and how the field affects the condition of possibility of discursive negotiations (Salter 2013c: 85ff.; Pouliot 2013: 48; Adler-Nissen 2008: 671f.). We can ask how agents perceive their own position, the position and position-takings of other agents, and how they make use of (different kinds of) capital, for what purposes, and with what success (Bigo 2011: 240; Villumsen Berling 2012: 465). Problematic is that agents working in, or close to, sensitive issue areas such as security policy are usually not keen to provide researchers with information concerning their own capital(s) (e.g., educational backgrounds, social networks, incomes) (Loughland et al. 2015: 33). Rather than detecting a unique truth, interviews offer ways to grasp agents' various perspectives on, and experiences of, the social world and how they make varying (!) and meaningful sense of its phenomena (Pouliot 2013: 49; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 4, 41). We can interview *practitioners* to enquire about their daily practices and practical knowledges, these practitioners – or *experts* with informed knowledge and more access than the researcher – might offer interpretive accounts of other practitioners' practices and relevant contexts, and an interview can itself be understood as a meaningful practice (Pouliot 2013: 49; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 89f.). Interviews are 'rich social interactions' that transport more than the uttered and can be revealing in themselves (Kuus 2014: 57; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 111). For Bourdieu, interviews are, first, shaped by often unrecognised and/or insufficiently minimised 'symbolic violence', since it is usually the interviewer who 'starts the game and sets up the rules' (1999c: 608f.). Second, they are shaped by the pervasiveness of points of view and of common sense, that is, impartiality is impossible and researchers should strive for a conversational, personal engagement rather than a 'concern for neutrality' (1999c: 608f., 619, 620). On the one hand, interviews are problematic in the sense that they only refer to – and often vindicate – practices without being these practices themselves (Reckwitz 2008: 196; Bueger/Gadinger 2014: 90). Interviews also risk overemphasising agents' very own perspectives and experiences, that is, they often lack the kind of objectification Bourdieu frequently calls for (Forget/Mérand 2013: 103). On the other hand, what is uttered can partly illuminate the practical knowledge of agents who might be otherwise located in spaces inaccessible and unknown to the researcher (Reckwitz 2008: 197; Pouliot 2013: 51). Since practical knowledge is usually embodied and tacit in

character, Pouliot suggests identifying interviewees' social positions in social space (i.e., 'talk *from*') rather than only to repeat what they say about practices (i.e., 'talk *about*') (Pouliot 2013: 51, 52; emphasis in original). In a similar fashion, Kuus highlights that we can contextualise interviewees by stating their precise positions in institutions and thus foregrounding the often underestimated 'know-where' of knowledge-claims (Kuus 2014: 50, 32). Interviews with experts can be particularly helpful in this regard, since they can offer both close, well-informed insights and a critical outlook on and from the 'wider field of knowledge production' (Kuus 2014: 48, 112).

Like Pouliot in his Bourdieusian case study of the NATO-Russia Council (Pouliot 2010: 7), I was mostly restricted to turn to those agents who get as close as possible to actual practitioners and their local decision-making spaces – a tactic he recommends as the best possible way to explore habitus if access is limited (Pouliot 2013: 51). Since I made use of the well-known 'snowball technique' to broaden my sample of interviewees to some extent (Gusterson 2008: 98; Kuus 2014: 46), this arguably steered the focus towards agents close to those already interviewed, that is, partly creating the problem of 'silencing of other voices' (Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 87). In total, I performed twenty-five in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with various individuals in the two fieldwork phases. Besides a few others such as a *well-renowned academic* (WRA), the following leading personnel of Nigeria's key (security) policy research institutions and NGOs were interviewed in 2015, as shown in *Table 5*:

Table 5

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Actor/Institution/Organisation</i>
Prof. Istifanus S. Zabadi	Provost of Centre for Strategic Research and Studies	National Defence College (NDC)
Prof. Ogaba D. Oche	Director of Research and Studies Department	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)
Prof. Charles Quaker-Dokubo	Associate Research Professor	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)
Prof. Warisu Oyesina Alli	Director of Research and Policy	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)
Major General, rtd., Ishola Williams	Executive Secretary	Pan African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG)
Idayat Hassan	Director	Centre for Democracy and Development West Africa (CDD)
Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo	Programme Manager	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)
Prof. Nuhu Yaqub	Professor; Chairman	Sokoto State University; Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA)

Except for interviews with a former Chief of Defence Staff (fCDS) and a non-Nigerian military advisor to the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, the following interviews were conducted with Nigerian experts, former practitioners, and acting personnel in 2016, as shown in *Table 6*:

Table 6

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Actor/Institution/Organisation</i>
Prof. Hassan Saliu	Professor	University of Ilorin
Dr. Gani Yoroms	Research Fellow; Centre for Strategic Research and Studies	National Defence College (NDC)
Air Commodore Pam Chollom	Directing Staff	National Defence College (NDC)
Dr. Chinedu S. Udeh	Research Fellow; Centre for Strategic Research and Studies	National Defence College (NDC)
Brigadier General Chukwunedum M. Abraham	Military Advisor (posted from DHQ to MFA)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); Defence Headquarters (DHQ)
Ambassador Prof. Ibrahim A. Gambari	Chief of Staff to the President of Nigeria; Former Foreign Minister of Nigeria; Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations	Presidency; Savannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democracy & Development
Dr. Bakut T. Bakut	Director of Research; Directorate of External Conflict Prevention and Resolution	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)
Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe	Professor	University of Benin; National Institute for Security Studies (NISS)
Ambassador Abdul Rimdap ⁷⁵	Former Ambassador (Berlin; Vienna; Brussels)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA)
Colonel, rtd., Dr. Wilson O.V. Ijide	Lecturer	University of Ibadan; Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA)

The lengths of the interviews varied between about thirty minutes and nearly two hours. It seems fair to say that some interviews started with an initial feeling of personal and/or professional scepticism on the part of the interviewees. Yet it also seems fair to say that nearly all interviewees became increasingly engaged over the course of the interview and began to speak more openly about their own perspectives on Nigeria's political space (e.g., political processes, elites, corruption) and how the country deals with its security challenges (or not). With Bourdieu, we might even say that some interviewees used the interview situation 'to *explain themselves*' concerning Nigerian politics and daily life (1999c: 615; emphasis in

⁷⁵ The interview with Ambassador Rimdap took place in London and the one with Colonel Dr. Ijide per Skype.

original). Several interviewees expressed their interest in continuing conversation and knowledge exchange in the future (e.g., offering further help; possible research collaborations). In approaching the interviews, I usually started with describing my own position and background (e.g., PhD student in the UK; time spent in Ghana) and the background and motivation of the research project. Although trying to adhere to an open-minded wondering bordered on sounding uninformed sometimes, this was meant to emphasise and was introduced as the project's exploratory character in terms of mapping a FNSP and agents' different points of view on the space of (in)security of Boko Haram. This tactic – for example, not to base the analysis on pre-established narratives about the *problematic* nature of Nigerian politics (e.g., corruption, violence, failing democratic institutions) – was mostly conceived of as a 'good proposition' to start with (Alli 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview). Udeh further underscored, however, the necessity to 'keep your mind open', to stay 'neutral', and not to 'work from [pre-conceived] answer to question', since he wanted me to 'robustly engaging different stakeholders and getting as much views as possible from the Nigerian populace' for my 'exploratory' work (Udeh 2016, interview). This was Udeh's reaction to a question on how agents *compete* in a FNSP, instead of his emphasis on *cooperation* (see Section 6.3 and Chapter 7). Others have pointed out how the very term *stakeholder* might not fit, or must be adjusted to, the Nigerian context (Zabadi 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; fCDS 2016, interview).

The next three chapters do not only show what kind of relations are constitutive for a FNSP (see Table 3 above and Tables 7 and 8 in Section 7.1), but also how we tend to make implicit, conceptual claims even if the intention is to operate with a flat ontology and tools for thinking only. It is, certainly, a self-reflexive result of the fieldwork that thinking with a *new gaze* is a truly difficult task and that *lofty academic claims* are being made because of both the different social scientific vocabularies introduced and personal inclinations. To some limited extent, it was part of this self-reflexivity and the construction of an own point of view to engage in the practice of ethnographic walking the cities of Abuja and Lagos (Newhouse 2012; Yi'En 2014). Like Newhouse, this was done without much prior theorising or a claim to significantly contribute to a feel for the game of these cities or a FNSP: 'I did what seemed automatic to me. I took a walk' (Newhouse 2012: 67). As a bodily, sensory, and performative practice, walking can help us to navigate and negotiate *the everyday* of urban, socio-political life with

its different 'materialities' and emotions (Yi'En 2014: 212, 220). Yi'En argues that walking allows for a 'critical elucidation of urban aesthetics and politics' by moving through the terrain and by engaging visual representational aids such as photographs, even though these aids tend to both freeze movements and rhythms, and to socially construct the specific gaze of the researcher (Yi'En 2014: 213, 217, 220). Exploring urban spaces enables us to make knowledge-claims that go beyond what is 'urban per se', so Sassen, for cities are meaningful and fluctuating articulations of 'complex multi-sited trajectories' both social and political (Sassen 2011: 576; Bueger/Mireanu 2015: 127). Obviously, my practical experiences were very much limited; I was mostly protected from daily insecurities through FES; and, like many foreign researchers, I was privileged by always being able to withdraw from the field (Newhouse 2012: 70; Bueger/Mireanu 2015: 131).

4.6 Conclusion

In outlining the methodological stance of this thesis, this chapter focused on the ways in which I can (re)construct and study a FNSP concerning the space of (in)security of Boko Haram. Rather than proclaiming definitive routes towards insular camps of socio-political analyses defending what science, truth, and history *are*, a Bourdieusian methodological stance underscores that these are always the products of historical struggles and, hence, advocates an open-minded, plural, and exploratory sociological vision. This involves the realisation how difficult it is to maintain such a vision, for a self-reflexive assessment reveals that our own habitus shapes the ways we conduct research and that we produce very much *placed* and perspectival stories of, for example, Nigerian realities. That said, self-reflexivity also enriches our research as we 'twist the stick in the other direction' (1992b: 80). Since a FNSP is both a practical thinking tool for, and an object of, the empirical analysis, mapping the field and exploring its possible habitus and specific capital(s) are what the empirical analysis strives for. Doing so means evaluating some of the fieldwork's (im)possibilities and the implications they have: As an outsider without adequate practical knowledge of, and close access to, a FNSP, it becomes necessary to engage with different perspectives onto the field and to focus on research sites, methods and data/evidence available to me. Given the obstacles in terms of obtaining relevant and current governmental publications (e.g., limited proliferation, missing funding, *official secrecy*) and organising interviews, the chapter demonstrated the necessity,

first, of adjusting the mapping of the field through a sociological discourse analysis to the practical logics and conditions of a FNSP, that is, locating relevant discursive classificatory practices about Boko Haram mostly in the Nigerian print media and scientific literature. It showed, second, the importance of actively establishing a network of contacts to access research sites and to organise interviews. As for the latter, the crucial role of intermediaries such as FES and close, personal relationships is apparent and culminated, among others, in the highlighted and sometimes negotiated encounters with knowledgeable experts and (former) practitioners. If we understand interviewees themselves as placed agents with related knowledge-claims, interviews are fitting and meaningful – though profoundly socially structured – approximations to investigate a FNSP's possible habitus. In what follows, Chapters 5 and 6 provide for the empirical analysis. In the end, this should lead to a new evaluation of the research endeavour in terms of its initial research questions and my own FNSP-related perceptions, a fresh look at how knowledge is produced concerning a FNSP, and a dissemination of the findings (Salter 2013c: 88; Emirbayer/Johnson 2008: 8; Schwartz-Shea/Yanow 2012: 37).

5. Writing (In)Security in a Field of Nigerian Security Policy

'Nigeria is one country that beats all the textbook theories. We are just something else' (Abati 2016).

5.1 Introduction

Among other methodological considerations, the last chapter established the ways in which a sociological discourse analysis offers a promising route to map the agents of, and their position and position-takings in, a Field of Nigerian Security Policy (FNSP), and to explore how agents speak authoritatively on spaces of (in)security. This chapter offers such a sociological discourse analysis through a close, analytical reading of the historico-sociological story of Nigeria's multifaceted and often turbulent engagements with Boko Haram in the textual sources of governmental publications, print media, and relevant scientific literature. As for the latter, the focus is here on *Nigerian* (!) scholars (i.e., those speaking with authority) in combination with well-established international experts of Nigerian politics. Based on Chapters 3 and 4, the reading traces and maps – emerging and specific – key discourses and the ways in which agents' *subjective position-takings* are employed by *classificatory practices*. Helped by my prior and newly acquired knowledge and experience of (West) African realities, the reading method involved a deep dive into these sources via laborious distilling acts to recognise discourses and their boundaries, the 'inventorying' of classificatory practices and their 'nodal points', and intertextual elements (including a quantitative dimension as evidenced in the number of related citations) (Dunn/Neuman 2016: 116, 110). The latter also partly informed my decision on which agents and their classificatory practices to include, if there were multiple possibilities available in the source material.

Yet where to start, if eminent Nigerian scholars and practitioners conceive of Nigeria's social universe the way they do (see Section 1.3), and if the idea was to provide for a *different* reading eventually? Since this can only be done based on empirical material available and accessed, I start with Boko Haram's rise to national attention in 2009. Based on that, I trace and map four key discourses and their constitutive agential classificatory practices: a *discourse on what Boko Haram is* (Section 5.2); a *discourse on what problems/scarcities*

enable and cause Boko Haram (Section 5.3); a *discourse on what practices/policies address Boko Haram* (Section 5.4); and a *discourse on what necessities address Boko Haram* (Section 5.5). As emphasised before, this chapter and the next are first empirical steps towards a FNSP without the intention or capability to reproduce a full Bourdieusian field analysis – a *beginning* others can follow, that is. This chapter concludes by summing up its empirical findings and paving the way to a FNSP's more informal insights in the next chapter (Section 5.6).

5.2 Discourse I – What is Boko Haram?

By the time of the controversial killing of Boko Haram's founder, Mohammed Yusuf (MY), in police custody on July 30, 2009 (Tell, 17.08.2009), different Nigerian security agencies had written reports to both the Federal Government (FG) under President Umaru Yar'Adua (UY) and the Borno State Government under Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS) on the growing threat of, and necessity to tackle, the group without much reaction (Tell, 10.08.2009).⁷⁶ Making sense of and labelling Boko Haram was and remains difficult due to a general lack of insights into its overall constitution and practices (Katsina 2011: 27).

And yet, it is possible to trace and map the first key discourse emerging with specific classificatory practices by agents as a *discourse on what Boko Haram is*. We can identify two nodal points: Boko Haram's *constitution* and Boko Haram's *practices/tactics*. As for Boko Haram's constitution, agents tend to classify Boko Haram as a *sect*⁷⁷ engaged in *terrorist*⁷⁸ and *insurgent*⁷⁹ activities – a sect that is considered *unknown* and *faceless* to some extent.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ I write out and use *initials brackets* – (...) – for the relevant agents (and their classificatory practices) of a FNSP mapped in the textual sources. I also use these initials to create with the software *GEPHI* (GEPHI 2025) a quantitative, network-like *Visual Representation 1* (VR 1) of the field in Section 5.6. The same goes for the agents mapped in the interviews and *Visual Representation 2* (VR 2) in Section 6.2. Both are merged into the final *Visual Representation 3* (VR 3) of a FNSP in Section 7.1.

⁷⁷ See, Adesoji 2010: 101; Nwolise 2012: 298; Pham 2012: 2; Bamgbose 2013: 128; Osumah 2013: 61; Onuoha 2013: 7; Eke/Tonwe 2013: 237; Pérouse de Montclos 2014b: 136f.; Onuoha 2014c: 162; Sampson 2014: 25; Alao 2014: 188; Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 225; Adewumi 2014: 8; ICG 2014: 33; Akpan/Jakob 2015: 4; Albert 2015a: 389; Adewale 2016: 176; Eji 2016: 203; Iyekekepolo 2016: 2219; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 12; Ani et al. 2018: 214; Uloho 2018: 48; Anugwom 2019: 2; Akinola et al. 2019: 7; Chilaka/Idika 2019: 90; Momodu 2019: 418. Pérouse de Montclos engages with the classification of Boko Haram as a sect more closely and points to 'its distinctive religious beliefs, its deviance from mainstream Islam, its intolerance, its claim to possess unique access to the truth, the selection of its members, their fanatic indoctrination, and the fascination exerted by their former guru, Mohammed Yusuf' (MY) (Pérouse de Montclos 2014b: 137).

⁷⁸ See, Omotosho 2014: 8; Olufunmilade 2017: 145; Ani et al. 2018: 214; Iweriebor 2013a: 17; Anugwom 2019: 204.

⁷⁹ See, Okoro 2014: 104; Pieri/Serrano 2014a: 198; Iyekekepolo 2016: 2212; Iweriebor 2013a: 17; Uloho 2018: 48; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 25.

⁸⁰ See, Aghedo/Osumah 2012: 854; Onuoha 2012: 4; Agbiboa 2013b: 8; Alao 2014: 188; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 19.

President Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) conceived of Boko Haram as a completely new, highly difficult and faceless challenge (Tell, 21.01.2012) consisting of terroristic, 'cult'-like 'ghosts' and 'spirits' (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014).⁸¹ With 'their own networks and sympathisers' (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014), the group would have supporters nearly within the entire Nigerian state, that is, in the 'executive arm', 'parliamentary/legislative arm', 'judiciary', and 'armed forces, the police and other security agencies' (BBC News, 08.01.2012). Different from the Nigerian civil war, it would thus be impossible to 'predict where the enemy' emerges (BBC News, 08.01.2012) and impossible to 'listen to' *ghosts* for dialoguing any potential, serious concerns of local socio-economic underdevelopment (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014). Boko Haram would consist of three components: First, an early 'religious component'; second, a 'political component' which is 'used by politicians for political reasons'; third, a component of pretending 'criminals' since nobody 'fighting a religious cause will [...] rob a bank' (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014). After establishing a state of emergency in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa in May 2013, he maintained: 'What we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a *rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups*' (BBC News, 15.05.2013; my emphasis). States Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ):

'These *terrorists and insurgents* seem determined to establish control and authority over parts of our beloved nation', for example, by using 'strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty' – and yet, 'we will not tolerate this' (Adewumi 2014: 7; my emphasis).

His political opponent and then aspiring candidate for Presidency, Muhammadu Buhari (MB), wanted problems such as Boko Haram initially understood as political: 'Wherever they say there is a religious crisis you will find out that there is a failure of government' (Tell, 14.02.2011).⁸² In his Inaugural Speech as new President, May 29, 2015, he stated:

⁸¹ Yet these claims of Boko Haram as faceless ghosts and spirits are also opposed by, among others, eminent religious figures such as Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS), Sultan of Sokoto: Their 'leaders [...] cannot be *faceless*, but someone somewhere is sponsoring these [real] people to do these *evil things*' (Tell, 26.09.2011; my emphasis; similar is Gabriel A. Ajayi (GA), Colonel and Intelligence Officer, rtd., Nigerian Army, Tell, 01.09.2014).

⁸² Similar agents such as Balarabe Musa (BM), ex-Governor of Kaduna State, went as far as voicing that Boko Haram are 'agent provocateurs established by the Federal Government to deal with its [mostly northern] opponents' (Tell, 01.04.2013).

'Boko Haram is a typical example of small fires causing large fires. An eccentric and unorthodox preacher with a tiny following was given posthumous fame and following by his extra-judicial murder at the hands of police. Since then, through *official bungling, negligence, complacency or collusion*, Boko Haram became a terrifying force [...] covering swathes of Nigerian sovereign territory. Boko Haram is a *mindless, godless* group who are as far away from Islam as one can think of. At the end of the hostilities when the group is subdued the government intends to *commission a sociological study* to determine its origins, remote and immediate causes of the movements, its sponsors, the international connexions to ensure that measures are taken to prevent a reoccurrence of this *evil*.' And: 'We cannot claim to have defeated Boko Haram without rescuing the Chibok girls and all other innocent persons' (Guardian, 30.05.2015; my emphasis; similar in Tell, 04.08.2014; Daily Trust, 29.06.2015).

On the one hand, he insisted at the G7 meeting in Elmau, Germany, June 7-8, 2015, that Boko Haram's practices have 'clearly *no* religious basis' (Daily Trust, 09.06.2015; Guardian, 09.06.2015; my emphasis; similar is Geoffrey Onyeama (GON), Professor, Foreign Minister, Guardian, 25.03.2016). On the other hand, he claimed that Nigerians 'are casualties of *Islamic terrorism*' during the controversial debate whether Nigeria should be part of the Saudi Arabia-led *Islamic Coalition against Terror* (Premium Times, 03.06.2015; my emphasis; Guardian, 20.03.2016).

The contested role of religion in constituting and understanding Boko Haram is also underlined by eminent societal figures: Writer and playwright Wole Soyinka ((WS), Professor, Nobel Laureate) claimed that Boko Haram's religious zeal not only became '[an irrational] fuel for mobilisation' and 'an augmentation of any other legitimate or illegitimate grievance that they might have against society', but that anyone outside of their ideological space would be 'due for *sanitation*' (Sahara Reporters, 06.02.2012; my emphasis). And Ishola Williams ((IW), Major General, rtd.; see also Chapter 6), one of Nigeria's most prolific voices on questions of (in)security, conceived of Boko Haram's 'centre of gravity' as an 'extreme violent jihadist faith-based governance and system' (Guardian, 14.06.2015; see also Walker 2012: 13).

When it comes to the question of who practically forms Boko Haram, the relevant scientific literature claims that most of its members (including former leaders Mohammed Yusuf (MY) and Abubakar Shekau (AS)) stem from the Kanuri (Anugwom 2019: 179; Okoro 2014: 117;

Pieri/Zenn 2016: 68; Agbiboa 2013a: 160; Chilaka/Idika 2019: 86), as well as Hausa-Fulani, ethnic group (Chilaka/Idika 2019: 86; Anugwom 2019: 180). Despite expanding primarily within the 'historic Kanem-Borno Empire' around the Lake Chad basin (Pieri/Zenn 2016: 68; Anugwom 2019: 181) and drawing upon Kanuri cultural techniques (e.g., language) and socio-economic networks for operational sustenance and mobilization (Olojo 2020: 8), it is neither perceived to be a 'Kanuri Movement' per se nor appears to recognise itself as such (Pieri/Zenn 2016: 68). While the group attracts as members mostly 'disaffected youth', 'unemployed high school and university graduates', and 'Almajiris' from Nigeria's North-East (Onuoha 2014d: 3; Ogbonnaya et al. 2014: 148; Akinola et al. 2019: 68; Chilaka/Idika 2019: 86), people from all walks of life join(ed) the group over time (Aronson-Ensign 2018: 434; Babatunde 2018: 383; Onuoha 2014d: 3; Ogbonnaya et al. 2014: 148).

As for Boko Haram's practices/tactics, agents tend to classify these as violent attacks on people from all walks of life and their places of daily interactions from religious institutions of both Christians and Muslims to 'police stations, military barracks, banks, beer parlors, media houses, motor parks, schools, market places, United Nations building, etc.' (Hassan 2014a: 1; Akinola 2015: 2; Olufunmilade 2017: 142; Iweriebor 2013a: 17). This includes both the destruction of social, knowledge, and information infrastructures (e.g., schools, telecommunication networks), and attempts to establish a 'state within a state' – a state not only seeking the 'control of territory', but also, as attacks on health workers, women and the abduction of the Chibok Girls (CG) and others have shown, 'to control the bodies that are within it, their health' in a (geo)biopolitical sense (Walker 2012: 3, 6; Elden 2014: 421, 415; Siegle 2013: 87; Akpan/Jakob 2015: 5). This also includes becoming newly accustomed to what used to be an 'alien' phenomenon to all Nigerians, and what is now part of the 'Nigerian lexicon' – *suicide bombings* (Chilaka/Idika 2019: 87; Adewumi 2014: 3; Iweriebor 2013a: 18; Nwolise 2012: 298; Pham 2012: 5; Pérouse de Montclos 2014b: 142; Onuoha 2014b: 70; Onuoha 2014c: 172, 174). States Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ): 'Terrorism, especially *suicide bombing*, is new to us' (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014; my emphasis; see also Sambo Dasuki (SD), National Security Advisor (NSA), Dasuki 2013: 4; and Section 6.4). Or, put similarly by Labaran Maku (LM), Minister of Information, after the bombing of the Nyanya bus terminal, Abuja, as well as the abduction of the Chibok Girls (CG) at Government Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, on April 14, 2014: 'What is happening is *strange to what we are*: it's a complete lack of respect for basic morals' (Tell, 28.04.2014; my emphasis). Even though

Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) saw an unclear 'degree of funding' of Boko Haram (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014), these actions were partly made possible by the very likely support of a limited set of local political and religious elites (Akinola et al. 2019: 77; Onapajo 2013: 56; Watts 2015: 16; Adesoji 2010: 101; Aghedo/Osumah 2012: 863), and the group's financing by mostly 'membership dues, donations, external funding, and bank robberies' (Onuoha 2014c: 163).

Boko Haram also transnationalised, regionalised, and internationalised its activities: It received training outside of Nigeria, perpetrated regular transborder attacks in the Lake Chad Basin region, attracted foreign fighters and funding, and established (symbolic) relations with groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab (ALS) in Somalia, and the Islamic State (IS) to some extent.⁸³ That is, it built 'links with Al Qaeda and some of the terrorist groups within the African continent', so Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) (Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014; see also Sambo Dasuki (SD), Dasuki 2013: 6), or what others call 'international terrorism' (Walker 2012: 8, 7; Osumah 2013: 62; Elden 2014: 419, 420) and 'global jihadist movements' (Watts 2015: 17). Through their practices/tactics, Boko Haram thus became a significant threat, first, to the stability and unity of northern Nigeria, second, to the whole Nigerian polity, and third, to regional security in West Africa (Walker 2012: 3; Siegle 2013: 87; Pham 2012: 1, 3, 5; Elden 2014: 419, 423; Oarhe 2013: 62; Bamgbose 2013: 127; Onuoha 2014a: 3).

5.3 Discourse II – What Problems/Scarcities Enable and Cause Boko Haram?

It is possible to trace and map the second key discourse emerging with specific classificatory practices by agents as a *discourse on what problems/scarcities enable and cause Boko Haram*. We can identify four – very much substantial – nodal points: The *problems/scarcities re the security agencies*; the *problems/scarcities re the military*; the *problems/scarcities re the Federal Government*; the *problems/scarcities re North(-Eastern) Nigeria*:⁸⁴

⁸³ See, Adesoji 2011: 112; Walker 2012: 13; Pham 2012: 1; Aghedo/Osumah 2012: 863; Onapajo et al. 2012: 338, 346; Osumah 2013: 64; Agbibo 2013c: 7; Ogbonnaya et al. 2014: 148; Onuoha 2014c: 180; Onuoha 2014b: 80; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 9; ICG 2014: 22; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 193; Hassan/Olugbuo 2015: 21; Ani/Ojokorotu 2017: 20; Mustapha/Tar 2017: 100; Angerbrandt 2017: 4; Akinola et al. 2019: 70, 77; Cannon/Iyekekpolo 2018: 379, 383; Anugwom 2019: 199.

⁸⁴ Since *the military* (TM) is the predominant, general classification in both the textual sources and the interviews, I also use it for what are officially the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) (i.e., Nigerian Army (NA); Nigerian Navy (NN); Nigerian Air Force (NAF)) (Mohammed 2011: 193; Azazi 2012: 116; Ogbonnaya 2020: 203f.). If an individual

As for the problems/scarcities re the security agencies, agents tend to classify these as, first, inter-agency rivalry, suspicion, and overlap,⁸⁵ second, corruption,⁸⁶ and third, lack of funding⁸⁷ (e.g., for aptly educated personnel and intelligence infrastructures), accountability, oversight, and transparency⁸⁸ (Alani Akinrade (ALA), General, rtd., Ex-CDS, Daily Trust, 26.05.2015; Punch, 15.09.2010; ThisDay, 11.10.2010; Tell, 27.06.2011; Tell, 04.07.2011). Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ), for example, observed at Nigeria's first (!) Internal Security Summit, Abuja, September 2010, that the 'glaring disconnect and *lack of synergy* as well as claims and *counter-claims over superiority among security agencies* have diminished the effectiveness of government's efforts towards combating *crime*' (Nigerian Tribune, 17.09.2010; my emphasis). Another telling illustration is the role played by so-called security votes: These are, on paper, state-security monetary funding mechanisms in the name of (apparently very secret) national security (threats) (Egbo et al. 2012: 598; Owonikoko 2019: 600). In practice, security votes tend to be viewed as local-to-national-level mechanisms to protect powerful political elites and a means of immense corruption.⁸⁹

As for the problems/scarcities re the military, agents tend to classify these as: First, the conceptual and practical inheritances of the 'colonial security structure' (Eke 2015: 290),⁹⁰ that is, a remaining focus on (narrow) regime/state security⁹¹ and reactive and conventional acts of 'occupation and suppression' (Momodu 2019: 410).⁹² Second, vastly corrupt practices⁹³ such as stolen salaries from 'ghost soldiers' existing on paper only (Waro 2020: 34), or nepotistic processes in personnel acquisition.⁹⁴ Third, extremely violent practices⁹⁵ in the

branch is stated, I use it respectively.

⁸⁵ See, Alli 2012: 74; Osumah 2013: 67; Adewumi 2014: 7; ICG 2014: 32; Agwai 2015: 233; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 186, 199, 201; Eme 2018: 3, 14; Ehiane/Mngomezulu 2018: 74; Varin 2018: 151; Alumona et al. 2019c: 671; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 41; Agomoh 2020: 20; Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 228.

⁸⁶ See, Hashim 2016: 10; Afoaku 2017: 35; Maiangwa/Popovski 2016: 164; Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 128; Okolie-Osemene 2019: 71.

⁸⁷ See, Sambo Dasuki (SD), Tell, 16.12.2013; ICG 2014: 32; Ikpe 2017: 389; Ehiane/Mngomezulu 2018: 77; Alumona et al. 2019c: 671; Akinola et al. 2019: 49, 66.

⁸⁸ See, Hashim 2016: 10; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 199; Adeakin 2016: 137; Afoaku 2017: 35; Agomoh 2020: 68.

⁸⁹ See, Ojukwu 2011: 76; Egbo et al. 2012: 598, 614; Hashim 2015: 14; Bappah 2016: 150; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 28; Owonikoko 2019: 595; Waro 2020: 35.

⁹⁰ See, Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 34; Momodu 2019: 410; Akinola 2015: 15.

⁹¹ See, Ebohon/Ifeadi 2012: 5; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 25, 34, 42; Momodu 2019: 410.

⁹² See, Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 25; Nwozor 2019: 576; Akinola 2015: 15.

⁹³ See, Pieri/Serrano 2014b: 15; ICG 2014: 32; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 201; Amnesty International 2015: 23; Eke 2015: 291; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 34f.; Isike et al. 2017: 458; Anugwom 2019: 194; Varin 2018: 149; Momodu 2019: 420f.; Waro 2020: 34.

⁹⁴ See, Bappah 2016: 149; Solomon 2015: 93; Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 132; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 41.

⁹⁵ See, Sambo Dasuki (SD), Dasuki 2015: 3; Onuoha 2014a: 11; Mohammed 2014: 26, 28; Adewumi 2014: 7; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; Adeakin 2016: 129, 140; Momodu 2019: 418; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 27; Agomoh 2020:

form of multiple human rights violations, unlawful arrests, and the infamous *extra-judicial killings* spiralling into thousands of cases (Amnesty International 2015: 4). Fourth, lack of (i) accurate, reliable, and proactive intelligence;⁹⁶ (ii) professionalism, training, and know-how;⁹⁷ (iii) resources/funding and equipment;⁹⁸ and (iv) morale and motivation.⁹⁹ Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) maintained, tellingly, in 2015:

'We never expected that Boko Haram will build up that kind of capacity. We underrated their external influence. Since after the civil war we've not fought any war, we don't manufacture weapons, so we had to look for help to re-equip our army and the air force' (BBC News, 20.03.2015; similar are Alani Akinrade (ALA), Daily Trust, 26.05.2015; Tell, 01.08.2011).

In the same year, Ishola Williams (IW) had 'no doubt that [the military] cannot defeat the Boko Haram with the present conventional military organisations' (Guardian, 14.06.2015). Moreover, the additional \$2.2 billion provided to Sambo Dasuki (SD), Colonel, rtd., National Security Advisor (NSA), to procure arms for the military went mostly missing; likely, for increasing the governing Peoples Democratic Party's (PDP) chances in the General Elections (Ikpe 2017: 389; Owonikoko 2019: 601; Waro 2020: 33).

As for the problems/scarcities re the Federal Government, agents tend to classify these as, first, a weak Nigerian statehood,¹⁰⁰ second, Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) lacking decisiveness, willingness, and strength,¹⁰¹ and third, governmental practices shaped by (i) a militarized counter-terrorism approach¹⁰² ignoring historical context and socio-economic issues, (ii)

8; LeVan 2013: 342; Hassan/Olugbuo 2014: 15; Agbiboa 2015: 432f.; Anugwom 2019: 2; Okoro 2014: 121; Walker 2012: 13; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 42; Pieri/Serrano 2014a: 194.

⁹⁶ See, Siollun 2015: 36; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 52; Onapajo 2013: 55; Onuoha 2014a: 11; Adewumi 2014: 7; ICG 2014: 32; Afoaku 2017: 35; Ehiane/Mngomezulu 2018: 73, 75; Anugwom 2019: 194.

⁹⁷ See, ICG 2014: 32; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 201; Bappah 2016: 147; Afoaku 2017: 35; Akinola et al. 2019: 66; Varin 2018: 148; Anugwom 2019: 194; Momodu 2019: 422.

⁹⁸ See, Sambo Dasuki (SD), Dasuki 2015: 3; Hashim 2016: 10; Adewumi 2014: 7; ICG 2014: 32; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 200; Amnesty International 2015: 23; Afoaku 2017: 35; Akinola et al. 2019: 66; Anugwom 2019: 194; ICG 2019: 14; Varin 2018: 148; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 35; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 17; Anugwom 2019: 194; Momodu 2019: 423f.

⁹⁹ See, Amnesty International 2015: 24; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 34f.; Afoaku 2017: 35; Momodu 2019: 422.

¹⁰⁰ See, Okoro 2014: 108, 117; Aghedo 2014: 239; Anugwom 2019: xii, 3; Eke/Tonwe 2013: 234.

¹⁰¹ See, Joseph Waku (JW), Vice Chairman, Arewa Consultative Forum, Tell, 21.11.2011; Jibrin Ibrahim (JI), Prominent Political Scientist, Ibrahim 2015; Bappah 2016: 147, 152f.; ICG 2014: 32; Maiangwa/Popovski 2016: 164; Akinola et al. 2019: 5; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 36, 38.

¹⁰² See, Alli 2012: 75; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 197; Solomon 2015: 86; Agwai 2015: 233; Akinola et al. 2019: 25;

corruption¹⁰³ and bad governance,¹⁰⁴ and (iii) a culture of impunity.¹⁰⁵ The topic of corruption is omnipresent and thus frequently represented in cartoons: For example, of the looting, corrupt (federal) governmental elite *chopping* Nigeria's national cake (Tell, 26.11.2012; Tell, 12.05.2014; Nation, 12.05.2015; Tell, 31.08.2015; Tell, 14.09.2015; Tell, 18.01.2016), and of the Nigerian masses being exploited by them (Tell, 30.07.2012; Tell, 08.10.2012; Tell, 01.06.2015). On the one hand, Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) did *not* see it as Nigeria's 'number one problem', and, rather, as often 'common stealing' only (Tell, 06.01.2014). On the other hand, Muhammadu Buhari (MB) partly ran his presidential campaign on this 'problem of Nigeria' (Guardian, 08.05.2015; see also Alani Akinrade (ALA), Daily Trust, 26.05.2015). I experienced myself through everyday, personal conversations how Muhammadu Buhari (MB) was often seen as the incoming hero figure fighting corruption in 2015 (see also Nation, 18.05.2015; Nation, 22.05.2015; Daily Trust, 31.05.2015; Daily Trust, 01.06.2015; Daily Trust, 07.06.2015). Yet, while Malam Garba Shehu (MGS), Spokesperson of the President and of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar (ATA), claimed that this hero's '*body language* alone has influenced people to shy away from corruption' (Guardian, 19.03.2016; my emphasis), Muhammadu Buhari (MB) is seen as corrupt himself for failing to deliver on this crucial problem a year later (Tell, 21.03.2016).

As for the problems/scarcities re North(-Eastern) Nigeria, agents tend to classify these first and foremost as poverty,¹⁰⁶ unemployment,¹⁰⁷ economic inequality and underdevelopment,¹⁰⁸ and lacking education.¹⁰⁹ They also point to the socio-political developments internal to northern, radicalising Islam¹¹⁰ shaped by what they conceive of as

Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 548; Cochrane/Oyawale 2020: 12f.; Eji 2016: 204.

¹⁰³ See, Bappah 2016: 152; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 12, 19; Maiangwa/Popovski 2016: 164; Akinola et al. 2019: 48; Anugwom 2019: 194; Ehiane/Mngomezulu 2018: 76; Okolie-Osemene 2019: 71; Walker 2012: 13; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 42; Eke/Tonwe 2013: 237, 240; Onuoha 2014d: 7; Oyeniyi 2014: 74; Okoro 2014: 121; ICG 2014: 49; Hoffmann 2014: 18.

¹⁰⁴ See, IPCR 2013: 137; Okoro 2014: 104, 117; Onah 2014: 72; ICG 2014: 1, 49; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 12; Anugwom 2019: 3; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 42.

¹⁰⁵ See, Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ), Tell, 29.03.2010; Egbo et al. 2012: 614; Adesoji 2011: 112; Ojukwu 2011: 73.

¹⁰⁶ See, Walker 2012: 13; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 42; Onapajo/Uzodike 2012: 26; Omitola 2012: 14; Agbiboa 2013a: 164; Eke/Tonwe 2013: 234, 226; Onuoha 2014d: 5; Oyeniyi 2014: 74, 87; Okoro 2014: 104; Onah 2014: 72; Adewumi 2014: 5; Anugwom 2019: 2; Hoffmann 2014: 18.

¹⁰⁷ See, NSRP 2014a: 18; IPCR 2013: 137; Onuoha 2014d: 5; Okoro 2014: 117; Adewumi 2014: 5; Hassan/Olugbuo 2014: 15; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 12.

¹⁰⁸ See, Eke/Tonwe 2013: 237; Okoro 2014: 116; Adewumi 2014: 5; ICG 2014: 1; Agbiboa 2015: 432; Eji 2016: 207; Hoffmann 2014: 14.

¹⁰⁹ See, Eke/Tonwe 2013: 237; Onuoha 2014d: 6; Oyeniyi 2014: 87; Okoro 2014: 117.

¹¹⁰ See, Loimeier 2012: 138; Omitola 2012: 13; Alao 2013: 136; Oyeniyi 2014: 87; Adewumi 2014: 5; ICG 2014: 1; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 12; Anugwom 2019: xii, 3; Chilaka/Idika 2019: 89; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 31.

'manifestation[s] of' Islamic-to-Jihadist 'ideolog[ies]' (Onuoha 2014c: 186).¹¹¹

5.4 Discourse III – What Practices/Policies Address Boko Haram?

It is possible to trace and map the third key discourse emerging with specific classificatory practices by agents as a *discourse on what practices/policies address Boko Haram*. We can identify three nodal points: The practices/policies of soft carrots; the practices/policies of hard sticks; the practices/policies of strategic legislation. The first two nodal points refer to the introduction of the Federal Government's (FG) new twin approach re Boko Haram – and thus own classification – of '[soft] carrot and [hard] stick' in June 2011, that is, both *dialogue with* (and potential *amnesty for*), as well as *military actions against*, the group (Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 225; see also the use of this classification by scholars, for example, Onuoha 2012: 4; Agbiboa/Maiangwa 2014: 78, 225; Albert 2015a: 396; Eke 2015: 289).

As for the practices/policies of soft carrots, agents tend to classify these as attempts towards dialogue within an often highly competitive discursive space shaped by socio-cultural and political *voices* from both vaguely demarcated *southern* and *northern* perspectives. Such competitive voices are also constitutive for other nodal points, yet they seem particularly salient here: While Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) claimed, reflecting upon his predecessor Umaru Yar'Adua's (UYA) initial success in the Niger Delta Region, that 'there is nothing wrong if you want to negotiate with *militia* groups' (Tell, 27.06.2011; my emphasis), Ayo Oritsejafor (AYO), President of Christian Association of Nigeria, conceived of northern leaders to be more interested in their 'religion' than in fighting Boko Haram (Tell, 05.12.2011). These leaders and groups in the North, in contrast, criticised the Federal Government (FG) for being unable to address the growing insecurity and 'culture of impunity' in the region (Afenifere Renewal Group (ARG), Borno Elders Forum (BEF), Tell, 01.08.2011; Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Tell, 09.01.2012). Some key Muslim individuals like Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS), Sultan of Sokoto, or organisations like the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), spoke out directly against Boko Haram and its terrorism (Harnischfeger 2014: 50; Gyang Man 2014: 101; Hassan/Olugbuo 2014: 18).

Many called upon the Federal Government (FG) to engage in dialogue with and grant amnesty

¹¹¹ See, Adeakin/Gray 2015: 186; Akinola 2015: 2; Pieri/Zenn 2016: 83; Rufai 2017: 202; Akinola et al. 2019: 128; Chilaka/Idika 2019: 89, 90, 96.

to Boko Haram.¹¹² In July 2011, the Federal Government (FG) established the Usman G. Galtimari (UG), Ambassador, headed Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North-East (PCDSCN) mandated to 'initiate negotiations' and appointed Sarkin Bello ((SB), Major-General, former Commander Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta Region) as Special Advisor to the President on Counter-terrorism (Tell, 26.09.2011; Nwogu 2012: 44; Albert 2015a: 391). Yet Bello did not seem to play a prominent role – at least publicly – in what followed. The PCDSCN report of September 2011 traced Boko Haram's origin back to the political campaigns of the 2003 general elections, since politicians instrumentalised '*militias* [...] as political thugs' – thugs who would turn to the 'religious extremism' of Mohammed Yusuf (MY) after being made redundant in the post-election period (Daily Trust, 31.05.2015; my emphasis). Analysing the role of the Federal Government (FG) and its security agencies, it observed both a lack of serious engagement with the question of how 'to understand the ideology and motives' of Boko Haram and 'palpable operational lapses, service rivalry, under-funding, under-equipment and lack of collaboration' (Daily Trust, 31.05.2015; ICG 2014: 32; Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 228). It recommended to discover and arrest Boko Haram's sponsors, to offer dialogue and amnesty to members abandoning radicalism and violent practices, and to tackle both 'the dire socioeconomic situation' in the North-East as well as human-rights violations by security agencies (Daily Trust, 31.05.2015; ICG 2014: 32f.; Dasuki 2013: 9f.; Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 225; Amnesty International 2015: 101; Albert 2015a: 390). A sub-committee under Abba Moro (AM), Minister of Interior, studied the report and the ensuing White Paper of March 2012 asked the Federal Government (FG) to realise the former's recommendations.

These years also saw a series of concrete dialogue attempts materialise: In September 2011, Olusegun Obasanjo (OO) undertook a first attempt by speaking with Babakura Fugu (BF), brother-in-law to late Mohammed Yusuf (MY), in Maiduguri. Fugu was, however, killed by assumed Boko Haram members shortly after (Tell, 21.01.2012) and negotiations seemed not a high priority for the Federal Government (FG), which also criticised northern elders for lacking engagement re the group (Tell, 05.12.2011). Although the Federal Government (FG)

¹¹² See, Borno Elders Forum (BEF), Tell, 01.08.2011; Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu (MBA), Niger State Governor, Tell, 09.01.2012; Inuwa Buala (IBU), Commissioner for Information Borno State, Tell, 21.01.2012; Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS), Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Harnischfeger 2014: 50; Gyang Man 2014: 101; Hassan/Olugbuo 2014: 18.

claimed searching for and reaching out to trustworthy leaders and groups in the North including Boko Haram, it also wanted to continue its 'carrot *and* stick approach' until then, for example, by further 'building up security architecture' (Tell, 05.12.2011; my emphasis; Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ), Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014; also Olusegun Obasanjo (OO), Tell, 04.02.2013; Tell, 01.09.2014).¹¹³

Between February and April 2012, a second dialogue attempt unfolded as some Boko Haram members indicated their willingness to dialogue with, among others, Dr Ibrahim Datti Ahmed (IDA), President-General of the Supreme Council for Sharia (Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 225; Albert 2015a: 393). This attempt ended quickly without success, since Ibrahim Datti Ahmed (IDA) and others left the negotiation table in March. They claimed that the Federal Government (FG) was dishonest, broke the talks' arranged secrecy, and had the Nigerian Army (NA) move against young Boko Haram members in Maiduguri (Walker 2012: 11; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 28; Sampson 2014: 41; Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 225; Albert 2015a: 393). The process perished a month later after Boko Haram published a video full of threats against Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) to counter his statement that the group would be dealt with until July (Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 226).

A new key agent, however, emerged: Taking over the position of National Security Advisor (NSA) from Andrew Owoye Azazi (AOA), General, rtd., Sambo Dasuki (SD)¹¹⁴ visited Yobe State in June 2012 to discuss Boko Haram with religious, traditional, and political leaders, and asked Governor Ibrahim Gaidam (IGA) to engage with the group (Tell, 09.07.2012). The Federal Government (FG) seemed more prone to dialogue (Tell, 23.07.2012), combined with the northern Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) criticising their own governors assumed inactions against Boko Haram by mid-2012 (Tell, 25.06.2012).

A third dialogue attempt became possible in November 2012 when self-proclaimed Boko Haram Commander of North and South Borno State, Sheik Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez (AMIA), appeared to have offered one under several conditions (e.g., talks in Saudi Arabia,

¹¹³ A cartoonish representation of Northern Governors (NG) asking the Federal Government (FG) for a bigger share of the national cake, while the latter asks whether this is for or against Boko Haram, makes one wonder what these discussions incorporated in practice (Tell, 26.03.2012).

¹¹⁴ Here, Nigerian observers underline the role *autochthony* plays in African contexts (e.g., Dunn 2009b): First, they claim that Andrew Owoye Azazi (AOA) was unsuccessful because his southern origin generated 'distrust' (Gabriel A. Ajayi (GA), Tell, 09.07.2012). Second, they claim that Sambo Dasuki (SD) – who is the nephew of Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS) – will either be able to better connect with northern elites or be unable to bridge the 'historical rivalries' with the Kanuri people from which many Boko Haram members stem precisely because of his north-western connections (Malam Garba Shehu (MGS), Tell, 09.07.2012).

specific negotiators, arrest of Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS), prisoner freeing) (Tell, 11.02.2013; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 28; Albert 2015a: 393). The most influential, northern Islamic group Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) (Alao 2013: 136) urged the Federal Government (FG) to dialogue with the Boko Haram faction, like they did with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS) welcomed a possible 'ceasefire', but the Federal Government (FG) would not detain Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS) and the Nigerian Army (NA) under Ola Sa'ad Ibrahim (OSI), Admiral, Chief of Defence Staff, asked Boko Haram to hold a 30-days ceasefire first (Tell, 11.02.2013; Albert 2015a: 393f.).¹¹⁵ The different factions within Boko Haram were a problematic issue the very latest by now, for its most powerful and biggest faction led by Abubakar Shekau (AS) denied both the alleged ceasefire and dialogue with the Federal Government (FG) (Vanguard, 03.03.2013; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 28). Neither was this dialogue attempt successful nor did the March 7-8, 2013, discussions among the Federal Government (FG) and the Governments of Borno and Yobe States and their elders produce a common solution to address Boko Haram.

Rather, competing voices and questions of perceptibility remained central: Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) reminded Nigerians, on the one hand, that negotiating with '[invisible] ghosts' is impossible and conceding necessary first (BBC News, 08.03.2013; Tell, 01.04.2013). Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS) and Kashim Ibrahim Shettima (KIS), Governor of Borno State, on the other hand, advocated for a ceasefire and amnesty by discovering these 'ghosts' (Tell, 18.03.2013; Tell, 01.04.2013).

Against this background, Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) revived the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North-East (PCDSCN) in April 2013. The 26 members, led by Alhaji Kabiru Tanimu Turaki (AKTT), Minister of Special Duties, were tasked to find and approach Boko Haram's leaders for beneficial dialogue and for charting a path towards a possible amnesty (Agbibo 2013c: 11; Adewumi 2014: 8).

Meanwhile, in May 2013 and under military pressure, Boko Haram agreed in Côte d'Ivoire to a fourth dialogue attempt, which envisioned a possible ceasefire. Yet this attempt remained a possibility as well, since the US put million-dollar rewards on Abubakar Shekau (AS) and Al

¹¹⁵ Wole Soyinka (WS), for example, argues that, unlike *militants* such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) focusing on environmental questions, dialoguing with an 'obscenity' such as Boko Haram wishing to annihilate the constitution through violence would be nearly impossible (Tell, 26.05.2014; Sahara Reporters, 06.02.2012).

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar (MBM) on June 3, and the Federal Government (FG) classified Boko Haram and its splinter group Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladin Sudan (JAMBS) as terrorist organisations (including the prosecution of all persons associated with them) on June 4 (ICG 2014: 30, 38; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 550; Hassan/Olugbuo 2015: 26).

The PCDSN's report submitted to the Federal Government (FG) on November 5, 2013, strongly suggested to develop and readjust the country's security agencies in terms of 'service, training and up-to-date equipment' (Tell, 16.12.2013). This report was, like similar ones, never openly published (Adewumi 2014: 8; Okenyodo 2016: 6; Zabadi 2015, interview) and the initiative rejected by Boko Haram (Agbiboa 2013c: 11). Another PCDSN (PCDSN) report was submitted on May 7, 2015, underscoring the '*need to interface with critical [local] stakeholders*' in combination with an emphasis both on disarmament, re-integration, and amnesty like in the Niger Delta, and on learning from '*Ireland, Liberia, South Africa and Sierra Leone*, among others' (Guardian, 15.05.2015; my emphasis).¹¹⁶

Other practices/policies of soft carrots implemented saw the Nigerian Army (NA) establish *Radio Dole* to gain the trust of local communities in northern Nigeria, the Kanuri-and-Hausa-language *Dandal Kura* radio station start to counter Boko Haram's divisive narratives (IPCR 2017: 161; Smith 2016: 215; Akinola et al. 2019: 93), and the Forum of Spokespersons of Security and Response Agencies (FOSSRA) found the Centre for Crisis Communication (CCC) in mid-2015 for conducting analysis and for coordinating efforts of crisis communication among Nigeria's various security and defense agencies (Daily Trust, 25.06.2015). In 2016, the Federal Government (FG) and the Nigerian Army (NA) also conducted *Operation Safe Corridor* to take in Boko Haram members willing to join a six-months 'deradicalisation' programme focusing on education and work-related training – including critiques that the programme classified an excessive number of people as *being* Boko Haram (ICG 2021: 1, 3f.).

As for the practices/policies of hard sticks, agents tend to classify these as attempts towards military actions against Boko Haram within the discursive space outlined above. In line with Boko Haram's rising influence in 2011, agents such as Kashim Ibrahim Shettima (KIS) (Tell, 01.08.2011) and the Federal Government (FG) both underscored the necessity of military

¹¹⁶ Inasmuch as might be learned from these cases re processes of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), one wonders about the extent of their help for understanding and addressing self-considered *Jihadists* (!) such as Boko Haram.

actions against the group (Tell, 05.12.2011). A Council States meeting in Abuja in early 2012, nevertheless, also exemplified their very opposing positions: Kashim Ibrahim Shettima (KIS) accused members of the governing People's Democratic Party (PDP) to sponsor Boko Haram, which was countered by Olusegun Obasanjo (OO) demanding retraction and Goodluck E. Jonathan's (GEJ) late call to all to develop solutions to deal with the question of insecurity in the country (Tell, 09.01.2012). This took place, first, within a national context where the Department of State Services/State Security Service (DSS/SSS) announced the arrest of Ali Ndume (AN), Senator, Minority Leader, House of Representatives, for sponsoring Boko Haram and accused Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS) of the same (Tell, 09.01.2012).¹¹⁷ And second, within a regional context where the states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (i.e., Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Libya, Niger, Nigeria) agreed to revive the 1998-formed Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to tackle regional security threats – with Boko Haram as the main one – in April 2012 (Mustapha/Tar 2017: 108).

Led by Nigeria partly due to its unwillingness to provide access to its national territory to other states (Albert 2017: 125, 127), the effectiveness of the 8.700-men strong Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was limited because of historic mistrust among the states, inconsistent commitment (e.g., securing borders), lack of cooperation, and funding issues (i.e., missing (international) funding and Nigeria being the main contributor) (Albert 2017: 130f.; ICG 2020: 13f., 27; NSRP 2015: 6; Comolli 2015: 112).

The public rhetoric and sentiments shifted further over time, especially with Boko Haram's escalating violent activities and growing territorial expansion in 2014. Not only did prominent figures such as the Emir of Kano (EOK) or Atiku Abubakar (ATA), former Vice President, ask Nigerians to 'protect themselves' (NSRP 2014b: 5f.), but Murtala Nyako (MN), Vice Admiral, Governor of Adamawa State, also claimed in a memo to the Northern Governors' Forum (NGF) on April 16, 2014, that the corrupt and 'evil-minded' Federal Government (FG) uses Boko Haram for genocidal practices against the people and leaders of northern Nigeria (Premium Times, 19.04.2014). The Federal Government (FG) and the Nigerian Army (NA) were also put under pressure to rescue the abducted Chibok Girls (CG) by agents such as the Bring Back Our Girls Campaign (BBOGC) and, for example, Muhammadu Buhari (MB) stating that '[i]t is

¹¹⁷ Even though Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS) denied all connections to Boko Haram (Tell, 15.09.2014), a video of Goodluck E. Jonathan's (GEJ) April 2013 visit to Borno State shows him joking precisely about the relation of the former with Boko Haram (Premium Times, 31.12.2014).

inconceivable and utterly disrespectful that the President can afford a political rally in the wake of yesterday's tragedy' (Tell, 28.04.2014; my emphasis). Other agents such as the civil society organisations Nigerians United Against Terrorism (NUAT) and Grand Alliance Against Terrorism (GAAT), in contrast, voiced their support for the Federal Government (FG) and Nigerian Army (NA), which led Alex S. Badeh (AB), Air Chief Marshal, Chief of Defence Staff, to claim: 'People have finally realised that you don't have another military than this one you have, and it is either you support your military or you are looking for anarchy' (Tell, 09.06.2014).¹¹⁸ With the Nigerian state losing substantial portions of its territory to Boko Haram in 2014,¹¹⁹ it seems fair to say that concerns about the capacity of, and support for, the Nigerian Army (NA) became more prominent and the (position of the) Nigerian Army (NA) emerged as an increasingly relevant agent (see Section 6.3).

At the beginning of 2015, however, Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) was optimistic that the 'tide' had changed (BBC News, 25.02.2015) and Boko Haram's defeat very likely, since the 'security architecture' was being 'overhauled and virtually reinvented' and the Nigerian Army (NA) 're-equipped and fully motivated' (Guardian, 29.05.2015). It appears that this – rather assumed and temporary – tidal change was mostly driven by the role and impact of up to hundreds of experienced, foreign mercenaries from South Africa and Eastern Europe contracted by the private military company STTEP (Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection) of Eeben Barlow (see, for example, Freeman 2015: 1, 3; NSN 2015: 2f.; NSN 2016: 2; Varin 2018: 144, 150; Anugwom 2019: 191). This was initially denied by the Federal Government (FG) in the form of Mike Omeri (MO), Coordinator National Information Centre/Director-General National Orientation Agency, who spoke of 'trainers' for new weapons only (Premium Times, 16.03.2015). But new President Muhammadu Buhari (MB) countered this by highlighting these mercenaries (Nation, 19.05.2015; Guardian, 02.06.2015, Editorial). His new Federal Government (FG), in turn, tried to demonstrate commitment to fighting Boko Haram from June 2015 onwards by increasing the funding of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), visiting several international partners for anti-terrorism collaborations, and selecting new leaders for Nigeria's key security agencies (George/Onuoha 2016: 210). By the end of 2015,

¹¹⁸ It is worth noting that part of Alex S. Badeh's (AB) own support for the military was him being indicted for corruption in the case of \$20 million gone missing at the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) (Iwuoha 2020: 95).

¹¹⁹ This includes rumours that some federal politicians from the North had to pay 'protection fees' of up to 4 million naira to Boko Haram to visit their constituencies (Tell, 26.05.2014).

Muhammadu Buhari (MB) was not only confident enough to claim that Boko Haram had to change its tactics from 'conventional attacks' to bomb attacks only, but even that: 'So I think *technically* we have *won* the war because people are going back into their neighbourhoods' (BBC News, 24.12.2015; my emphasis; ICG 2016: 2). He underlined this confidence in his Independence Day Speech, October 1, 2016: '*On Security*, we have made progress. Boko Haram *was defeated* by last December – *only* resorting to cowardly attacks on soft targets killing innocent men, women and children' (Premium Times, 02.10.2016; my emphasis).

As for the practices/policies of strategic legislation, agents tend to classify these as attempts towards addressing security challenges – clearly, comprising the space of (in)security of Boko Haram – via strategic legislation within the discursive space outlined above. Nigeria took important steps in this regard over the years: In February 2011, after Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) called upon the National Assembly (NASS) to pass the national anti-terrorism bill throughout 2010 and early 2011, the latter authorised the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 (TPA) (Aigbovo/Igbinovia 2014: 227). The TPA defines an 'act of terrorism', among other things, as 'an act which is deliberately done with malice, aforethought and which [...] may seriously harm or damage a country or an international organization' (FG 2011c: 133).¹²⁰

In 2012, Nigeria established the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) for practices of coordination, capacity-building, strategic communication, and local-to-international collaboration (Dasuki 2015: 3; Musa 2018: 9; Monguno 2018: 5; Eme 2018: 11). It also amended the TPA the following year with the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 extending acts of terrorism to include their 'financing' (FG 2013: 3).¹²¹ This TPA mandates the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) as 'the coordinating body for all security and enforcement agencies' and as the responsible agent to both formulate and implement 'a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria' and to 'build capacity' (FG 2013: 4f.; Dasuki 2013: 8).

Based upon that, the Federal Government (FG), with the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) as the lead agency, developed and introduced Nigeria's first *National Security*

¹²⁰ In 2011, Nigeria also introduced the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (FG 2011b), which was amended a year later with the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012 (FG 2012; Akinola et al. 2019: 83).

¹²¹ Such a broad definition of terrorism, as Sampson underlines rightfully, creates both a 'dilemma of *classification*' and a dilemma of appropriate political and legal responses, if more mundane practices of opposition and violence must be considered (Sampson 2014: 27; my emphasis).

Strategy (NSS) in 2014 to make 'Nigeria a violence-free, safe, peaceful, self-reliant, prosperous and strong nation' (FG 2014b: 1, in: Onuoha 2019: 554; Monguno 2019: vii; Agomoh 2020: 15). The NSS itself contains Nigeria's first National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) presented by Sambo Dasuki (SD) in March 2014 and authorised by Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) a month later (FG 2014a; Eme 2018: 10; Akinola et al. 2019: 84). It was the outcome of multiple discussions with international collaborators, local civil society organisations, and the research community, so Sambo Dasuki (SD), and 'seeks to prevent attacks before they happen by preventing our people from becoming terrorists in the first place' (Premium Times, 20.03.2014; see also Section 6.3). Representing Nigeria's '*soft* approach to counter terrorism' (Premium Times, 20.03.2014; my emphasis), it is based on studies of multiple foreign 'counter-terrorism models', organised around 'five work streams' (see below, fn. 122), and is '*all-embracing*', '*comprehensive*', and '*holistic*' (Dasuki 2013: 9; my emphasis; Dasuki 2015: 2). He continues stating that NACTEST engages a local-to-national Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme, tries to make sense of terrorism's '*economic root causes*', and is 'open to *new ideas or inputs* that the public may have' (Premium Times, 20.03.2014; my emphasis). It is implemented by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (including an intelligence-gathering Fusion Centre) to allow for agencies' 'coordination' and 'synergy' (Dasuki 2013: 9; Akinola et al. 2019: 84).

Arguably shaped by the realities on the ground re Boko Haram in 2014 and 2015, the Federal Government (FG) continued to review NACTEST and presented a second version in August 2016 (FG 2016; Eji 2016: 204; Eme 2018: 10). This version moved conceptually further towards a 'whole-of-government approach', that is, it delineated 'roles and statutory responsibilities' for all agents from governmental Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), via civil society organisations, to everyday Nigerians (ONSA 2018: 75, 77; FG 2019: 23; Eme 2018: 2; Musa 2018: 13; Akinola et al. 2019: 93). It also identified Boko Haram and its splinter groups as Nigeria's 'most significant threat' (FG 2016: 14; Chukwuma 2022: 3).¹²²

¹²² The five work streams of this second NACTEST consist of: First, the *Forestall* stream attempting to address 'the radicalisation of individuals and emphasizing security awareness amongst the populace' by national and international Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) practices in fields such as research and teaching, interreligious dialogue, and youth education (ONSA 2018: 76; Akinola et al. 2019: 94; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 555). Second, the *Secure* stream attempting to 'safeguard[...] citizens and [critical] infrastructure by reducing their vulnerability to attacks' through means such as security agencies' training and securing borders and infrastructures (ONSA 2018: 76; Akinola et al. 2019: 96; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 555). Third, the *Identify* stream attempting to 'stop[...] terrorist threats and attacks on Nigeria and her interests' (ONSA 2018: 76) by efforts targeted at improved investigation, intelligence, and prosecution (Akinola et al. 2019: 101; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 556). Fourth, the

Launched in August 2017, the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PFPCVE) continued this path: Based on 'research' and 'local knowledge' (FG 2017: 11), the PFPCVE attempts both to implement a 'Whole-of-Government' and 'Whole-of-Society Approach' to move 'from a state-centred to a people-centred [and 'non-kinetic'] approach' (FG 2017: 13; FG 2019: 24) and to 'mainstream peace building into our efforts in dealing with the economic and social consequences of violent extremism in rebuilding and stabilizing the North East and other parts of Nigeria' (Buhari 2017: 3).

Nigeria's second National Security Strategy (NSS), published by the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) in December 2019, then, recognises that the 'splintering' of Boko Haram (e.g., Islamic State in West Africa Province, (ISWAP)) increases the 'complexity' of insecurity in the country (FG 2019: 28). It not only envisions 'a comprehensive and coordinated whole-of-nation' and 'whole-of-government approach' whereby 'all Nigerians' take over 'responsibility' but is also to be 'implemented in a robust manner' (FG 2019: 260) by combining and employing 'soft power and combat engagements' (FG 2019: 220, 222, 223; my emphasis).

5.5 Discourse IV – What Necessities Address Boko Haram?

It is possible to trace and map the fourth key discourse emerging with specific classificatory practices by agents as a *discourse on what necessities address Boko Haram*. In line with the second discourse (see Section 5.3), we can identify four nodal points: The *necessities re the security agencies*; the *necessities re the military*; the *necessities re the Federal Government*; the *necessities re North(-Eastern) Nigeria*.

As for the necessities re security agencies, agents tend to classify the need to improve and in fact implement, first, inter-agency collaboration and synergy,¹²³ second, local-to-international and technology-driven intelligence (including analysis and technical

Prepare stream attempting to 'ensur[e] that the Nation is ready to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack' by way of capacity building for agencies, technological infrastructures (e.g., CCTV), or socio-economic (e.g., *Presidential Initiative on the North East*, PINE) and security initiatives (e.g., Safe Schools Initiative, SSI) (ONSA 2018: 77; Akinola et al. 2019: 104ff.; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 556). Fifth, the *Implement* stream attempting 'cooperation at all levels – from the public to the private sector including civil society organisations' – to create synergy across all agents both domestically and with international partners (ONSA 2018: 77; Akinola et al. 2019: 107; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 556).

¹²³ See, Tell, 17.01.2011; Tell, 27.06.2011; Oladeji 2012: 408; Onuoha 2014b: 85; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; George/Onuoha 2016: 213; Eji 2016: 212; Eme 2018: 16f.; Okolie-Osemene 2019: 80; Momodu 2019: 434; Agomoh 2020: 20f.

infrastructures),¹²⁴ and third, capacity building, training, and equipment.¹²⁵ Sambo Dasuki (SD), for example, puts it this way re Boko Haram in 2015: There is the need for 'deep introspection' and for both 'hard and soft approaches', that is, for 'shift[ing] from conventional warfare to fighting asymmetric war in towns and communities' (Dasuki 2015: 2ff.). As for the necessities re the military, agents tend to classify the need to address and abolish the military's 'heavy-handed' (i.e., highly violent and killing-oriented)¹²⁶ and corrupt¹²⁷ practices, as well as the need for modern and specialised tactics, training, equipment, and logistics (including the possibility of Special Forces).¹²⁸

As for the necessities re the Federal Government (FG), we enter a discursive territory with rather unclear boundaries considering what is usually claimed about the *Nigerian political space* in more general terms (see Section 1.3). While I thus trim down this nodal point for practical reasons, agents tend to classify – first and foremost – the need to develop and implement both a (conceptual) strategy for, and a (practical) approach to, national security and counter-terrorism realities – realities which necessitate a 'new thinking' (Ishola Williams (IW), Guardian, 14.06.2015) in terms of strategies and approaches classified, inter alia, as: *Bottom-up; comprehensive; holistic; inclusive; proactive; people/human security-oriented; robust*.¹²⁹ Second, agents tend to classify the need for good governance (including envisioned

¹²⁴ See, Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ), Adesola Nunayon Amosu (AA), Air Marshal, Chief of Air Staff, Muhammadu Buhari (MB), and Usman Jibrin ((UJ), Rear Admiral, Chief of Naval Staff, in: Daily Trust, 17.05.2015; Sunday Tribune, 04.07.2010; Tell Interview, 27.02.2012, in: Tell, 17.03.2014; Daily Trust, 04.05.2015; Daily Trust, 12.06.2015; Daily Trust, 03.06.2015; Guardian, 03.06.2015; Anabas Sara-Igbe (ASI), Security Consultant, Tell, 19.05.2014; M.D. Isah (MDI), Major-General, rtd., Daily Trust, 17.05.2015; Think Security Africa 2011: 4; Pham 2012: 6; Onuoha 2013: 7; Agbiboa 2013a: 166; Sampson 2014: 46; Hassan 2014b: 27; Albert 2015b: 370; George/Onuoha 2016: 213; Pieri/Zenn 2016: 84; Eji 2016: 213; Fasakin 2017: 100; Ani et al. 2018: 223; Eme 2018: 17; Alumona et al. 2019c: 672.

¹²⁵ See, Gabriel A. Ajayi (GA), Tell, 11.02.2013, Forum; Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 143; Eji 2016: 212; Akinola et al. 2019: 153; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 45; Momodu 2019: 434; Alumona et al. 2019c: 672; Agomoh 2020: 20.

¹²⁶ See, Agbiboa 2013a: 166; Pieri/Serrano 2014a: 207; Onuoha 2014a: 12; Amnesty International 2015: 13; Adeakin 2016: 142.

¹²⁷ See, Onah 2014: 77; Eji 2016: 212; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 39; Akinola et al. 2019: 154.

¹²⁸ See, Ishola Williams (IW), Guardian, 14.06.2015; Pham 2012: 7; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 201; Solomon 2015: 134; Siollun 2015: 36; Eji 2016: 213; Amao/Maiangwa 2017: 39; Afoaku 2017: 39; Akinola et al. 2019: 154; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 43.

¹²⁹ See, (ONSA), ONSA 2015a: 9; Oshita Oshita (OSO), Prof., Director of Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Telegraph, 05.10.2014; Think Security 2011: 4; Onuoha 2012: 5; Ebohon/Ifeadi 2012: 16; Eke/Tonwe 2013: 240; Agbiboa/Maiangwa 2014: 88; Mohammed 2014: 31; Onuoha 2014c: 186; Sampson 2014: 44f.; Onuoha 2014b: 85; Onuoha 2014a: 12; Adewumi 2014: 3f., 10; Hassan 2014b: 27; ICG 2014: 49; Agbiboa 2015: 433; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 201; Solomon 2015: 19; NSN 2015: 5; Agwai 2015: 226, 233, 239; Eji 2016: 209; Pieri/Zenn 2016: 84; Olojo 2017: 319; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 26, 43; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 563; Nwozor 2019: 571; Pogoso/Saleh 2019: 644; Alumona et al. 2019c: 671; Agomoh 2020: 20.

institutional reform),¹³⁰ political will,¹³¹ and tackling corruption (including prosecuting complicit agents).¹³² Third, agents tend to classify the need to implement negotiations with moderate Boko Haram members ((ONSA), ONSA 2015a: 10; (IPCR), IPCR 2013: 118, 137; Oyeniyi 2014: 92; Mohammed 2014: 31; Eji 2016: 216), demobilize and reintegrate Boko Haram members (Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 30; Eji 2016: 216; ICG 2021: 1), promote peace and education,¹³³ and strengthen regional¹³⁴ (including border security) and international¹³⁵ cooperation.

As for the necessities re North(-Eastern) Nigeria, agents not only seem to direct their classificatory practices to both the Federal Government (FG) and State Governments at the same time, but also – first and foremost – highlight the socio-economic conditions as they tend to classify the need to tackle poverty (Sambo Dasuki (SD), Dasuki 2015: 2ff.; (ONSA), ONSA 2015c: 10; Olusegun Obasanjo (OO), Daily Trust, 29.03.2016; Ibrahim Datti Ahmed (IDA), Daily Trust, 15.06.2015; Jibrin Ibrahim (JI), Ibrahim 2015; Tell, 30.11.2009; Daily Trust, 17.05.2015),¹³⁶ create employment opportunities (for youths),¹³⁷ and improve social justice, equality, and fairness.¹³⁸ Moreover, agents tend to classify the need for non-ideological

¹³⁰ See, Maiangwa et al. 2012: 54; IPCR 2013: 118, 120; Okoro 2014: 122; Sampson 2014: 45; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 21; ICG 2014: 49; Obiozor 2015: 245; Uloho 2018: 61; ICG 2019: 23; Alumona et al. 2019c: 673; Agomoh 2020: 23; Aghedo/Osumah 2012: 867; Omitola 2012: 5; Fasakin 2017: 101; IPCR 2017: 70; Babatunde 2018: 388; Akinola et al. 2019: 156.

¹³¹ See, Ehiane/Mngomezulu 2018: 80; Agbiboa/Maiangwa 2014: 90; Onuoha 2014a: 12; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; Eji 2016: 215.

¹³² See, Sambo Dasuki (SD), Dasuki 2015: 2ff.; Ishola Williams (IW), Tell, 07.09.2009; Pham 2012: 6; Adisa 2019: 324; Onuoha/Varin 2020: 228; Aghedo/Osumah 2010: 143; Onuoha 2014d: 9; Okoro 2014: 122; Onah 2014: 77; Sampson 2014: 45; Onuoha 2014b: 85; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; Alozieuwa 2016: 190; Afoaku 2017: 38; Akinola et al. 2019: 152; Owonikoko 2019: 605.

¹³³ See, (ONSA), ONSA 2015b: 10; Onuoha 2014d: 8; Ani/Ojakorotu 2017: 25; Eji 2016: 216; Ani et al. 2018: 223; Babatunde 2018: 388.

¹³⁴ See, (IPCR), IPCR 2013: 119; Pham 2012: 7; Osumah 2013: 70; Onuoha 2014a: 12f.; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; Solomon 2015: 134; Eji 2016: 215; Angerbrandt 2017: 4, 7; ICG 2019: 24; Akinola et al. 2019: 153; Think Security Africa 2011: 59; Osumah 2013: 70; Adisa 2019: 323.

¹³⁵ See, Onapajo et al. 2012: 351; Osumah 2013: 71; Onuoha 2014a: 13; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; Adisa 2019: 324.

¹³⁶ See, Think Security 2011: 58; Walker 2012: 14; Loimeier 2012: 152; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 54; Aghedo/Osumah 2012: 867; Onapajo/Uzodike 2012: 36; Omitola 2012: 5; Osumah 2013: 70; Onuoha 2013: 7; Agbiboa 2013a: 166; Onuoha 2014b: 85; Agbiboa 2015: 433; Adeakin/Gray 2015: 202; Hassan/Olugbuo 2015: 25; Chizea/Osumah 2015: 91; Alozieuwa 2016: 191; Afoaku 2017: 39; Olojo 2017: 319; IPCR 2017: 70; Anugwom 2019: 164; Akinola et al. 2019: 54; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 42; Onuoha/Ugwueze 2020: 560.

¹³⁷ See, (IPCR), IPCR 2013: 118; Maiangwa et al. 2012: 53; Onapajo/Uzodike 2012: 36; Onuoha 2014d: 8; Okoro 2014: 122; Mohammed 2014: 31; Onuoha 2014b: 85; Onuoha 2014a: 12; ICG 2014: 43; Chizea/Osumah 2015: 91; Alozieuwa 2016: 191; Akinola et al. 2019: 54, 151; Nwozor 2019: 572; Ikelegbe/Oshita 2019: 26.

¹³⁸ See, (IPCR), IPCR 2013: 118; (IPCR), IPCR 2017: 70; Pham 2012: 7; Loimeier 2012: 152; Omitola 2012: 14; Onuoha 2012: 5; Eke/Tonwe 2013: 240f.; Okoro 2014: 122; Onuoha 2014b: 85; Fasakin 2017: 101; Akinola et al. 2019: 60.

knowledge production and dissemination through social networks and religious leaders¹³⁹ (for example, sensitisation efforts by organisations such as Jama'atu Izalatu Bid'ah Wa Ikamatu Sunna (JIBWIS), Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN), or the National Council of Muslim Youth Organisations (NCMYO); Olojo 2020: 9f.).

5.6 Conclusion

Based on a sociological discourse analysis of Nigerian print media, governmental publications, and scientific literature, this empirical Chapter 5 traced and mapped the key discourses and constitutive classificatory practices by agents (i.e., their subjective position-takings) in and of a specific FNSP concerning the space of (in)security of Boko Haram. The chapter, I argue, offers an early, preliminary mapping of a FNSP by identifying, delineating and registering its emerging discourses, nodal points, agents, and concrete agential classificatory practices (see Chapters 6 and 7 for further steps). As established in Section 3.6, the latter take diverse forms (e.g., political acts, discursive statements) and shape Nigeria's security policy towards Boko Haram eventually. The close reading across diverse textual sources reveals four – interrelated and co-productive – key discourses whose stories I have organised around questions (without a particular reason for their sequential arrangement).

Within a discursive space of multiple voices making simplifications – especially geographical labels such as *northern* and *southern* – somewhat inevitable, the first discourse asks what Boko Haram is and centres on the nodal points of Boko Haram's constitution and practices/tactics. At large, the group is classified as a *terrorist/insurgent sect* constituted by a diverse membership of mostly young people from the Kanuri and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups. The notions of terrorism and insurgency are frequently stated and blended by both political actors and scholars. One wonders whether a more nuanced engagement with and conceptualisation of such different notions would be beneficial. Strong discursive competition, however, emerges on how to further imagine and classify Boko Haram: Whether and to what extent is it an omnipresent challenge in the Nigerian political space of *unknown/faceless ghosts* with unclear funding rendering dialogue nearly impossible, as President Goodluck E. Jonathan and related agents have it? Whether and to what extent is it the *product of power*

¹³⁹ See, Onapajo/Uzodike 2012: 36; Pérouse de Montclos 2014c: 30; Onuoha 2014d: 7; Afoaku 2017: 38; Chizea/Osumah 2015: 76.

politics by the Goodluck E. Jonathan-led Federal Government, as Muhammadu Buhari and related agents have it? Whether and to what extent is its *centre of gravity religious* and driven by a radical Islamist impetus? Discursive cooperation reigns on the group's actual practices/tactics, considering the indiscriminate violent attacks on both local populations and the state security agencies, the destruction of social and knowledge infrastructures, the *statehood-like* ambitions with territorial and biopolitical components, the *alien* character of suicidal dispositions, and the (border-)geographies-transversing activities.

The second discourse asks what problems/scarcities enable and cause Boko Haram and centres on the nodal points of problems/scarcities re Nigeria's security agencies, military, Federal Government, and North(-Eastern) region. Even though the extent of the problem was contested for political reasons between President Goodluck E. Jonathan and the assumed *hero figure* of new President Muhammadu Buhari, the first three nodal points and thus (groups of) agents are clearly classified – and frequently visualised – as being affected by extensive, detrimental corruption (including the practical competition for state-internal positions). Nigeria's security policy approach to current security challenges such as terrorism remains riddled with a colonial and traditional understanding of (in)security focusing on regime security and the use of hard military power, which includes excessively violent practices against local populations. The security agencies and the military not only suffer from a lack of apt training, knowledge (including intelligence), resources, and individuals' professionalism, but also inter-agency rivalry (i.e., competition; see also Section 6.3). These issues combine with the general weakness of Nigeria's statehood, the bad governance and impunity of its political elites, and the personal weaknesses of President Goodluck E. Jonathan. They also combine with what primarily scholars classify as socio-economic and educational underdevelopment in North(-Eastern) Nigeria and the ways in which people are radicalised towards Islamist Jihadism there. It is, therefore, expected that the imaginative and real-world powers of the Nigerian state to address Boko Haram were limited.

And so, the third discourse asks what practices/policies address Boko Haram and centres on the nodal points of practices/policies of soft carrots, hard sticks, and strategic legislation. Very strong discursive competition emerges concerning the possibility and extent of both soft dialogue with, and hard military action against, Boko Haram: For the group's very perceptibility is in serious question as (un)disguised and (un)willing ghosts in an environment of accusations between mostly northern and southern socio-political elites – that is, of *being*


and/or funding Boko Haram, of corruption and *evilness*, of doing the *inconceivable*. For public – mostly northern – calls for dialogue and amnesty echo in an environment of corruption of both the Federal Government and Northern Governors. For a series of dialogue attempts are unsuccessful, given agents' radical(ised) positions in an environment of existential violence and disinterest for conflict resolution. For the PCDSN reports not only determine Nigeria's knowledge and resource gaps and inter-agency rivalry (i.e., competition), but the need for dialogue and amnesty, socio-economic development in the North-East, and transformed and less violent security agencies. For presidential optimisms about Nigeria's new domestic security capabilities or wars *technically won* are premature, given the role played by foreign mercenaries and the continuing, extensive suffering of at least local populations. For the country's own deradicalisation programme is criticised for excessively classifying Nigerians as terrorists, the capture of the Chibok Girls (and others) reveals the public's split over supporting the military, and the effectiveness of extra-territorial measures such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) remains limited. Nigeria's strategic legislation, on the other hand, seems less controversial (see Section 6.3 for parts of its practical genesis), although the *Terrorism Prevention Act* defines terrorism very broadly and makes the National Security Advisor position very powerful in the national security governance system. With a splintered Boko Haram classified as its key national security threat, Nigeria produces *National Security and Counter-Terrorism Strategies* and a *Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* which envision and move conceptually from being more coordinated, holistic, synergetic and prevention-oriented to mobilising a whole-of-government and then a whole-of-nation/society approach. It combines governmental practices of soft carrots and hard sticks with a populace *made accountable for security* (see also Section 6.3) – all of which is shaped by a dominant sense of *aspiration* to address necessities.

Relatedly, the fourth discourse asks what necessities address Boko Haram and centres on the nodal points of necessities re Nigeria's security agencies, military, Federal Government, and North(-Eastern) region. Because of the discourse's fully aspirational character, cooperative engagement emerges: Based on inter-agency collaboration and synergy, security agencies and the military modernise training schemes, build up the resource basis, and employ multi-level, technology-driven intelligence. The Federal Government and the military not only abolish violent and corrupt practices, but the former also governs beneficially, has – in very

short – a *people-oriented* security policy to reintegrate moderate Boko Haram members, and strengthens extra-territorial cooperation. The entire Nigerian state, moreover, enables and secures socio-economic and educational development in the North(-Eastern) region.

Before the next chapter studies the more informal insights of a FNSP through interviews with Nigerian experts and practitioners, we can visually represent the mapping of the relevant agents of a FNSP in the textual sources with *Visual Representation 1* (VR 1):

Visual Representation 1



6. Dialoguing (In)Security in a Field of Nigerian Security Policy

6.1 Introduction

This chapter studies the more informal and personal insights into and of a FNSP through interviews with leading Nigerian experts and practitioners. The interviewees offer their own depictions of a FNSP's possible *habitus* (Section 6.2), of a FNSP's possible *capital* (Section 6.3), of *perspectives on Boko Haram* (Section 6.4), and of *responses to Boko Haram* (Section 6.5). Since I strongly emphasise the need for African (here: Nigerian) perspectives and voices to be mapped and heard on issues of (in)security, I try to let the interviewees dialogue and convey these as directly as possible. I am aware, however, that this is still only *my* best attempt to minimize my *methodological imperialism* as a researcher, given the ways in which I have framed the questions in the first place (see Chapter 4) and condensed, ordered, and interpreted their extensive and valuable inputs afterwards. While this sometimes both produces repetitions (i.e., similar topics emerge in different sections) and/or deviates from what was initially asked and intended with the question to some extent, this is precisely the point: It offers rich, Nigerian insights into and of a FNSP and the Nigerian political space more generally. For the interviewees are not only very knowledgeable individuals about, but also become agents with subjective position-takings in, a FNSP.¹⁴⁰ This chapter concludes by summing up its empirical findings and offering self-reflexive insights concerning the fieldwork's interview situations (Section 6.6).

6.2 Habitus – Characteristics, Knowledges, Aspirations

This section explores the ways in which the interviewees depict a possible *habitus* of a FNSP (and its agents), that is, the characteristics, knowledges, and aspirations at work. This three-tier structure is derived from my take on habitus for analytical purposes (see Section 3.5).

As for the characteristics, we can identify the three topics¹⁴¹ of democratic transformation, agential constitution, and problems/scarcities, in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices: Nigeria is a highly 'complex' country still transforming democratically (WRA 2015,


¹⁴⁰ For a minuscule part, this might be also true for the interviewer.

¹⁴¹ Rather than speaking of *nodal points* like in the traced discourses of Chapter 5, I use the label of *topics* for now, since these classifications were only uttered to me and are not yet part of the public discursive realm.

interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview) with a 'plural society' driven by what Yoroms calls 'deep [socio-political] cleavages' and commitments which, in turn, shape all policies (Yoroms 2016, interview). The country's historical '*mindset*' re its (in)security discourses (Hassan 2015, interview; Zabadi 2015, interview; my emphasis) has mostly been driven by the exclusionary and 'top-down' practices of the Federal Government's (FG) agents in its military-rule past (Hassan 2015, interview). Yet the post-1999 'democracy has opened up the political space', so Oche and others, enabling not only significantly more room for manoeuvre and opportunities for individual agents and groups of agents in general (Oche 2015, interview; Abraham 2016, interview),¹⁴² but also the inclusion of different stakeholders – especially from Nigeria's civil society – into its (in)security discourses more specifically (Chollom 2016, interview; Zabadi 2015, interview). When asked about the concrete stakeholders shaping Nigeria's security policy, the interviewees painted a varied picture. We can visually represent the mapping of the relevant agents of a FNSP in the interviews with *Visual Representation 2* (VR 2):

¹⁴² Abraham claims that this new, democratic 'freedom' also led to inappropriate violent 'agitations' by agents, for example, in the cases of resource control struggle in the Niger Delta, terrorism in the North-East (!), and widespread criminality (Abraham 2016, interview).

Visual Representation 2



Some emphasise the difficulty of locating and mapping the stakeholders (e.g., Bakut 2016, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; fCDS 2016, interview) – specifically because institutional structures (i.e., agential memberships, roles, and powers) might remain 'elusive' or 'secretive' (fCDS 2016, interview). Bakut is, in fact, amused by how difficult it is to pinpoint the most influential stakeholders:

We might 'think it is the NSA (NSA), then you find the army (NA) doing their own, then the presidency (FG)' or 'the SSS (DSS/SSS), the NIIA (NIIA), and all these agencies are coming. And so, is difficult to really see this is who is doing what' (Bakut 2016, interview).

Chollom, with a sense of wit given his National Defence College (NDC)-affiliation and the place of the interview, claims that '*anyone*' willing to tackle insecurity has '*a stake*' (Chollom 2016, interview; his emphasis): 'So, I cannot say *this* stakeholder is more important than the other', since 'every stakeholder is [*equally*]' important towards our collective security approach' (Chollom 2016, interview; his emphasis). For the fCDS, however, the very term – *stakeholders* – aspires to the inclusion of all, but the stakes are usually shared unequally and limited to those agents (e.g., academics) with substantial 'interest' and able to persuade their close '*friends*' in the Federal Government (FG) to address specific issues (fCDS 2016, interview; my emphasis; see Section 6.3).

The interviewees highlight the topic of problems/scarcities: Although democracy allowed for a nationally-oriented 're-socialisation' of agents to some extent (Oche 2015, interview), pervasive 'corruption' substantially weakened the state's institutional capacity and bureaucratic efficacy for several decades by now (Oche 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview).¹⁴³ Both individual *money(-making)* in the democratic setting – that is, getting a 'slice of the cake' (Rimdap 2016, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Alli 2015, interview) or pursuing 'turf protection' (Bakut 2016, interview) – and managing and answering what Oche calls the frequently ignored key sociological problem of the 'local interest' of agents' (home) communities (Oche 2015, interview) prevail over an aptly organized and capable national security governance system. The latter remains widely

¹⁴³ For Alli, politics in Nigeria resembles a *comical theatre*, because 'every component, every phase, of decision-making becomes polluted' which, in turn, leads to damaged strategies and tactics (Alli 2015, interview).

'closed' and thus selectively non-public (Bamidele 2015, interview; Oche 2015, interview) – or, as Oche has it, 'to some extent, Nigeria is not a big country' (Oche 2015, interview). Its key stakeholders lack 'synergy' (Williams 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Udeh 2016, interview), fact-based intelligence gathering and sharing (Bamidele 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview), accountability and efficiency (Yaqub 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview), and civil society engagement (Yaqub 2015, interview; Zabadi 2015, interview). Their thinking is, according to Williams, also hampered by an 'acute *intellectual* dependency syndrome' (Williams 2015, interview; my emphasis). The system also overrelies on unpredictable external partners due to its 'acute *international donor* dependency syndrome' (Williams 2015, interview; my emphasis; Ijide 2016, interview), and existing academic institutions such as think tanks and universities lack drive, cooperation, and a broad audience for making their voices impactful (Williams 2015, interview).

As for the knowledges, we can identify the two topics of institutional experience and education, and problems/scarcities, in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices: Individuals acquire practical knowledge over time in a variety of security-related institutions through everyday experience, education, and training (Oche 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Alli 2015, interview; Ijide 2016, interview). This involves subjective processes of inculcating specific 'norms', 'codes of conduct', and forms of 'communication' (e.g., how hierarchical relations with colleagues play out; how to deal with demands) to enable '*practical ability*' (Abraham 2016, interview; his emphasis). Put differently, to inculcate a specific 'ethic' for becoming a true '*professional*' (fCDS 2016, interview; my emphasis), or to possess '*natural* instinct' for offering understanding and interpretation (Alli 2015, interview; my emphasis). Three examples are noted, related to the interviewees' personal experiences and affiliations: First, some emphasise the role of the National Defence College (NDC) in both producing strategic and policy-relevant knowledge – even 'brilliant ideas' (Alli 2015, interview) – and conveying it to the personnel of key stakeholders (e.g., (ONSA); (DHQ)) (Yusuf 2015, interview), and in educating military personnel towards a democratic 'mindset' (Zabadi 2015, interview). Second, the fCDS describes how his three-year training in the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) made him 'a soldier', considering how the military ideally takes out 'the civilian' with its 'biases and sympathies' (fCDS 2016, interview). Third, Ikelegbe states that the National Institute for Security Studies (NISS) organises field trips for agents to '*understand what is really happening* in the [regional] states' (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; my emphasis).

Nigeria's military is specifically conceived to possess genuine practical knowledge due to frequent and constantly revised domestic and international training schemes (Yusuf 2015, interview; Abraham 2016, interview), which is very important for assessing the (im)possibility of security practices such as how to handle public '*information*' on Boko Haram (Ijide 2016, interview; his emphasis).

The interviewees highlight, once more, the topic of problems/scarcities: Numerous governmental and bureaucratic agents in positions of relevance considerably lack appropriate training, knowledge,¹⁴⁴ and practical skills (Alli 2015, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview). For agents tend to get to occupy such positions, including their potential for career trajectories, through interpersonal networks and relationships based on 'nepotism' (Bamidele 2015, interview), 'cronyism' (Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview), and local 'politics of [ethnic] identity' (Yaqub 2015, interview) – something Alli designates not-so-metaphorically as follows: '*Come and eat, I am here now*' (Alli 2015, interview; my emphasis; see Section 1.3 and Bayart 2009). States Bakut: 'All you need is just...your old, *secondary* classmates, university mates, and [network of] friends. If you don't have those, you are finished' (Bakut 2016, interview; his emphasis). And so, competent and specialised agents able to go beyond the 'realm of speculation' re crucial and urgent topics of (in)security remain seldom (Yusuf 2015, interview). As for the aspirations, we can identify the two topics of necessities re individual, political agents, and necessities re collective, security stakeholders, in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices: First, the need both to appoint ethical and knowledgeable individuals in relevant political positions in the first place and to have them occupy these (WRA 2015, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview), and to implement fundamental and research-informed capacity building for them (Yusuf 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview). These individuals must be able and willing to deeply examine and understand Nigeria's complexity, various socio-political problems, and practices of insecurity (Yaqub 2015, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview;

¹⁴⁴ Yoroms claims that usually political 'leader[s] don't read', since their self-perception is moulded around '*big man-ism*' (Yoroms 2016, interview; his emphasis). On the other hand, Ijide assumes that political leaders read newspapers to understand the (in)security situation as a basis for their inputs (Ijide 2016, interview). Yoroms also recalls how a 'friend' and Member of National Assembly (NASS) working on military affairs thanked him for a book on parliamentary oversight of the security sector, which would allow to ask suitable questions (Yoroms 2016, interview).

Zabadi 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview). Examining such issues should consist of a 'forensic study' (Bamidele 2015, interview) and rely on expert knowledge, for Yoroms would like to ask more often: '*Oga*, have you read what I left for you on the table?' (Yoroms 2016, interview; his emphasis). Second, the need to enable and build up an open, diverse, and collective network of democratic security stakeholders consisting of both governmental and non-governmental agents (Yaqub 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Ijide 2016, interview; Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; Ukiwo 2015, interview; Oche 2015, interview). The Federal Government (FG) and its security agencies must be willing to embrace and listen to the positions, (expert) voices, and intelligence insights of different 'platforms' such as Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA), Nigerian Network on Security and Democratic Governance (NINSED), Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), and universities (Ukiwo 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview; Ijide 2016, interview). It also must make use of existing and develop new social infrastructures for security stakeholders such as workshops, conferences, and seminars (Ijide 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Ukiwo 2015, interview; see also Section 6.3). These 'citadels of learning' (Ijide 2016, interview) would allow for constant knowledge exchange or what Williams envisions as a 'system of innovation' to generate 'new [strategic] ideas', conduct 'experimentation', and infuse specialised information and expertise (Williams 2015, interview; Oche 2015, interview; Zabadi 2015, interview). For positive, self-reliant security in Nigeria requires persistent 'thinking on our own' (Williams 2015, interview).¹⁴⁵

6.3 Capital – Resources, Strategies, Voids

This section explores the ways in which the interviewees depict a possible *capital* of a FNSP, that is, its resources, strategies, and voids. This three-tier structure is derived from my take on capital for analytical purposes (see Section 3.5). Yet I merge *resources* and *strategies* here, since it was impossible and would have been counterproductive to introduce the uncommon, Bourdieusian rendering of agents' strategies in the dynamic and open-ended interview situations.

¹⁴⁵ Yaqub and Bamidele go even further: The former calls for nothing short of an institutional and programmatic 'revolution' (Yaqub 2015, interview), while the latter claims: 'So, before we can get a *good* security policy, there is a need to put [...] a square peg in a round hole' (Bamidele 2015, interview; his emphasis).

As for the resources/strategies, we can identify the five topics of, first, formal education, second, social infrastructures, third, context and collaboration, fourth, personal networks and authoritative voices, and fifth, money(-making), in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices: To obtain and occupy an objective position of relevance and to have a subjective, authoritative voice on (in)security for shaping Nigeria's security policy, first, formal education in the form of acquiring academic degrees at well-known (international) universities or academic institutions like the National Defence College (NDC), National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), etc., is considered to play a role (fCDS 2016, interview; Oche 2015, interview; Ukiwo 2015, interview; Chollom 2016, interview).

Second, to (re)present their points of view on security policy, both governmental and non-governmental agents use social infrastructures like workshops, conferences (e.g., 2014 National Conference; Armed Forces Staff Conferences), seminars (Dabugat 2015, interview; Ukiwo 2015, interview; Ijide 2016, interview), and – if permitted to – high-profile meetings (e.g., National Council of State (NCS); National Security Council (NSC); National Defence Council (NDCL); Presidential Dinners) (Ukiwo 2015, interview).¹⁴⁶

Third, some interviewees focus on questions of context and collaboration: Chollom takes the strongest position arguing that all stakeholders are essentially committed, and contribute '*equally important*', to Nigeria's '*collective objective*' of security, for context rules and thus specific stakeholders '*lead [...] naturally*' with apt '*capability*' in different circumstances and strategies always shift (Chollom 2016, interview; my emphasis). States Chollom: 'We are all stakeholders in security' (Chollom 2016, interview). Udeh initially rejects my question about competition among stakeholders and the varying power of their authoritative voices due to 'inter-agency cooperation, collaboration, [and synergy] between and among the different stakeholders' (Udeh 2016, interview; see, however, Section 6.5). These combine '*different capabilities*' and '*complementary roles*' to practically engage security problems as best as possible (Udeh 2016, interview). For example, the different branches of the military (TM) usually '*lead*', speak out, produce '*visibility*', and yet also suffer public blame, in relation to their distinctive operational '*terrains*', which provides them '*naturally*' with an advantage over

¹⁴⁶ The National Defence Council (NDCL) 'shall have power to advise the President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria', and consists of the following members: President (Chairman); Vice-President (Deputy Chairman); Minister of Defence; Chief of Defence Staff; Chief of Army Staff; Chief of Naval Staff; Chief of Air Force; other persons appointed by the President (FG 1999, Third Schedule, Section G).

other stakeholders (Udeh 2016, interview). 'So, we must be a little bit selective in terms of how we measure the success and the parameters we use', Udeh maintains, 'if you buy in my *concept of collaboration*' (Udeh 2016, interview; my emphasis). Ukiwo strongly emphasises that agents, depending on the security challenge, gather in and make use of highly 'different vehicles', 'channels', 'forums', and 'platforms' to ponder ideas and employ their '*practical, local knowledge, you know, experiences* that they've had to influence thinking in the [security] sector' and to contribute to the Federal Government's (FG) '*thinking*' (Ukiwo 2015, interview; my emphasis). He mentions, for example, the work of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) and the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) (where he is a Project Manager), concerning workshops and other measures (Ukiwo 2015, interview). In 2012, NSRP supported NIPSS to organise the Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meetings bringing together various stakeholders from 'academia, military, civil society' to think about crucial topics of national security (Ukiwo 2015, interview). Recognising the need for a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS) (see Section 5.4), the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) held another (NSRP-supported) workshop with various stakeholders on national security, paving the way for the development of a NSS (Ukiwo 2015, interview). He also points to how research can affect the thinking and positioning of the Federal Government (FG), since the (NSRP-supported) Oxford-Nigeria Research Network's studies on (de)radicalization were basically both asked for by the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) and well-received by them (Ukiwo 2015, interview). For Ukiwo, shaping security policy in Nigeria is thus a contextual, practical undertaking: 'I will say, you know, pragmatism really' driven by '*pragmatic* political interests' (Ukiwo 2015, interview; his emphasis). Ijide claims, relatedly, that the National Defence College (NDC) used different conferences to draft the National Security Strategy (NSS), which not only reorganised Nigeria's national security architecture towards more 'synergy' among stakeholders but also demonstrated the National Defence College's (NDC) significant role in shaping the country's security policy.

Yusuf describes the typical practice of how mainly conventional 'desktop' and 'library research' steered the development of Nigeria's National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) by examining other countries strategies and models (e.g., UK, US) to produce a draft, which was primarily circulated in the military (TM) later (Yusuf 2015, interview). In 2013, the National Defence College (NDC) and the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)

also organised a workshop with London-based, public relations and communications company Albany Associates (AAS) on strategic communication and advice for moving towards a 'soft power approach' re Boko Haram (Yusuf 2015, interview).¹⁴⁷

Ikelegbe highlights the role of context as well and how specific 'conflict situations' produce and increase the power and voice of specific security stakeholders, albeit in sometimes counterintuitive ways and without 'scientific *evidence*' (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; his emphasis). For example, Boko Haram's wide-ranging and violent practices seriously damaged the military's (TM) 'image' early on both in the eye of the public and in its self-perception as one of the most competent African armies; but the former also urged the latter to tackle these issues of perception, and increased its visibility and power with achievements in the field over time, that is, its 'voices, both informally and formally with government, [became] stronger' (Ikelegbe 2016, interview). Boko Haram also considerably empowered both the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), as it became Nigeria's counter-terrorism coordinating centre (Ikelegbe 2016, interview),¹⁴⁸ and those northern political leaders perceived to be rather neutral in the public sphere (Ikelegbe 2016, interview).

Acknowledging competition as a feature of social life and thus security stakeholders likely strive '*for* resources', Abraham claims that specific stakeholders tend to have 'more voice' and '*listening-ears*', since they can draw upon their 'constitutional role', capabilities, and achievements in the field (Abraham 2016, interview; my emphasis). The latter is exemplified by the military (TM) retaking most of Nigerian territory from Boko Haram since early 2015, which reestablished the former as a significant voice both in the public sphere and in interactions with the Federal Government (FG) (e.g., budget negotiations) (Abraham 2016, interview). Hence, Abraham states: 'So, your capability, your *capacity*, the ability to *deliver*, gives you a bigger voice than others' (Abraham 2016, interview; his emphasis). Nigeria's anti-terrorism bill was, for example, developed by stakeholders such as 'the military, the State Security Service, the police, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, various departments in [...]

¹⁴⁷ Yusuf criticises, however, two things: First, NACTEST focuses more on a descriptive, 'beautiful language', rather than on necessary implementation schemes. Second, the entire process was politicised: For example, the recommended and then established National Information Centre was staffed with politicians and Permanent Secretaries establishing a 'press briefing centre' only, rather than staffing it with the strategic communication experts of the workshop (Yusuf 2015, interview).

¹⁴⁸ For Ikelegbe, this created, in turn, problems as chains of command between the military (TM) and the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) became blurred both in terms of reporting and purchasing weapons, which opened the possibility for various corrupt practices (Ikelegbe 2016, interview).

ministries', which met, studied, and discussed in '*committees*' both forms of domestic terrorism and international anti-terrorism bills, before the Federal Government (FG) used lawyers to evaluate the bill's constitutionality as a preparation for the National Assembly's (NASS) vote (Abraham 2016, interview; his emphasis).

Fourth, some interviewees focus on questions of personal networks and social groups: The fCDS holds that '*informal* groups' of individuals close enough to encounter policymakers by being former 'school mates', or from being in the same ethnicity or religion, can make 'small, *recognized, accepted recommendations*' to them to affect policymaking potentially (fCDS 2016, interview; my emphasis). He states:

'So, the stakeholders who end up having more influence are those who have *more connection*, who have *more listening-ears*, who can get more listening-ears from those who are policymakers' (fCDS 2016, interview; my emphasis).

Quaker-Dokubo claims that certain individuals' authoritative voices are so powerful that they have 'access' to the Federal Government (FG), which 'always *accept*' these voices (Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview; my emphasis). Bakut underlines how living abroad for about fifteen years damaged his 'right connections' – that is, making it impossible to become a 'big man somewhere' – and how 'friendship[s]' develop in settings such as 'social clubs' and '*really playing* by the rules of that friendship' are crucial: 'You protect me, I protect you' (Bakut 2016, interview; his emphasis). Since governmental positions tend to be provided through these personal, particularistic networks, so Bakut, 'people tend to operate, the agencies operate, *based on...body language* of the president' (Bakut 2016, interview; his emphasis).¹⁴⁹

Others highlight how the frequently authoritative voices of agents such as social groups (e.g., Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF); Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE)) – drawing upon 'policy statements', media engagements, and personal connections – are assessed and considered by the Federal Government (FG) for specific cases of policymaking (Yoroms 2016, interview; Ukiwo 2015, interview). The role played by academics and academic institutions is also

¹⁴⁹ Bakut claims, for example, that both Goodluck E. Jonathan's (GEJ) government through the Ahmadu Bello University and Muhammadu Buhari's (MB) government through the military are overly shaped in this way, which would open the possibility for corrupt practices and misuse of political power (e.g., incrimination of political rivals) (Bakut 2016, interview).

mentioned: Their perspectives, voices, and scientific '*authority*' are disseminated mostly through print media (e.g., newspaper editorials) and specific conferences typically organised by a limited, 'closed', and recurrent set of platforms such as the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA), and Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA) (Ukiwo 2015, interview; his emphasis; Oche 2015, interview; Ijide 2016, interview).

Fifth, some interviewees focus on questions of money(-making): Yoroms and Bamidele emphasise the perceived and material centrality of money(-making) for agents to '*control*' policymaking processes and to be part of the 'circulation of [powerful] elites' (Yoroms 2016, interview; his emphasis; Bamidele 2015, interview). Not only does political success such as winning elections often imply the phenomenon of 'godfathers' financing individuals and their campaigns (Yoroms 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview), but money(-making) also becomes, Bamidele criticises, the defining 'language' of Nigerian political and economic life: 'Money, money, money' – 'Are you *serious*? Are you mad?' (Bamidele 2015, interview; his emphasis). Yoroms puts it this way: 'Sir, you have to have *money*. If you want to *survive* in this society, if you want to be a force to be reckoned [with]' (Yoroms 2016, interview; his emphasis). Getting admission to the 'political space' remains, therefore, complicated for 'new entrants' (Yoroms 2016, interview; fCDS 2016, interview).

As for the voids, we can identify the two topics of funding and knowledge production in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices: Attempts to shape security policy are – very practically – hampered by a lack of funding of both governmental institutions and civil society stakeholders (Ijide 2016, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; see Section 4.4). '*Look at us, we don't have light!*', Bakut decries during the interview and a power outage, and wonders why the Federal Government (FG) did not further fund an otherwise impactful and close-to-the-President Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) (Bakut 2016, interview; my emphasis). Problems re competent knowledge production arise as well: Yusuf claims that strategies and subsequent practices too often remain in the 'speculative realm', since they tend to be based on insufficient engagement and 'secondary resources' only, rather than informed, grounded research (Yusuf 2015, interview). Relatedly, Ukiwo identifies 'tensions' and 'suspicion' among academics and governmental agents to some extent, for the former's 'culture of criticism' focuses on distancing itself from the latter, and the latter perceives the former to lack understanding of real-world practices (Ukiwo 2015, interview).

Ijide conceives of a cognitive 'information overload' of the political elite's 'disposition', because they are unable to process the sheer scope of Nigeria's (in)security issues and possible '*solutions*' (Ijide 2016, interview; his emphasis). Due to personal and interest-based networks, Bakut criticises, key governmental figures only turn to the security intelligence produced by agents they are '*more inclined*' and '*closer to*', that is, refusing '*real facts*' and '*systemic institution building*' (Bakut 2016, interview; his emphasis). For example, IPCR's intelligence reports on the dangers of Boko Haram in the early 2000s were ignored, and its draft National Peace Policy was stopped by the Attorney General as it contested existing structures (Bakut 2016, interview).

6.4 Understanding (In)Security – Perspectives on Boko Haram

This section explores the ways in which the interviewees depict *perspectives on Boko Haram*. Although two interviewees mention each two different, specific sets of (three) conflictive perspectives on Boko Haram (i.e., Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Bakut 2016, interview), and Yoroms maintains that 'it depends on *where you find yourself*' (Yoroms 2016, interview; my emphasis), we can identify the three topics of Boko Haram's root causes, constitution, and practices/tactics, in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices:

As for Boko Haram's root causes, the interviewees refer to religion and socio-economic and educational underdevelopment in the North-East.¹⁵⁰ Religion in the form of '*Islamic fundamentalism*' (Ijide 2016, interview; his emphasis) is the '*centre of gravity*' of the group (fCDS 2016, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview). This includes, under conditions of the introduction of Sharia law in twelve northern states from 1999 to 2002, how early Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf (MY) was able to mobilise large crowds with his preaching against the corrupt Nigerian state, how this was exploited and manipulated by Borno State Governor Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS) to win elections, and how the killing of Yusuf by the police radicalised the group (Ijide 2016, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; Abraham 2016, interview). Pervasive and long-standing socio-economic and educational underdevelopment in the North-East has generated

¹⁵⁰ Only two interviewees briefly refer to the role played by ethnicity (WRA 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview).

widespread frustration and social unrest among – young, marginalized and 'alienated' – local populations (Yaqub 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Dabugat 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview; Abraham 2016, interview).¹⁵¹

As for Boko Haram's constitution, the interviewees conceive of Boko Haram as a highly significant and problematic phenomenon (Bamidele 2015, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Gambari 2016, interview) for Nigeria's 'political calculus' (Yaqub 2015, interview) mostly engaged in essentially *terrorist* (Alli 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; Ijide 2016, interview) and *insurgent* activities (WRA 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Ijide 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview). Yet making informed knowledge-claims about this phenomenon remains difficult and often guesswork (fCDS 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview). 'Who is Boko Haram?', the fCDS thus asks (fCDS 2016, interview), and the interviewees underscore: Its *novelty* and widely *unknown* characteristics and modalities (WRA 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; fCDS 2016, interview).¹⁵² Its *foreignness* (for example, so Rimdap, by speaking a 'kind of Arabic which show[s] that these people are *not* from here') (Rimdap 2016, interview; his emphasis; Williams 2015, interview). Its *factionalisation* over time (Rimdap 2016, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview) as 'insurgents-turned-criminals-turned-[international] terrorists' (WRA 2015, interview).

As for Boko Haram's practices/tactics, the interviewees refer to the group's recruitment, violence, and geography. Drawing upon the '*power of language*' and its specific manipulation against the Nigerian state's practices of corruption and violence (Yaqub 2015, interview; my emphasis), the group continues to be able to recruit new fighters in local populations (Yaqub 2015, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview). Local recruitment is, besides the mentioned root causes, thus assisted by the fear of both the security services' often unbounded violent practices – as 'we only hear *killing, killing, killing*' of both real and assumed fighters (Rimdap 2016, interview; his emphasis; fCDS 2016, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview) – and of the harsh retributions by Boko Haram (Abraham 2016, interview). Boko Haram conducts intense and escalating violent attacks against local populations and all opposing

¹⁵¹ The WRA, however, wants to demystify the notion of an exceptionally marginalised North-East, for local elites would not only produce this conundrum themselves but it is also a common feature of Nigerian life in the Niger Delta and Middle Belt regions (WRA 2015, interview).

¹⁵² In contrast, the fCDS recalls from his own, practical experiences in the 1990s that most rebel leaders in Sierra Leone's civil war were uncovered (fCDS 2016, interview). This, again, speaks to what is mentioned in fn. 116.

their views (Gambari 2016, interview; Abraham 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview). It fights an irregular, fluid war (Ijide 2016, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview) with altered tactics such as the use of (female) suicide bombers (Yusuf 2015, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview) leading to 'impunity upon impunities' (WRA 2015, interview). Since Boko Haram became under Abubakar Shekau (AS) what Rimdap calls the '*killing one*', local populations' perceptions changed, support weakened, countering voices arose, and cooperation with the security services (e.g., providing information) increased over time (Rimdap 2016, interview; my emphasis; Yoroms 2016, interview; Abraham 2016, interview; fCDS 2016, interview). Boko Haram also regionalised (e.g., transborder violence) (Dabugat 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Gambari 2016, interview) and internationalized/transnationalized (e.g., weapons through Libyan and Malian conflicts; connections to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab (ALS)) (Rimdap 2016, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview). Gambari states, pointedly, that Boko Haram '*does not respect [any] geography*' (Gambari 2016, interview; my emphasis) and that understanding the close link between geography and (in)security is crucial: 'We are suffering from the aftermath of the Libyan thing, the proliferation of weapons, money, terrorists...' (Gambari 2016, interview). And so, the group shapes 'a different *field* altogether' – for example, its unwillingness to negotiate as normal agents of conflict – and renders traditional military structures and conflict management approaches ineffective or even useless (Williams 2015, interview; my emphasis). Rather than being 'ragtag people' (Rimdap 2016, interview), it holds considerable 'human power' or 'capital' in the North-East (Ikelegbe 2016, interview).

6.5 Governing (In)Security – Responses to Boko Haram

This section explores the ways in which the interviewees depict *responses to Boko Haram*. We can identify the three topics of problems/scarcities, practices/policies, and necessities, in the interviewees' specific classificatory practices:

As for the problems/scarcities, the interviewees – of which some emphasise their large quantity and scope (Hassan 2015, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview) – refer to, first, state weakness, second, corruption, third, the national security governance

system, and fourth, (national) political elites. First, they highlight Nigeria's general socio-economic and political 'state weakness' (Alli 2015, interview; Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview) and the ways in which its state society relations are overly shaped by religious considerations limiting policy options and actions as well as (self-)silencing critical and non-radical voices (WRA 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview). The WRA assesses: 'Again, you blame the Nigerian state and you blame the leaders from [the North-East] for failing to educate their people', and for preserving epistemological 'darkness' (WRA 2015, interview). Bamidele connects the latter to inappropriate educational settings producing knowledge '*under the tree*' (Bamidele 2015, interview; his emphasis).

Second, they see ubiquitous corruption at work (Gambari 2016, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; Alli 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview) – for example, in the misuse of military resources (Williams 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview) – countering any serious developmental efforts. Yoroms even diagnoses a kind of national psychological defect and tragedy: 'Jan, I can reason! *Something wrong with your brain?* Carry money, just like that?!' (Yoroms 2016, interview; my emphasis).

Third, they characterise Nigeria's national security governance system, given its long colonial and military-rule eras' socio-historical configurations (Williams 2015, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview), as still too much driven by an 'outdated', top-down, 'narrow', 'hard power' and 'traditional' approach to questions of (in)security (Williams 2015, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview). Notwithstanding its existing National Defence Policy (NDP) of 2006 and National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2014 (FG 2006; FG 2014b; Alli 2015, interview; see below),¹⁵³ this system thus still lacks (i) up-to-date, focused and deep

¹⁵³ Developed from 2000 onwards by a Defence Minister General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (TD)-headed committee and adopted in 2006, Nigeria's National Defence Policy (NDP) provides for its 'national security doctrine' (Fawole 2008: 96, en. 3, p. 114; Katsina 2011: 25; Alli 2012: 20). It outlines a broad set of 'objectives' based upon the 'six inter-related principles' of 'prevention, protection, deterrence, rapid force mobilization, projection and cooperation with allies' (Alli 2012: 21; MOD 2012: 106). These objectives include the 'protection of Nigeria's sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory against external threats', and shall encourage 'security consciousness among Nigerians' (Alli 2012: 21). Envisioned are practices such as follows: (i) contribute positively to international peace, security, cooperation, rule of law, democracy and economic relations; (ii) tackle corruption, (transnational) crime and terrorism; (iii) support the government in domestic and foreign affairs (e.g., defence information and advice; disaster management); (iv) secure and stabilise West Africa; v) enhance national socio-economic development and prosperity (Alli 2012: 21; MOD 2012: 106; Durowaiye et al. 2012a: 27; Agwai 2015: 232). The NDP tasks the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to implement internal 'crises management activities' and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to lead re 'external security interests' (Alli 2012: 76). Because of the NDP's institutional background, scholars see it operating with a rather

knowledge, understanding, and theorising of today's multiple security challenges (e.g., local human security needs) (Alli 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview). It realised only very late how foreign and security policy interrelate as 'two sides of a coin' (Williams 2015, interview) and has a 'memory gap' (Ikelegbe 2016, interview): For example, the Nigerian civil war created some awareness of the academic discipline of *Conflict Studies* in the country, yet it did not create a deeper engagement with *Security Studies* (Williams 2015, interview). It strongly lacks (ii) knowledge about and understanding of Boko Haram – its leaders, supporters, underlying causes, etc. – to develop an effective, long-term response to the group (Bamidele 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview). States Ijide: 'I think we failed to properly *diagnose* the onset of this crisis which started during the Obasanjo regime' (Ijide 2016, interview; my emphasis). Yusuf stresses this point for local security needs:

'No matter the *strategy* you have adopted, if you are *unable to feel the pulse of those people whom those policies are supposed to impact directly upon*, you maybe misdirected that policy towards another direction' (Yusuf 2015, interview; my emphasis).

For Rimdap, the system remained unprepared and ignorant to comical degrees: With its '*search lights*' off, it was not prepared, despite multiple episodes of UN and US intelligence services signalling contacts of Nigerians to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda to the Federal Government (FG) after the September 11, 2001, attacks (Rimdap 2016, interview; his emphasis). Its ignorance is exemplified by the episode of the Inspector-General of Police making public '*noise*' against Boko Haram; only to become a victim of the Police Headquarter bombings afterwards (Rimdap 2016, interview; my emphasis). It also lacks (iii) the practical implementation of existing strategies and policies (Alli 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview). States Yusuf:

'So, even though we've been able to formulate the *policies* on how to use both the

conventional understanding of insecurity produced by foreign/external threats in need of deterrence through military power (Alli 2012: 19; Katsina 2011: 25).

hard and soft power approach in combating the insurgency, until we are able to extricate the political intrigues surrounding the fight against Boko Haram, we may not be able to overcome it' (Yusuf 2015, interview; his emphasis).

Neither was it possible to implement ECOWAS' regional peace and security framework, given that Chad and Cameroon are affected by Boko Haram's transborder practices yet are non-members (Gambari 2016, interview), nor were Western partners willing to provide required weapon systems (Abraham 2016, interview). The military (TM), moreover, lacks (iv) fitting training (including special forces), advanced equipment, and social welfare (Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview). This led to strong motivational issues and practices ranging from simple deserting to active subverting for Boko Haram (e.g., intelligence leaks enabling attacks) (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview), which Rimdap links to the question of national identity: '*Nigerian-ness in the person is not even there, because you die for nothing*' (Rimdap 2016, interview; my emphasis). And yet, underscoring his position as a southern academic, the WRA holds: 'I, for one, have never doubted the capacity of the Nigerian military to take charge of the Nigerian space *if they want to*' (WRA 2015, interview; his emphasis).

Fourth, the interviewees characterise Nigeria's (national) political elites to both lack attention, training, and professionalism (Bamidele 2015, interview; fCDS 2016, interview; Udeh 2016, interview), and to mostly consist of a small circle of individuals playing only self-interested, identity-based political power games to the detriment of local populations (fCDS 2016, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview). The response of the Federal Government (FG) under Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) to Boko Haram was not only initially inactive, ineffective, and unorganised (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Gambari 2016, interview; Dabugat 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview), but also rife with silence on and closeness about the group (Hassan 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview). From limited suppression to full classification as a 'threat to national security', the response to the group was belated (Ijide 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview).¹⁵⁴ The WRA, therefore, asserts: 'I can tell you as a matter of fact that

¹⁵⁴ Gambari underscores the enduring importance of the physico-military practice and 'concept of national security' but considers its usefulness questionable given Boko Haram's violent attacks against local populations

the Nigerian state and its leaders had tolerated the *impunity*' (WRA 2015, interview; his emphasis). Yoroms claims that the Federal Government's (FG) own '*sympathy for Boko Haram*' was perceivable in their 'body language' and the reason for their inactions (Yoroms 2016, interview; his emphasis). And Quaker-Dokubo points to the centrality of the oil complex (see Section 1.3), because governments focus more on the Niger Delta's oil riches than on the North-East and Boko Haram: 'So, definitely, he that controls the oil, controls Nigeria' (Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview). This combines with, so Ikelegbe, an influential '*class*' of northern political elites being silent out of fear or even opposing actions against Boko Haram (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; his emphasis; Yoroms 2016, interview), as well as with the public's own varying insensibilities since 'people are ready to turn a blind eye', according to the fCDS (fCDS 2016, interview; Gambari 2016, interview). Friendly, 'pity, poor' Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) (Bakut 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview) further compounded the critical situation, for his various personal incapacities (Yaqub 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview; Ukiwo 2015, interview; see Section 5.3), his corruption, passivity, and 'party politics'-orientation (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview), his fixation on the 'military angle' (Yaqub 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview), and his inability to understand northern politics: 'An *outsider* will only be a *victim*' (Bakut 2016, interview; his emphasis; Yaqub 2015, interview).¹⁵⁵ For Hassan, the Federal Government's (FG) response also lacked practical impact, since it mostly focused on 'talk, talk, talk, talk, have conferences', and the Office of the National Security Advisor's (ONSA) instituted 'pseudo-participatory model' consulted knowledgeable civil society organisations only on theoretical aspects of security policy, rather than on key practical aspects such as military and counter-insurgency strategies and actions (Hassan 2015, interview).

As for the practices/policies, the interviewees refer to national texts, local-to-international factors, and the Muhammadu Buhari (MB) Presidency. Responding to security challenges like Boko Haram is a key responsibility of the Federal Government (FG) (Ijide 2016, interview;

and, hence, the importance of questions of human security (Gambari 2016, interview).

¹⁵⁵ The WRA criticises Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) for initially ignoring the kidnapping of the Chibok Girls (CG) due to the foolish power game that a destabilised, All Progressives Congress (APC)-ruled North-East would either offer more chances of national electoral success for his People's Democratic Party (PDP) or even stop the election there through a state of emergency (WRA 2015, interview). However, he also perceives a predicament for Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ): Northern military personnel refrain from killing fellow northerners and those from the South are cognizant of Nigeria's difficult history of alienation from the state and frequent coup d'états (WRA 2015, interview).

Gambari 2016, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview) and predominantly guided by national texts like the 2006 National Defence Policy (under review; e.g., May 2015 Committee on Review of Defence Policy's report to Ministry of Defence (MOD)) and the 2014 National Security Strategy (under review; see Section 5.4) (Ijide 2016, interview; Chollom 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview).¹⁵⁶ The reviews demonstrate that these texts are not 'sacrosanct' as they are subject to revision and modification (Chollom 2016, interview).

A combination of local-to-international factors shaped Nigeria's gradually more contested and fundamental discourse on (in)security and its response to Boko Haram over time: The Federal Government (FG) under Goodluck E. Jonathan (GEJ) had to alter its political stance on and military actions towards Boko Haram, because the group's violent attacks against local populations became a serious risk for winning the 2015 General Elections (Williams 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview), and because sustained public critique moved the discourse both towards 'human security' and development in the North-East (Yusuf 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview) and towards more and open consultations and cooperations among security agencies and civil society organisations (Yusuf 2015, interview; Hassan 2015, interview). The discourse turned towards 'winning the hearts and minds' of people (Hassan 2015, interview) and a firmer, united '*consensus*' emerged (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; my emphasis). States Ikelegbe:

'Well, I will say that it is the [atrocious] activities of Boko Haram that actually drove the nation [and its various stakeholders including most northern elites] into building that consensus' (Ikelegbe 2016, interview).

The Federal Government (FG) established a new army division, monitoring and early-warning security mechanisms, and the citizen-induced Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North-East (PCDSCN) headed by Alhaji Kabiru Tanimu Turaki (AKTT), Minister of Special Duties (Ijide 2016, interview). It also had relative success with secretively employing South African mercenaries as a 'game changer' against Boko Haram (Williams 2015, interview; see Section 5.4), whereas its attempt to

¹⁵⁶ States Rimdap: 'So, it is *not we*, the commoners, the common people, but it is the Nigerian state that should take up the responsibility to *solve* this problem, because they are elected for that purpose to protect our lives and property' (Rimdap 2016, interview; his emphasis).

acquire weapons from mercenaries in South Africa was a failure of, so Alli, 'banana republic' proportions (Alli 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Ijide 2016, interview). The latter followed the US rejection to sell weapons to Nigeria (Ikelegbe 2016, interview), because of human rights discussions in the wake of the Nigerian military's (TM) violent practices against local populations while fighting Boko Haram (see Section 5.3), which culminated into the prominent critique of Amnesty International (AI) (Dabugat 2015, interview). In June 2015, different civil society organisations raised their 'voice' publicly to support the military (TM) (Dabugat 2015, interview) – which is echoed by Abraham criticising Western civil society organisations' likely bias towards negative representations of human rights issues in Nigeria to secure international funding by saying that 'this is *how Nigeria is*' (Abraham 2016, interview; my emphasis). 'As if we don't have training, as if we are very inhuman', and without acting lawful, he describes Nigerian feelings, and continues: 'So, for a Nigerian army soldier to be seen in uniform, slaughtering somebody like [...] a goat [...] is *inconceivable*' and '*impossible*' (Abraham 2016, interview; his emphasis). Even though Boko Haram was perceived as a risk to West Africa and thus discussed within ECOWAS, it was for long mostly classified in terms of 'a Nigerian [territorial] problem' (Dabugat 2015, interview). Yet the severe Nigerian and transborder (in)security realities on the ground and the Federal Government's (FG) regional initiatives were eventually able to convince both regional and international actors to implement a more capable Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Ijide 2016, interview; Dabugat 2015, interview).

The situation with the new Federal Government (FG) under President Muhammadu Buhari (MB) is seen, then, rather ambivalent by the interviewees. Some stress a changed situation now, for Boko Haram is '*technically defeated*' (Chollom 2016, interview; his emphasis; Udeh 2016, interview; Abraham 2016, interview) as they can only attack 'soft targets' without securing vast stretches of Nigerian territory anymore (Chollom 2016, interview; Abraham 2016, interview). As a stern, 'puritan', respect-inducing (WRA 2015, interview), and 'catalyst' leader who 'really galvanised [...] the *whole* nation' (Abraham 2016, interview; his emphasis), Muhammadu Buhari (MB) employed several measures to respond to Boko Haram differently: First, he consulted and cooperated with West African neighbours such as Chad and Niger as inspired by them (Abraham 2016, interview) and implemented a steadier approach of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by insisting on Nigeria's sole leadership (Dabugat 2015, interview). Second, he provided proper training and equipment to the military (Abraham 2016,

interview) and installed new military Chiefs of Staff (Abraham 2016, interview; WRA 2015, interview), since 'local parlance' has it, so Abraham, that 'when the head is rotting, of course, the whole body is dead' (Abraham 2016, interview). Third, he engaged different, key stakeholders ranging from the Bring Back Our Girls Campaign (BBOGC) (Ukiwo 2015, interview) to Nigeria's security services more collaboratively (Udeh 2016, interview). Fourth, all key stakeholders understand their shared responsibilities re Boko Haram and its insurgent 'nature' now, that is, 'a completely *different ball game*' is produced (WRA 2015, interview; my emphasis).

Others stress that former general and newly-elected President Muhammadu Buhari (MB) did not yet turn into the insecurity-solving 'messiah' of early popular belief (Alli 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Bakut 2016, interview). Rather, Yoroms claims, he had to take a stronger stance on Boko Haram to counter his domestically perceived bias towards, and factual embroilment in, northern politics (Yoroms 2016, interview). The entire situation also remains, contrasting notions of Boko Haram's defeat, highly volatile and uncertain due to ongoing changes in both the group's capabilities and the levels of commitment of key stakeholders ranging from local leaders to the Federal Government (FG) (Rimdap 2016, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview).¹⁵⁷

As for the necessities, the interviewees refer to, first, stakeholders' engagement, second, socio-economic development in the North-East, third, the national security governance system, fourth, (national) political elites, and fifth, regional and international cooperation. They highlight, first, the need for governmental agents to engage, consult with, and value the perspectives of, a variety of local stakeholders in an open, collaborative, and synergetic way (Ijide 2016, interview; Hassan 2015, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview; Bakut 2016, interview). Second, the need for socio-economic development in the North-East (e.g., addressing youth unemployment) (Ijide 2016, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview; Rimdap 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview; Ikelegbe 2016, interview; see Section 5.5), including an apt education system tackling radicalisation tendencies (Ikelegbe 2016, interview; Bamidele 2015, interview; WRA 2015, interview). Third, and albeit Chollom already identifies a strategic and 'progressive' conceptual turn starting from Umaru

¹⁵⁷ It shall be mentioned that two of these *other* interviewees are still hopeful that a northern, capable Muhammadu Buhari (MB) can bring positive and transformational change to Nigeria's democracy and responses to security challenges (Yoroms 2016, interview; Alli 2015, interview).

Yar'Adua's (UY) Niger Delta amnesty and evolving up to Muhammadu Buhari's (MB) Presidential Committee on North-East Initiative (PCNI) (Chollom 2016, interview), the need for the national security governance system to change towards: (i) a (self-)critical and deep analysis of emergent, key national security threats such as Boko Haram (Yaqub 2015, interview; Yusuf 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview) to understand their multiple constitutive root causes, dimensions, and contexts (Yusuf 2015, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview);¹⁵⁸ (ii) an open and broad, synergetic and cooperative, human security-centred and 'down-up' (i.e., to '*feel the impulse of those at the base*'), multi-stakeholders' approach for conceptualising (in)security and shaping security policy (Yusuf 2015, interview; my emphasis; Yaqub 2015, interview; Gambari 2016, interview); (iii) a restructured, modernised, professionalised, and specialised military (Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview; Alli 2015, interview; Williams 2015, interview);¹⁵⁹ (iv) the establishment of ideally only one guiding policy document (e.g., National Defence Policy) addressing all questions and being implemented practically (Udeh 2016, interview; Chollom 2016, interview).¹⁶⁰ Fourth, the need for the (national) political elites to tackle corruption (Rimdap 2016, interview; Yoroms 2016, interview), 'strengthen the machinery of democracy' (Rimdap 2016, interview; Alli 2015, interview), and receive apt training to increase Nigerian-ness: 'We need specific training for our political class to have national consciousness, national interest' (Yoroms 2016, interview; Yaqub 2015, interview). Fifth, the need for more regional and international cooperation (Alli 2015, interview; Chollom 2016, interview; Gambari 2016, interview; Williams 2015, interview) – not least, since our 'own security cannot be guaranteed in isolation from the security [and geography] of other countries' (Gambari 2016, interview).

6.6 Conclusion

Based on in-depth and wide-ranging interviews with leading Nigerian experts and practitioners, this empirical Chapter 6 explored their depictions of a FNSP's habitus and

¹⁵⁸ Relatedly, the fCDS wants to deal with Boko Haram 'just like fish: You either remove the fish out of the water or the water from the fish' (fCDS 2016, interview).

¹⁵⁹ For Quaker-Dokubo, such a military would be 'slim, fit, mobile, right straight to action' (Quaker-Dokubo 2015, interview) – that is, continue to be what Alli calls a comparatively 'key national asset' (Alli 2015, interview).

¹⁶⁰ Udeh wishes this document to also address 'inter-service rivalry – *competitions if you like*' (Udeh 2016, interview; my emphasis), which seems to alter his claims above (and against my framing) (see Section 6.3). In fact, the very collaboration among Nigeria's security stakeholders and its exclusiveness became a point of delight among us during the interview.

capital, and of how to understand and respond to Boko Haram. The chapter, I argue, offers deeply informed and personal insights re a FNSP and the Nigerian political space by mapping, giving voice to, and analysing *Nigerian perspectives on (in)security*.

Yet a self-reflexive, methodological note on the interviews first: To remain open-minded and avoid replicating common, essentialist classifications of the Nigerian political space as much as possible, I asked a set of predefined – however, what I perceived as very open or perhaps even naïve – questions. This entailed the risk of receiving similar answers but helped to create increasingly engaged interview *games*. The interviewees emphasised their wish for me 'coming from Europe' to understand and study the highly challenging Nigerian experience and condition (Alli 2015, interview). 'I don't know, *if you understand me*', Abraham wonders (Abraham 2016, interview; my emphasis), and Bamidele asks during a short power outage in the interview situation: 'See what I mean?' (Bamidele 2015, interview). On the one hand, this Nigerian context is one of complexity, specifically, regarding questions of (in)security and of how security policy is shaped. On the other hand, I was friendly ridiculed for asking 'complex' and '*objective* question[s]' (Udeh 2016, interview; Alli 2015, interview; my emphasis; WRA 2015, interview). States Bamidele: 'In fact, the more you ask questions, the more you add, the more you get confused' (Bamidele 2015, interview). Alli also maintains: 'Ha! So, Klaassen, *you can see for yourself*' – 'just making appropriate deductions from what you see in the way institutions are managed, decisions are made' (Alli 2015, interview; my emphasis).

And so, the interviews reveal a series of interrelated topics: On habitus, the interviewees depict its characteristics as shaped by a social history of military rule and a yet incomplete democratic transformation. The advent of democratic rule since 1999, however, has increasingly opened the Nigerian political space towards the inclusion of civil society stakeholders (i.e., cooperation), according to interviewees mostly from governmental institutions (e.g., NIIA, MFA, NDC). But how precisely agents constitute a FNSP remains, notwithstanding outlier positions like Chollom's *equality* universalism, considered elusive to some extent, given the difficulty of locating and mapping the most relevant stakeholders and their practices (see Sections 5.6, 6.2, and 7.1). The key problems/scarcities of corruption and money(-making) (i.e., competition and domination) substantially weaken a Nigerian state and further damage a national security governance system lacking openness, intelligence work, and professionalism of, and synergy and cooperation among, its key stakeholders. The knowledges of habitus are shaped by the ways in which individual agents acquire *practical*

knowledge over time in security-related institutions through personal experiences, education, and training. They learn practical, *naturalised* abilities by inculcating specific ethics and ways of acting, leading to professional, democracy-oriented, and informed *mindsets*, especially in the military. Problematic is that multiple agents tend to obtain relevant political positions through non-merit-based interpersonal networks and relationships (i.e., domination), that is, they lack appropriate training, knowledge, and practical skills. In other words, tackling (in)security often becomes a *realm of speculation*. Relatedly, the aspirations of habitus are shaped by the need for appointing ethical and knowledgeable individuals to relevant positions and for providing capacity building to make them experts of Nigeria's complex socio-political problems and practices of insecurity. There is also the need for a comprehensive network of democratic security stakeholders, that is, a national security governance system valuing expert knowledge from different, Nigerian *platforms* and *social infrastructures* to enable highly innovative and self-reliant knowledge production and exchange.

On capital, the interviewees depict its resources/strategies as shaped both by formal – at best prestigious – academic education in security-related institutions and by how agents – notably (!) – make use of context-dependent *social infrastructures* such as workshops and conferences for their classificatory practices (i.e., cooperation and competition). The insignificant role of the National Assembly (NASS), for instance, is striking here. While it was impossible to directly and clearly link individuals and their social trajectories, institutional backgrounds, capitals, etc., to their specific classificatory practices, we can additionally delineate three, broad and nonexclusive foci with their principal relations: Cooperative and competitive engagement emerges re the focus on context and collaboration, as the relevance, power (of their voice), and potentially *naturalised* leadership role of specific stakeholders are produced by their practical – and perceived – capability in relation to specific insecurity contexts and their shifting urgencies. Countering terrorism and insurgency by practices of conceptualisation, coordination or (perceived) operational achievements, for example, means more voice and *listening-ears* with the Federal Government for key agents such as NDC, ONSA, and TM. What we might call *informal* cooperation and competition emerges re the focus on personal networks and authoritative voices, for specific stakeholders of both individuals and groups are relevant, heard and can thus influence national policymaking by close, personal connections to policymakers and by being strong, authoritative voices (e.g., social-identity groups, academics) in the discursive struggles of the Nigerian public sphere.

Competition and domination reign over the focus on money(-making), for specific stakeholders are highly relevant and powerful (e.g., godfathers) by employing their financial capacities to (corruptly) steer and control policymaking and to enter the political space in the first place. The voids of capital are found where security policy is hampered by a lack of funding for agents and by an epistemic environment of knowledge production partly grounded in *speculation, distrust, and ignorance*.

On perspectives on Boko Haram, the interviewees depict root causes shaped by the *religious centre of gravity* of Islamic fundamentalism, the politicisation of the early group's practices, and omnipresent socio-economic and educational underdevelopment alienating local populations. Like in the last chapter, Boko Haram constitutes with its *terrorist/insurgent* activities (i.e., competition and domination) a substantial crisis for the Nigerian state(hood): The group, as a space of (in)security (see Section 1.4), creates epistemic insecurity (i.e., competition and domination) by being *novel, unknown, foreign, factionalised, and suicidal*. Drawing upon regionalised and internationalized/transnationalized practices and tactics, it both violently attacks local populations and recruits from them by discursively rendering the Nigerian state as overly corrupt and violent. Competition, domination, and transversality over epistemologies and points of view reign over these discursive struggles – and at the same time, the Nigerian state's own agents compete over (self-made) scarce socio-economic resources.

On responses to Boko Haram, the interviewees depict – and stress once again – problems/scarcities shaped by a generally weak Nigerian state whose state society relations are entrenched with ubiquitous corruption (i.e., competition and domination) and religious considerations limiting the political space's room for manoeuvre. The national security governance system persists in approaching (in)security primarily in a conventional, military, and top-down fashion. It lacks a deep and lasting epistemological and scientific-disciplinary grasp of security challenges, which would allow for *feeling the pulse* of local populations and turning the system's *search lights* on – that is, dealing with the issue of perceptibility of insecurity (see also Section 5.6). It also lacks practical implementation of its own related strategies and policies and of a modernisation of its military. The (national) political elites, moreover, consist mostly of a limited set of self-interested and unprofessional individuals playing competitive politics only. As competition reigns over which and why specific agents might tolerate or even directly support Boko Haram's impunities, the Federal Government led

by an incapable President Goodluck E. Jonathan and northern politicians produce policy failures of common *silence*, talkative *indifference*, and militarised security practices. Nigeria's Federal Government is, on paper, responsible for tackling security challenges and its concrete practices/policies guided by amendable national texts like the National Security Strategy and National Defence Policy.

In practice, various local-to-international factors have shaped an initially more competitive national discourse on (in)security and on the challenge of Boko Haram due to the group's mounting importance and violence. Because of this, cooperation emerges: Security agencies and civil society organisations collaborate more on the local level, the Federal Government strengthens its security and military capabilities (including using South African mercenaries) on the national level, and the MNJTF is bolstered on the regional-to-international level. Yet this development does not seem to amount to a national, human-security-oriented consensus: For the role of the military is discursively strongly contested because of their violent practices against local populations, even though some might find this *impossible* and doing the *inconceivable* (see also Section 5.6). For the role of the Muhammadu Buhari (MB) Presidency is ambivalent in the sense that some conceive of Buhari as the very capable leader who has produced a *different ball game* by *technically defeating* Boko Haram through practical security measures and uniting all key stakeholders, while others neither conceive of him as the anticipated *messiah* nor of a resolved security challenge given the volatility of the Nigerian context. Responding to Boko Haram, further necessitates that the Nigerian government truly collaborates with and learns from local stakeholders, socio-economic and educational development in the North(-Eastern) region, and strengthened extra-territorial cooperation. A revamped national security governance system can not only study and understand complex national security threats but approaches them both with a united and – again in very short – *people-oriented* security policy and a capable military. The Nigerian political elites, moreover, become less corrupt, more democratic, and more nationally oriented. Here again, like in the last chapter, cooperative engagement emerges, because of the aspirational character of the interviewees' classifications.

The next and final Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by summing up its key *practice*-theoretical and empirical findings, and by bringing together its research question, African (here: Nigerian) perspectives on (in)security, how a global(ised) Bourdieu illuminates these inquiries, and what could be done in this manner in the future.

7. Conclusion

'As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa' (Adebanwi/Obadare 2010: 380).

7.1 Nigeria's Approach to (In)Security and the (Im)Possibilities of Bourdieusian Sociology

Questions and developments related to African security and insecurity are fundamentally relevant for both African societies and the geopolitical and geoeconomic imagination and praxis. A deep ocean of important – and often *external-theoreticist* – scholarly and policy-oriented work focuses on the various security challenges these societies are facing. Yet sound engagements with genuine *African perspectives on* (in)security are scarce and, as argued, it remains unclear how African states shape their security policy to deal with *their very own* security challenges. The specific reasons are: First, conventional distinctions of what is internal/external, domestic/foreign, secure/insecure or political/sociological are outdated, since they are traversed by multiple, complex, and interrelated socio-political practices and relations in the plurality of today's social world. Second, neither can the conventional Western/Northern-centric social sciences make sense of the African condition and context, nor can the helpful-in-this-regard African Studies and African International Relations literatures escape their own pre-established essentialisms, pessimistic stereotypes, and mono-causal explanations.

Motivated by this conundrum and how it calls for novel analyses centring on African agencies, practices, and voices, this thesis made core arguments two and three: For the development of new analytical devices to study how African states' security policies are shaped in less essentialist and more context-sensitive ways. And, against the backdrop of an often superficial and *opportunistic-theoreticist* Bourdieusian International Studies (BIS) literature, for understanding the practice turn in the social sciences and for appropriating Pierre Bourdieu's sociology by an in-depth sociospatial reading of his work – helping us to interpret and employ his thinking tools as truly global, interrelated, and practical. This involved making the case for and tracing how the tools of field and habitus intersect, carving out this thesis' key object of analysis and thinking tool of a Field of Nigerian Security Policy (FNSP), and thinking the tools of habitus and capital primarily as an outcome of the empirical analysis.

7. CONCLUSION

Drawing upon this analytical device and based on an exploratory, decidedly empirical case study of Nigeria, this thesis asked the research question of how Nigeria shapes its security policy towards the space of (in)security of Boko Haram. And so, I further conclude, first, by recapitulating what was written, dialogued, and analysed re Boko Haram proper, and second, by returning to the possible questions and relations introduced in Sections 3.6 and 4.3 to 4.4, which I can address to a degree.

On Boko Haram: Within an environment shaped by Nigeria's northern/southern socio-political rift, Boko Haram is conceived of as a terrorist/insurgent sect with a centre of gravity of Islamic fundamentalism and statehood-like ambitions. Boko Haram's geography-traversing, novel (and *alien*) practices/tactics of existential (and *suicidal*) violence against local populations and the Nigerian state (including social and knowledge infrastructures), and the simultaneous recruitment from local populations, constitute not only a key national security threat and crisis for the Nigerian state(hood), but also a space of (in)security creating both epistemic and physical security and insecurity – which is also true for the Nigerian state to some extent. Boko Haram is possible because of the environment of problems/scarcities shaping the Nigerian state and political space: Nigeria's statehood is weak, since its political elites engage mostly in self-interested, unprofessional practices of competition, corruption, indifference (e.g., for conflict resolution), and impunity – in combination with the personal incapacities of key figures such as President Goodluck E. Jonathan. The national security governance system persists in operating with a widely conventional, top-down, and military power-first understanding and praxis of (in)security. It is often devoid of apt knowledge, training, resources, professionalism, implementations of strategies and policies, and modernisations of the military. It is often hampered by inter-agency rivalries, militarised and highly violent security practices (also against local populations), and the inability to epistemologically perceive and understand (new) security challenges and local populations' sensibilities (e.g., how socio-economic and educational underdevelopment drives radicalisation). The Nigerian state responded to Boko Haram by practices/policies of soft carrots (e.g., dialogue attempts; more collaboration among security stakeholders), hard sticks (e.g., military power), and strategic legislation (e.g., Terrorism Prevention Act; National Security and Counter-Terrorism Strategies moving conceptually towards a whole-of-nation/society approach). Yet its overall response remained (and remains) unproductive, given the ebbs and flows of Boko Haram's (and its splinters') prevalent ability to produce


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everyday insecurity and the limited powers of individual politicians, irrespective of whether they are perceived as messianic figures in the Nigerian public. A productive response to Boko Haram becomes possible if, and only if, the environment of aspirations/necessities is addressed: The governance practices of the Nigerian state's political elites must live up to truly democratic, nationally-oriented, and non-corrupt principles. The national security governance system must be transformed towards being able to fully grasp (new) security challenges and its security policy made people-oriented. It must ensure the resource basis for and implement apt knowledge production and exchange, training, and the modernisation of the security agencies and the military – including putting an end to the conduct of violent security practices alienating local populations. It must ensure inter-agency collaboration and synergy, collaboration with and learning from local stakeholders, and extra-territorial cooperation. It must ensure dialogue with and amnesty and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) for moderate Boko Haram members, as well as socio-economic and educational development in the North(-Eastern) region.

On the existence, agential constitution, and limits of a FNSP: The avid reader will have recognised that I kept the wording of *a* FNSP, rather than *the* FNSP, throughout this thesis. I not only wanted to keep this analytical device exploratory and transitional for as long as possible by using it as a tool *for thinking*, but mapping a FNSP with a sociological discourse analysis also revealed that it does not constitute a *definitive* field with a single, common meta-identity (see below, Table 8). For it is *too diverse and early in its social history*, operates with a *dual habitus*, and multiple – even *negative* – kinds of capital (see below). And yet, as a network of objective relations between positions, a FNSP is a space of specificity with an ever-shifting nomos that produces specific goods in the form of security practices/policies in Nigeria eventually (see below on habitus' classificatory practices). A space that can and should be studied in its entirety as constituted by its agents, relations, and practices, to arrive at fleeting explanations and truths. Consequently, I merge and visually represent the mapping of the relevant agents of a FNSP in the textual sources (Chapter 5) and the interviews (Chapter 6) with *Visual Representation 3* (VR 3):

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Visual Representation 3



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VR 3 offers a first, empirically rich, and grounded mapping of a FNSP and its constitutive agents with a total of 327 citations. The larger the nodes and the closer to the centre they are, the higher the citation count is. We have learned that the identification and placement of relevant field-constituting agents can be elusive to some extent (see again Section 6.2). Yet we can make several observations: First, the Federal Government (FG: 50) per se, the Presidents in question (GEJ: 29; MB: 16), the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA/NSA/SD/AOA: 31), and the military (TM/NA: 21; MNJTF: 5) play highly significant roles, unsurprisingly (see below on the notion of dominant/dominated agents). Second, while the role of the National Assembly (NASS: 5) is less significant than one might expect, other institutions such as the National Defence College (NDC: 5) and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR: 7) play significant roles, despite my introduction of a related bias with the reached interviewees. Third, the social history of a FNSP partly intersects with Boko Haram's own roots under Mohammed Yusuf (MY: 6), with how Nigerian politicians like Ali Modu Sheriff (AMS: 5) contributed to the group's rise, and with how its leaders like Abubakar Shekau (AS: 4) steered it towards violent escalation and expansion. Fourth, authoritative voices of academics (ACA: 5) and of eminent persons like Muhammad Abubakar Sa'ad (MAS: 5), Ishola Williams (IW: 5), and Olusegun Obasanjo (OO: 4), play moderate roles. Fifth, the same is true for platforms like the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North-East (PCDSCN: 4), Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF: 3), Borno Elders Forum (BEF: 2), and Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA: 2). Since diverse agents thus constitute a FNSP, where are its constantly contested limits? Agents are members of a field and within its limits both by shaping and determining it themselves and – vice versa – by being shaped and determined through its effects. From my perspective, VR 3 provides a suitable approximation to a FNSP's limits, under conditions of my limited capacity to access agents and assess their habitus and capital(s). This is, consequently, also a limitation of this thesis.

On the constitutive relations of a FNSP: Drawing upon the possible relations introduced in Chapter 4, Table 3, we can trace and map the following relations and the areas of agential classificatory practices they arise from as represented in *Table 7*:

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Table 7

<i>Areas of classificatory practices</i>	<i>Relations of cooperation (COP)</i>	<i>Relations of competition (COM)</i>	<i>Relations of dominance (DOM)</i>	<i>Relations of transversality (TRA)</i>	<i>Relations of ??? / informal cooperation (infCOP)</i>
Nigeria's northern/southern socio-political rift	X - re conceptualisation	X (strong) - especially how this rift connects to Boko Haram (e.g., interdependent accusations)	X - especially how this rift connects to Boko Haram (e.g., interdependent accusations)	X - especially how this rift connects to Boko Haram (e.g., interdependent accusations)	
Boko Haram's constitution/causes	X - re conceptualisation	X (strong)	X	X	
Boko Haram's practices/tactics	X - re conceptualisation	X (very strong) - especially Boko Haram's violent clashes with the Nigerian state over territorial, biopolitical, socio-political and epistemic sovereignty	X - especially Boko Haram's violent clashes with the Nigerian state over territorial, biopolitical, socio-political and epistemic sovereignty	X - especially Boko Haram's violent clashes with the Nigerian state over territorial, biopolitical, socio-political and epistemic sovereignty	X - especially Boko Haram's violent clashes with the Nigerian state over territorial, biopolitical, socio-political and epistemic sovereignty
Responding to Boko Haram – problems/scarcities	X - re conceptualisation	X - state's resource and knowledge gaps & inter-agency rivalries - unprofessional political elites contesting within a weak statehood	X - state's resource and knowledge gaps & inter-agency rivalries - unprofessional political elites contesting within a weak statehood	X (strong) - state's resource and knowledge gaps & inter-agency rivalries - unprofessional political elites contesting within a weak statehood	
Corruption at large		X (very strong)	X	X	X (very strong)
Responding to Boko Haram – practices/policies	X - especially discursive shift towards more collaboration among security stakeholders	X (very strong) Soft carrots of dialogue, amnesty and socio-economic development versus hard sticks of	X Soft carrots of dialogue, amnesty and socio-economic development versus hard sticks of		X - Soft carrots of dialogue, amnesty and socio-economic development

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		military power, violence and securitisation (also against local populations)	military power, violence and securitisation (also against local populations)		
Responding to Boko Haram – aspirations/necessities	X (strong)			X (strong)	
Agents' possessed volume of different kinds of capital - kinds 1 to 7 (see below)	X - kinds 1, 2, 3	X - kinds 1 to 7	X - kinds 2 to 7	X - kinds 4, 6, 7	X - kinds 4, 6

All possible relations of a BIS-analytical framework – cooperation, competition, dominance, transversality – are active in a FNSP and accompanied by what I call relations of informal cooperation. Relations of competition tend to turn into relations of dominance when agents start to dominate specific areas of classificatory practices. While the focus of the object of analysis of a FNSP and its placed agents lies with how Nigeria's security policy is shaped towards Boko Haram, the latter's properties as a space of (in)security intersect with the former, as seen above.

On the nomos of a FNSP: As introduced in Chapter 3, considering a FNSP's nomos means considering how its specific relations, logics, vocabularies, and principles of vision and division socially structure agents' field-specific, everyday conditions of possibility and what is (un)imaginable. Again, rather than understanding these socially structuring historical specificities as a definitive and single *fundamental law*, as nomos is also called, they are found where and active when: (Informal) cooperation, competition, dominance, and transversality play out and intersect; the socio-political rift between northern and southern political agents emerges; specific practices and policies of soft carrots and hard sticks are imagined and lived; current problems and scarcities hinder what future aspirations and necessities must address.

On the existence and form of the habitus of a FNSP: In Chapter 4, I introduced how habitus – understood as dispositional schemes of perception, thought, and action – works and can be analysed on different *levels* from the individual to the field. Given the nature and (im)possibilities of my empirical *fieldwork* and the relevance of the field/habitus-intersection (see Chapter 4 and Section 6.6), I locate and delineate habitus here on the level of a FNSP as such. Corresponding to the temporal and socio-political contexts analysed, I delineate a *dual*

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habitus re a FNSP: A *habitus of problems/scarcities* consisting of dispositional schemes of perception, thought, and action shaped by non-practical knowledge (i.e., non-feel for the game), speculation and indifference, and rivalry and corrupt money(-making). And: A *habitus of aspirations/necessities* consisting of dispositional schemes of perception, thought, and action shaped by practical knowledge (i.e., feel for the game), understanding and people-orientation, and collaboration and ethical, democratic leadership(-making). Produced by the field/habitus-intersection, this dual *habitus* of acquired characteristics, incorporated experiences, and a (non-)feel for the game of a FNSP (and the wider Nigerian social space), invents and generates agents' individual and collective classificatory practices (see above on field's goods). I wonder whether a form of *intermediary* *habitus* is missing or possible, but the analysed social universe of a FNSP suggests otherwise. Specifically, artifacts like the National Security and Counter-Terrorism Strategies tend to be aspirational in character only, for they are translated into political praxis insufficiently. Alli also encapsulates the dual *habitus* by asking Nigerians: 'Is Nigeria doing well?' (Alli 2015, interview) – which he answers in the negative – and thus urges Nigerians to turn towards 'what we think *ought to be*' (Alli 2015, interview; my emphasis).

On the existence and form of practical knowledge of a FNSP: We find that practical knowledge is mostly considered in relation to what can be called its *positive* and *securito-productive* mastery and native, sensible feel for the game. As outlined conceptually in Section 3.5 and found precisely here, Nigerian agents practically acquire this bodily knowledge via their personal, everyday *experience, education, and training* in Nigeria's security-related institutions, including the development of professional-democratic mindsets. Again, looking above and below, I wonder whether a form of *negative* and *security-unproductive* practical knowledge could be at work and explored scientifically as well. This also speaks to the above question of the limits of a FNSP, since we see now that simply declaring agents lacking an apt feel for the game as field-external would fall short of the mark.

On the existence and form of a capital of a FNSP: Rather than identifying only one specific kind of capital re a FNSP, we can identify what I call six (6) *positive* and one (1) *negative* field-specific and always contested and changing resources, stakes, and powers at work in the game played (see Sections 6.3 and 6.6): First, a capital of academic education (which resembles the notion of social capital). Second, a capital of social infrastructures (which resembles the notions of social and symbolic capital). Third, a capital of context-dependent

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capabilities (which resembles the notion of symbolic capital). Fourth, a capital of personal connections (which resembles the notion of social capital). Fifth, a capital of public, authoritative voices (which resembles the notion of symbolic capital). Sixth, a capital of financial capacities (which resembles the notion of economic capital). Seventh, a capital of voids, which is different from the others and warrants more explanation: On the one hand, I understand this capital as a kind of *negative* capital in the sense that it explicates what constrains agents in the field (see Section 3.5), that is, what is problematic, scarce, and lacking (e.g., individuals' and social groups' capacities; financial means and infrastructural resources; professionalism, knowledge, and training; implementation of policies and strategies) in a FNSP. On the other hand, I understand this capital also as a kind of *power-to* in the sense that it explicates what enables agents in the field to precisely navigate these constraints and be capable to act successfully in such a space. Enquiring about a FNSP's capital is thus difficult, for it often turns into an explication of what is problematic, scarce, and lacking. This is, however, another reason for why I employed this thinking tool as an outcome of the empirical analysis for such a space.

On the existence and form of a specific interest/illusio of a FNSP: All agents employing one or several of the above recognised capitals of a FNSP are to varying degrees *invested* in it, part of it, engage in its game's struggles and illusions, and pursue strategies to practically advance their position and capital(s). Produced by the field/habitus-intersection, the specific interest of a FNSP and its placed agents lies with, in the last analysis, accessing and influencing the local decision-making spaces of the Federal Government to shape Nigeria's security policy towards Boko Haram. We see that agents pursue strategies from (informal) cooperation to competition and domination, depending on the different positions they occupy and the kinds of capital they possess – creating a FNSP going beyond idealised conceptualisations of a space of entirely *equal collaboration* (e.g., Chollom 2016, interview; Udeh 2016, interview).

On the existence and form of a doxa of a FNSP: As introduced in Chapter 4, considering a FNSP's doxa means considering how agents share its fundamental beliefs, when they take for granted and self-evident its nomos, and when dominant players produce with their classificatory practices its (tacit) *common sense*, typically, through a specific *official* discourse. Again, the diversity of a FNSP renders definitive fundamental beliefs shared among agents unlikely so far. Certainly, the aspirations/necessities laid out in Nigeria's national security texts such as the National Security and Counter-Terrorism Strategies contribute meaningfully

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towards a doxic understanding of a FNSP, making people the referent objects of security as both recipients (i.e., human security) and stakeholders (i.e., populace made accountable). But social praxis interfered: Whereas Nigeria's official (in)security discourse moved partly from competition to more cooperation among stakeholders due to Boko Haram's exploits on the ground, there was no doxic common sense established, given the problems/scarcities at hand (e.g., military's violence against local populations; soft carrots versus hard sticks; conceptualising Boko Haram beyond the basics of terrorist/insurgent sect). Rather, these latter issues themselves contribute meaningfully towards a doxic understanding of a FNSP.

On the existence and identification of dominant and dominated agents in a FNSP: As Sections 3.5 and 4.3 introduce, agents in a FNSP occupying dominant positions possess apt habitus and capital(s), enabling them to configure the field, and to profit from it. Since I stated above that agents play roles of varying significance within this space, we could be tempted placing them on dominant, intermediate, and dominated positions accordingly. Yet again, this would stretch too far and make too speculative what my limited capacity to access agents and assess their habitus and capital(s) enables, and what a FNSP's dual habitus further complicates. This is, consequently, also a limitation of this thesis.

We can and must, therefore, stop at this point of the – and my own – constitution of a FNSP and finalise the overview of the BIS-analytical framework (Part 2) with *Table 8*:

Table 8

<i>Object/Thinking Tool</i>	Field (formal and informal practices within a structured, rule-governed social space)	Field of Nigerian Security Policy (FNSP)
<i>Key Concepts/Thinking Tools</i>	Habitus (H) (subjective dispositions or understandings about the objective field) Capital (C) (symbolic, economic, cultural, social, ???) Doxa (D) (unconscious values and beliefs, paradigmatic truths, taken-for-granted rules and ideas, common-sense understanding)	field/habitus-intersection H, C, D as partial outcome of empirical analysis H – dual habitus of problems/scarcities and aspirations/necessities C – multiple (including negative) kinds of capital D – unlikely so far
<i>Collection</i>	Discourse analysis (DA) Interviews (IN) Participant observation (PO) Ethnographic walking (EW) Visual analysis (VA)	(DA) governmental documents; media publications (IN) research Institutions; NGOs; MFA; NDC; eminent individuals (PO) discussion groups (indirect, limited) (EW) Abuja; Lagos (VA) photographs, cartoons

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<i>Data</i>	Practices (PRA) Discourses (DIS) Norms (NOR) Institutions (INS) Relationships (REL)	(PRA) public speech acts; policy formulation; security governance (DIS) security policy; security challenges; Boko Haram (REL) amid field's agents; of the field
<i>(Possible) Relations</i>	Cooperation (COP) Competition (COM) Domination (DOM) Transversality (TRA) ???	COP COM DOM TRA InfCOP
<i>Fit</i>	Professional sector united by common meta-identity	Too diverse and early in its social history Future research with deepened <i>field</i> access necessary

(Adopted from Salter 2013c and Pouliot 2013, further extended/adjusted)

This also brings us to the *research question of this thesis*, at last: *How does Nigeria shape its security policy towards the space of (in)security of Boko Haram?* The reader will – hopefully by now – not be surprised that neither my engagements with Bourdieu's sociology nor the case of Nigeria studied in this manner will produce a simple, objective truth or answer to this question. In contrast, if we take to heart thinking global politics differently with him, we realise and engage with the ways in which the diverse and ever-evolving space of specificity of a FNSP intersects with *its own* dual habitus and agents mobilise *its own*, different kinds of capital precisely for navigating, strategizing, and changing this space. This dual habitus invents and generates agents' classificatory practices, which not only produce field-specific social relations (see above), but together shape Nigeria's concrete security policies towards its security challenges eventually. With the focal and co-constitutive subjective and objective moments of relational social life intersecting and struggling, these practices of security policy were (and are) thus born by way of and between the dispositional schemes of perception, thought, and action of problems/scarcities and aspirations/necessities. Once more, it is hard to escape these and other dualisms and oppositions, since I introduce new ones throughout this thesis. They are, however, not theorised a priori, taken for granted, or prioritised on one side over the other. They are socio-historical products uncovered by a specific empirical analysis and placed knowledge-claims, which try to deeply understand and problematise these products in the first place. This analysis also identifies, to some extent, what the more conventional claims of others introduced at the beginning (see Section 1.3): First, how the Nigerian state has a weak territorial and ideational statehood with highly violent and alienating components. Second, how Nigeria's political elites govern with the troubling

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practices of extensive conflict, division, and corruption. Third, how social networks based on close, interpersonal relations (i.e., neopatrimonialism) allow access to the state's resources (i.e., prebendalism). Fourth, how the link between oil and money reproduces socio-political power. They are, however, not theorised a priori, taken for granted, or used to essentialise universal (or Nigerian) truths into being. Rather, these properties of a FNSP co-shape – together with the other properties found in this thesis – what this moving, relational space and its field/habitus intersection produces and articulates.

7.2 Thinking Nigeria and Africa with a Globalised Bourdieu

Thinking complex and fragile Nigeria and its approach to Boko Haram with a *world-making* FNSP engages with the possibility of multiple agents shaping Nigeria's security policy, without theoretically pre-establishing, predetermining, and universalising prior to empirical analysis the (potential) primacy of specific agents, spatio-political categories, and causal principles across time. It allows us to stay open-minded to conceive of different security agents as field-internal and not only as mere addressees of orders in Nigeria's national security governance system. It helps us unpack and empirically examine how the Nigerian state is socio-historically configured, what and how social relations from (informal) cooperation to transversality constitute a field and play out, and how new security challenges necessitate different ways to understand and address them in Nigeria's social fabric. It, however, neither takes these things for granted nor does it preclude us from engaging with their social conditions of possibility. Quite the opposite. And this seems more important by the day, considering the news emerging from Nigeria and West Africa (Reuters 2025; The Continent 2025; Adebayo 2025). With its relevant empirical analysis and self-reflexive fieldwork focusing on African perspectives on (in)security with Nigeria as a case study, this thesis thus develops a less essentialist and more context-sensitive analytical device to study African social formations (for example, for exploring the ways in which African states' security policies are shaped). It, thereby, not only advances the field of African International Relations in theoretical terms but offers deep insights into – and a 'fresh thinking' of – the Nigerian political space in practical terms (Adebanwi/Obadare 2013b: 12). Others can follow this path and/or I might find the right condition of possibility to continue it – for example, by mobilising advanced digital methods for mapping and analysing a FNSP (e.g., larger body of texts; possibly higher

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availability of official, governmental texts) and by increasing the number of interviews and their closeness to local decision-making spaces (e.g., expansion of network of trusted contacts; possibly increased access to ethnographic research sites).

In the end, did I manage to come closer to understanding the Nigerian condition and context, as some interviewees wished me to? In part, I would say. For my very own (outsider) position and habitus shaped this research and what and how I was (un)able to think, write, and construct in relation to Nigeria's specific social space in partial ways – its (self-)perceived and practiced subjectivity and objectivity, problems/scarcities and aspirations/necessities, and things-to-be-discovered by an exploratory vision. I am also not sure whether or to what extent this thesis might change 'minds' or be 'useful and beneficial' in helping to tackle Nigeria's security challenges, as some suggested (Abraham 2016, interview; Ijide 2016, interview). Yet it would be great to explore avenues of future collaboration to jointly produce and exchange knowledge, and engender small, practical steps towards a more understood, peaceful, and prosperous Nigeria.

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